**Charles Tilly**

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« War made the state, and the state made war »

Charles Tilly.

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Why did wars occur at all? The central tragic fact is simple: coercion works; those who apply substantial force to their fellows get compliance, and from that compliance draw the multiple advantages of money, goods, deference, access to pleasures denied to less powerful people.

The **willingness** of making war depends on 3 factors:

* The character of its major rivals
* External interests + elites security
* Security for the nation.

As these factors change, causes of war too.

Knowing that a few states are able to pay for military expenditures, creditors are important for war conduct. Easier it is to borrow money, easier it is to mobilize for war and invest in expensive wars. Availability of credit depends on : state payment credibility and presence of capitalists.

Government revenues come from tributes (arbitrary payments for lands, goods and services), rents, payments on flows (taxes, customs, transaction charges, tolls), payments on stock (land and property taxes), income taxes. Flows and stock payments depend both on the ability for people to pay cash. Payments on flows and payments on stocks depend on monetization. Monetization increases flows. For stocks, there is the need of a market that will match value with taxes, and then revenue are not stable.

Taxes with little surveillance rely on open use of force more frequently that the one who need continuous surveillance. There is a link between morality and taxes, as morality render easier the collect of money. With a given amount of effort at collection, flows, stocks and income generate a high return. A state attempting to collect exactly the same amount from the same tax in a less commercialized economy faces greater resistance.

Does the war making/state making thesis, most associated with Charles Tilly, apply in the developing world? That is the problematic of the text, through the analysis of the influence of war on 2 countries: Afghanistan and Vietnam.

War in Vietnam contributed to state building, while war in Afghanistan has been state destroying. The main difference between Vietnam and Afghanistan is the existence of a **core ethnic group** (ethnic homogeneity) in Vietnam, that enable a long standing political community, and the **combination of war and revolution** that facilitate the promulgation of a unifying national ideology.

There are 3 mechanisms to explain why war contributes to state formation:

**Raising money** (development of administrative capacity), **building armies** (creation of coercive agencies), **making nations** (strong national identity).

The prerequisites for war helping the creation of states are:

\_Before war, countries must have some degree of political and national coherence (social cohesion), created as a consequence of war in modern Europe.

\_A relative Unified ideology.

\_war must take place in a state system that has already been created.

\_Juridical sovereignty is not enough to create a state; it is necessary to have raw materials, empirical sovereignty to govern.

« European state building began with the effort to monopolize the means of violence within a delimited territory » (Tilly, 1985).

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| **War → extraction → repression → state formation** |

The desire to establish control by a prospective ruler in a specific territory leads him into a clash with the population. Then, the one who will succeed most to gain access to **resources (men, materials, money)** will enable to create military, financial and administrative structures for ruling a state. The one who will succeed most is the one who has the ability to repress rivals, that is to say internal and external opponents. Porter (1994) believes in the Social Darwinism for states, as only the stronger states survive to war. The history of European political development is at least as much about failure of states as it is about state formation.

A unique vision of European political development is wrong; the process varied considerably depending on the presence or absence of capital (generally in the cities). The geo-military pressure can also explain the variance of regime (constitutional versus autocratic) and the nature of public administration (bureaucratic versus patrimonial).

In Africa, because of demographic and geographic circumstances (like low density of pop. and inhospitable territories), it is difficult to project power over long distances. Then, there was no necessity of security. But limited war made limited states, like in Latin America.

For Hui (2005), « self-strengthening reforms » involve direct control over coercion and finance, specifically conscription and national taxation. For Lustick (1997), in Middle East, there are no great powers because European States prevented « state building wars ». Tilly : less intense war leads to weaker states.

For Authors like Organski, violence in Africa 25 years ago did not indicate state breakdown but primitive accumulation of power, analogous to that in Europe centuries ago before. The, actual **interstates rivalries** in the third world can also create **increase the extractive capacity of states**. **But**, warlords have no prospects of generating societal support and may control more coercive power and economic resources than the state does. For Reno, in Africa, the international context is different, with more external elements than predominate on internal elements. Moreover, States no longer engage in major wars of expansion and the possibility of crystallizing energy for a community is lesser. Furthermore, civil war normally strengthen the state. But if it is not coupled with the threat of an external war and conquest; the effect is not the same. Perhaps, revolution is most important than civil war for strengthening a state, like in Iran and Ethiopia, where the state-sponsored terror in the midst of civil war played in building state capacity (Rosemary O’ Keane).

For Feason, **civil war** **leads to** **state weakness** and state weakness to civil war. In fact, civil war is a period of weakness because there is no monopoly of legitimate coercion. After a civil war, the situation can be worst than before.

For Leander, for developing countries, it is the access to international capital that count, not the domestic one. The economic behavior of core states and companies can contribute to state weakness. For some scholars, as Leander, the decentralization of control over coercion, that is to say the prominence of irregular armed forces, can create instability. For others, at the contrary, the situation is like in Europe before and it will be constructive. A final factor comes from the state building strategy pursued by rulers and the relation with domestic elites.

The effort to build armed forces is the largest stimulus to develop abilities to tax the society. It is perhaps the best indicator of state strength. “Money is the artery of war” (Peter the Great).

