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Book Reviews

Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age. By Alberto Melucci. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. xiii+441. $64.95 (cloth); $24.95 (paper).


Alain Touraine  
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Challenging Codes is certainly the best introduction to the study of social movements. The book is based on a wide variety of information from both North American and European sources. Melucci rightly defines three types of social movements.

The first definition considers social movements as crises or dysfunctions that arise in the institutional order either because institutions are not able to give a satisfactory answer to social demands or because these demands cannot or will not find an institutionalized solution. This approach is certainly the least useful because it denies any autonomy to collective actions that are only reactions to a social or, even more, to a political crisis.

Melucci opposes two different approaches to this functionalist conception of social movements. The first approach defines social movements as a collective pursuit of rationally defined personal interests. It concentrates its efforts on analyzing strategies, forms of resource mobilization, leadership, and alliances that are means of action because goals are defined in terms of rational choice from the beginning on. Melucci rightly observes that economic liberalism and Marxism often converge to inspire this type of study, but he is not satisfied with it. He follows Pizzorno in his critique of rational choice theory, which reminds us that the formation of actors and conflicts determines the definition of interests instead of being determined by them. Melucci also criticizes this idea of rational choice theory—as well as the “functionalist” one—because they tend to reduce social movements to political action, as if collective actors were no more than interest groups that try to influence political decisions.

Melucci’s double critique leads him to defend a more radical definition of social movements that corresponds to the title of the book, Challenging Codes. Social movements are the type of collective behavior that challenge the ends, values, and power structure of a given society. However, Melucci thinks that this definition is ambiguous, and he rejects a Marxist
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approach that identifies social movements with the idea of history or with the battles of reason against irrational forms of profit or power. He criticizes this Marxist approach, especially because he subordinates social movements, which can only make structural contradictions manifest, to political action, while positive goals can be defined only by revolutionary intellectuals and parties.

In the search for an approach that gives a solid ground to the autonomy and creativity of social movements, Melucci defines a social movement as the “individual and collective reappropriation of the meaning of action that is at stake in the forms of collective involvement, which make the experience of change in the present a condition for creating a different future” (p. 9). This action has three main components: group solidarity, definition of a conflict, and “a breach of compatibility of the system within which the action takes place” (p. 30); this definition corresponds to the analysis of social movements I have offered since 1965. Melucci’s analysis is original, however, because it constantly rejects any “essentialist” definition of social movements and any attempt to identify one central social movement in each societal type. Social movements as processes of building collective identities—what Melucci calls “identization”—do not serve any principle of order or change. They are the final end of their own action, especially in contemporary societies where life experience is penetrated and shaped by classification and manipulations. This central idea leads him to define democracy as the creation of conditions that “allow social actors to recognize themselves and be recognized for what they are or want to be” (p. 219). Social movements defend and create the existence and freedom of social actors and have the capacity to give unity and meaning to life worlds that are segmented and invaded by mass society.

This general view of social movements has two categories of consequences. First, it allows Melucci to overcome the opposition between the so-called European and American traditions—between a sociology of structural conflicts and resource mobilization theories—which both contribute to the analysis of social movements. He is nearer to the second tradition of resource mobilization theories when he devotes a large part of his book to the processes of the formation of collective action. However, he shares the idea that our societies are dominated by general conflicts that oppose the freedom of actors to a power structure and to the imposition of codes on individuals and groups with the European tradition. Second, Melucci helps us, in a very innovative way, to understand what I have defined as new social movements since 1975: youth protest, the women’s movement, the ecological campaign, the peace movement, and the defense of ethnic-national or religious identity. He does not believe in a deep-seated unity of these movements because his main preoccupation is to avoid an essentialist view of them.

