Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, Chapters 1, 2 and 3

Chapter 1: Interdependence in World Politics

Both the modernist view of "global village" and the traditionalist view of "globaloney" are inadequate for understanding world politics of interdependence (ID). The book asks what the major features of world politics are when (economic) ID is extensive; and how and why international regimes—governing arrangements through which governments influence ID—change. / ID refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among actors in different countries. Where there are reciprocal—not necessarily symmetrical—costly effects of transactions, ID exists. ID does not mean mutual benefit. ID relationships involve costs, that cannot be specified a priori. Competition and distributional conflict persist. Unlike in military security politics, the resources that produce power capabilities have become more complex. Power is the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do. But there are always differences between initial resource power and ultimate power over outcomes. Losses in power translation exist. Sensitivity ID: How quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes to another given the framework of policies and how great are the costs? Vulnerability ID: What available and costly are the alternatives that various actors face. Long-term vulnerabilities depend on political will, governmental ability and resource capabilities. In this light, asymmetrical IDs can be sources of power. Since losses in power translation exist, asymmetrical ID by itself cannot explain bargaining outcomes. / Relationships of ID often occur within, and may be affected by, networks of rules, norms, and procedures (i.e. international regimes) that regularize behavior and control its effects. Regimes intermediate between the distribution of capabilities (structure) and the bargaining behavior (process) within a power structure.

Chapter 2: Realism and Complex Interdependence

	Realism	Complex interdependence
Goals of actors	Military security will be the dominant goal.	Goals of states will vary by issue area. TG politics will make goals difficult to define. TN actors will pursue their own goals.
Instruments	Military force will be most effective, although economic and	Power resources specific to issue areas will be most relevant.
of state policy	other instruments will also be used.	Manipulation of ID, IO, and TN actors will be major instruments.
Agenda	Potential shifts in the b of p and security threats will set the	Agenda will be affected by changes in the distr. of power
formation	agenda in high politics and will strongly influence other agendas.	resources within issue areas; the status of int'l regimes; change in importance of TN actors; linkages from other issues and politicization as a result of rising sensitivity ID.
Linkages of	Linkages will reduce differences in outcomes among issue areas	Linkages by strong states will be more difficult to make since
issues	and reinforce international hierarchy.	force will be ineffective. Linkages by weak states through IO will erode rather than reinforce hierarchy.
Roles of IO	Roles are minor, limited by state power and the importance of military force.	IOs will set agendas, induce coalition-formation, and act as arenas for political action by weak states. Ability to choose the organizational forum for an issue and to mobilize votes will be an important political resource.

Chapter 3: Explaining International Regime Change

International regimes (Ireg) help to provide the political framework within which international economic processes occur. Four explanations for regime change exist: 1) economic processes 2) overall power structure 3) issue area power structure 4) power capabilities as affected by IO. Economic Process: Technological change and increases in economic ID will make existing Iregs obsolete \rightarrow Governments will be highly responsive to domestic political demands for a rising standard of living \rightarrow Great aggregate economic benefit resulting from international movement of capital, goods and labor will give governments strong incentives to modify or reconstruct Iregs to restore their effectiveness. Overall Power Structure: The distribution of military power determines the power structure, and the powerful states make the rules. Therefore, as the power of states changes (i.e. a structural change), the rules that comprise Iregs will change accordingly. This explanation does not differentiate among issue areas, and predicts a strong tendency toward congruence of outcomes among issue areas. Since power is fungible, it will be shifted to secure equal marginal returns in all areas. This explanation thus claims to understand changes in international economic relations by shifts in military power. While it explains structure, it fails to explain changes in the structure. The explanation fails to account for domestic politics and complications introduced by multiple channels of access and to differentiate issue areas. Issue Area Power Structure: A state most powerful in the issue area will dictate the rules of the issue area. Three limitation exist in structural explanations: 1) If issue linkages are possible, the explanatory power of issue-area structural explanation is reduced. 2) They ignore domestic and transnational political actors. 3) The process of political bargaining and of translation of power is ignored. An IO Model: International organization refers to multilevel linkages, norms and institutions. Because these things are hard to change, even governments with superior capabilities will find it difficult to impose their will on established international organizations. IOs also give rise to organizationally dependent capabilities such as voting power, ability to form coalitions and control of elite networks. In general, this explanation focuses more on the political processes. The model assumes that actors do not try to destroy the regime by attempting to exploit one another's vulnerability ID. These four different explanations are combined to explain changes in regimes—starting with the economic process explanation, adding general politics through structural explanations and refining with process-based international organization explanation.

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