War cannot be fight without warriors. The ability to create armies more powerful than those of internal and external rivals is central to European state making. For Howard (1976), the general progression in Europe is from “the war of the knights”, to the war of mercenaries to the war of the professionals and finally the wars of the nations.

Purveying nationalism increases the state’s capacity for war, the military serving as a “school for the nation”. It creates a homogenization of the society, a strong national identity that strengthens the state power. Nationalism came relatively late in the process of European state building.

Ethnicity and Revolution

Ethnically homogeneous states are more able than heterogeneous ones. War creates great ethnic and nation consciousness and can be disastrous in a heterogeneous country. **The combination of war and revolution is potent because revolutionary regimes are able to mobilize excluded groups**. It can lead to party and state officials to stick with a collective project (even if at the individual level it is better inaction, in time of uncertainness). Revolutionary elites understand better the importance of controlling and wielding state coercion.

By state strength, we mean the capacity of the state to maintain its territorial integrity, control the means of legitimate violence, and ensure the reliable implementation of its decisions. 2 of the World’s Bank’s measures of governance quality are: Political stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness. There is a **clear relationship between ethnic homogeneity** and **state strength**. In contrast, the overall ethnic fractionalization of a given state is unlikely to change much over time. However, other divisions like religion should be taken in consideration. Vietnam is a strong state whereas Afghanistan is a weak one, with low incomes.

**War making and state making in Vietnam**

Afghanistan and Vietnam suffered both of deadly conflicts with international and internal wars.

Vietnam: French colonization 🡪 1945: Revolution: Ho Chi Minh at power 🡪 First Indochina War 🡪 1954: French go home, separation of the country between North and South 🡪 American involvement in the War🡪 Second Indochina War 🡪 1975: end of the war end reunification of the country under a communist regime. 1979: War with Khmer Rouge (Cambodia) 🡪 Occupation of the country until 1989.

During the independence war against France, the Viet Minh developed a capacity to fund its operations by extracting resources, money and fighters. Certainly, foreign aid played an important role for both South and North Vietnam, but the latter’s capacity to leverage domestic resources was far more effective and ensured its victory. It is also thanks to its ability to frame the war as a conflict between Vietnamese and foreigners, its appeal to nationalism. French system credited indirect taxes to the central government while indirect taxes went to regional budgets. USA didn’t change the collecting system and covered all deficit budgets. By 1957, 73% of the budget was coming from USA. At the contrary, the Vietcong had 4 ways of raising money:

Extortion; production enterprises, victory tax (in the liberated areas, focusing on rice, lumber, rubber and tea production), volunteer contributions with a strong collective system. Of course, North Vietnam received also billions aid from abroad, but less than the south.

After reunification, the government nationalized most farms and industries; there was a process of collectivization and the use of coercion for collecting money and resources.

The **F**rench created garrisons throughout Indochina filled through conscription and volunteers, during colonization. After 1946, they created a Vietnamese national army, but conscription was difficult under French control. For the Vietcong, Diem relied on large conscription and guerilla technique, like setting up self defense militia in every village. The victory of the communist in China benefited the Vietminh and directly affected the conflict. After the victory against France, Hanoi created the People’s army of Vietnam and rebuilt the Communist Party for strengthening the liberation forces, especially in their contact with the population. They used both guerilla units and civilians to help seize power in villages. The targeted villages by the Viet Cong were the one in which peasants had grievances against authorities. After the reunification, the army counted 1 million soldiers.

Vietnam experienced a process of violent state and nation building. The Kinh, people originated in the north, conquered all the country or assimilated the Cham and Khmer people. There was then the creation of a proto-nationalism. Lockard (1994) links the national feeling to centuries of war and resistance to external domination. Even after the French division of Vietnam into 3 regions, Vietnamese continued to see themselves as 1 people. Ho Chi Minh created a program that combined communism and nationalism.

To summarize, war-making clearly contributed to state making in Vietnam. It was thanks to:

The strongly hegemonic population; the conjunction of revolution and war: the strong extraction of men and money that helped the creation of a powerful state.

**War-Making and State-Making in Afghanistan**

Afghanistan: 1978: civil war began after a coup organized by the Soviet to sustain the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan. 🡪Russian invasion to sustain PDPA VS Mujahidin sustained by Pakistan, USA and Saudi Arabia. 🡪 1989: URSS go home, state infrastructure is disintegrated, Mujahidin and regional militia commanders have power 🡪 civil war between Mujahidin and Taliban 🡪 1999: Taliban take power of most Afghan provinces 🡪 2001: Taliban VS USA, USA. To be continued…

During Soviet war, the Afghan government and the resistance were unable to create a strong and united military forces or a centralized government. Much of the state infrastructure disintegrated throughout the country and power shifted from Kabul to the Mujahidin. The Mujahidin and regional militias created well armed and autonomous power centers around ethnic and religious ties. But the disappearance of a common enemy deepened ethnic, clan and religious differences; the state building effort was unsuccessful and the central authority unable to restore authority. In the late 1990s, the Taliban succeed to take power but didn’t create administrative structure of a modern state. Afterwards, the new government imposed by USA has problems of state building.

After the WW1, Afghanistan declared independence from UK and became sovereign. That was the end of British financial backing and the leader Amanullah instituted a new system of taxation with direct taxes that reduced dependence from outside, but excluding regional and tribal lords 🡪 Amanullah was expulsed and the state returned to a strong tribal decentralized society, without relevant taxation system. During the soviet war, the central government received abundant soviet aid and didn’t create a taxation system. The resistance relied on local resources, with direct and indirect taxes on a voluntary basis (because peasant would not have tolerated a more intrusive system). At the contrary, when the Mujahidin took power, they were dependent of external support, and divisions between them appeared for receiving resources; in fact Pakistan distributed money on political preferences. By 1992, Afghanistan was a state in name, the government‘s resources being in the hand of regional lords. 1994: The Taliban, coming from the South took Kabul. They relied on opium trade, customs and smuggling to raise revenue. They imposed order for better efficiency for illicit trades and receive more external aid. But they didn’t create an effective state administrative structure. The war was funded directly by the Mullah Omar (Taliban leader). After 2001 US invasion, the Afghan government remains dependent on foreign aid while regional strongmen continue to earn money from opium, smuggling,…The low fiscal capacity that the Afghani possessed before 1978 has been completely destroyed by 30 years of war.

Amanullah reformed the military service, but the rebellion against this reform (and others) forced him to exile. His successor canceled the reforms and during the 1978 revolts, the army collapsed because of bad policies and the impossibility to enforce measures. The Afghan army remained divided into factional and ethnic divisions. In fact, there was 7 parties inside of militaries. Massoud developed the most extensive protostate in Afghanistan. At the end of the 1990’s, Talibans succeed to create a military force that controlled most of the country. Pashtun helped Taliban to drive out Uzbek and Tajik groups out of Kabul. Local Pashtun mujahidin commanders helped Taliban for recruitment, sometimes problematic. 1/3 of Taliban troops were provided by Pakistan (madrassas), plus Al Quaeda soldiers. Pakistan support was critical. The Taliban were successful in maintaining internal order, thanks to a religious police to enforce Taliban interpratation of the Sharia, that was supported by external forces. But Taliban were not able to overcome the extreme decentralization of the monopoly of legitimate coercion in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan has always been a borderland between empire, many time divided and conquered. It is divided into ethnic groups, subdivided into rival clans and tribes. There are the Pashtun, the largest ethnic group (30-40% of the pop.), divided between the Muhammadzin and the Durranis. The tajiks, which represent 25-30% of the pop., the Hazaras (10-15%), the Uzbeks and Turkmen (15%). In Kabul, the PDPA, lead by the Pashtun Najibullah and sustained by URSS was rife into tensions between clans, ethnic groups, religious faith and between ideologies(fundamentalist and moderated). The resistance weaken PDPA position, but was also divided. Even in front of a common ennemy, people didn’t developed a sense of community. The Mujahadin, lead by the Tajik Ahmas Massoud (allied with Uzbek) were divided as well and couldn’t provide a substitute to the Kabul regime. One reason for the rise of the Taliban was the desire for Pashtun to recapture their position of dominance. Today, even the loyalty structures are fragmented and tribal structures are destroyed. The Taliban, despite their Pashtun roots, attempted to break with tribal identities, offering instead a vision of Afghanistan united around devotion to Islam. But the version of Islam promulgated by Taliban is antistatist, with strict enforcement of Sharia. It is more a transnational than national movement.

In conclusion, Afghanistan didn’t have raw materials for state building: underdeveloped economy, challenging geography, heterogeneity of population.

To summarize, war can strengthen and weaken states. The Tillyian literature is still relevant. The efforts of would be rulers to extract greater resources from society in the fear of violent conflict are evident. The difference however between what happened in Europe before and the situation today is that today, states are allowed to persist, even if their sovereignty is more juridical than empirical. Then, the international context is determinant.

Religious homogeneity is not a sufficient unifying force in the face of ethnic and national heterogeneity. A core ethnic group and a unifying revolutionary ideology can be determinant (Iran, Vietnam). The material structuralism has to give a great weight to cultural and ideational variables. Other explanations of war/ state building can be: regime type, level of development and cleavages other than ethnic ones. Other potential direction can be geographical studies and the role of neighboring states involved in the conflict, or comparing pacific states with nearby war prone states, to determine the effect of war on state building.

“The ratchet effect”: temporary increases in state extraction during war are not reversed after the war.

Another topic related to the Tillyan argument is the relationship between internal and external coercive agencies (military and police) and the way they are separated (or not). For Tilly, the absence of external threats has led many third world militaries engage in coups. Then, it is significant the grade of civilian control over state coercion for political and economical development. And of course, the economic growth and political violence are determinant for the strength of a state.

The ratchet effect: an inflated wartime budget fails to return to its prewar level. It is because wartime increase in state power gives officials new capacity to extract resources, take on new activities, and defend themselves against cost cutting; because wars either cause or reveal new problems that call for state attention; and because wartime accumulation of debt places new burdens on the state.