_The Playing Self_, a companion book to _Challenging Codes_, examines the unity of the protest movement. It offers a “weak” image of the self similar to what Elster has called the multiple self. “The inner planet is
no longer an essence, but an articulation of levels and systems which alter
the way we perceive ourselves" (p. 62). This mobile, “playing” self is de-
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defined by its effort to create its own identity—which is not conceived in
macrosociological terms—as the effort to create or maintain a meaningful
life experience—which is not what I call subjectivity. The formation of
an actor, according to Melucci, consists mainly in reconstructing the total-
ity of life experience and its internal diversity by linking together body
and mind, identization and participation, diversity and unity. This defi-
nition of new social movements corresponds to the concrete analyses that
are offered in the second part of Challenging Codes, but it is carefully
titled “contemporary collective action.” We can use here Melucci’s own
remarks that all collective actions have various dimensions to suggest
that a “weak” definition corresponds better to the broad category of col-
lective action, while social movements express more directly a central
conflict between identity and deregulated, market-oriented processes of
change that threaten, destroy, or manipulate self-identity.

Melucci seems to waver between a soft and a hard definition of self-
identity and, consequently, between two definitions of collective actions:
one aims at enriching and reconstructing personal experience, and an-
other more conflict-loaded definition emphasizes resistance to all forms
of domination and manipulation.

I would like to emphasize the deep originality and importance of these
books, which not only provide us with a large amount of information,
but also lead us to the central problems of the sociology of collective ac-
tion and social movements. Challenging Codes and The Playing Self will
be very useful for graduate courses not only in sociology but in psychol-
ology and philosophy as well.

Organizing Dissent: Unions, the State, and the Democratic Teachers’
Movement in Mexico. By Maria Lorena Cook. University Park: Pensyl-
vania University Press, 1996. Pp. xvi+359. $55.00 (cloth); $19.95 (paper).

Diane E. Davis
New School for Social Research

In this thoughtful examination of the emergence and survival of the dem-
ocratic teachers’ movement in Mexico, Maria Lorena Cook offers a rich
case study central to several important debates in the fields of social
movements, democratization, and Mexican studies. Cook asks how an
oppositional and democratic movement could emerge under conditions
of authoritarianism, and more important, how it could endure for more
than a decade given that the repression of popular opposition is generally
the norm in such contexts. For answers, Cook turns away from the new
social movement paradigm and its concerns with identity and autonomy,
which now dominate the social movement literature on authoritarian
countries, and instead employs a “political process” approach. Like Sid-
ney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, she examines strategy and organization as well as political opportunities, arguing that “the timing of the emergence of the teachers’ movement can best be understood by the presence of conflict between major actors in the movement’s immediate environment—namely the state and union leadership—which in turn provided the movement with some protection from repression and opportunity for mobilization” (p. 4); its survival owed to internal organization and movement strategy and especially its democratic character.

To substantiate both claims, Cook examines six regions in Mexico where the independent teachers’ movement emerged—contrasting the enduring successes of the movement in Oaxaca and Chiapas, where internal organization was much more democratic but movement strategy less confrontational, with the fleeting successes of independently organized teachers in other states who employed more conflictual, extralegal tactics. Her findings are noteworthy. One might expect that in authoritarian contexts, and in Mexico in particular, conciliatory movements that use the state’s own formal legal channels to make claims, as happened in Chiapas and Oaxaca, would fall prey more easily to co-optation and, thus, lose popular support and their capacity to survive. But Cook’s evidence suggests otherwise: a “self-limiting” strategy, as Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen (Civil Society [MIT Press, 1992]) might call it, produced better results. In combination with internal democratic organization, those movements that employed a less oppositional and more conciliatory strategy were more likely to survive than those that preserved their ideological purity and rejected state structures in their entirety.

Cook’s study also sheds light on the process of political change in Mexico, not just its much-touted democratic transition but also the slow but veritable institutional transformation of the party-state. Because teachers have historically been one of the largest and best-organized sectors of a national union movement that for decades sustained the power of the party-state, the mere emergence of an independent, democratically organized teachers’ movement “reflected a crack in the system itself” (p. 9). As such, this case study lends considerable insight into the crumbling edifice of one-party rule in Mexico. Given that far too many studies of democratization speak in abstract generalities about the Mexican political system—how it works and why it may be failing—Cook’s approach is a breath of fresh air. Most worthy of commendation is her empirically grounded, nuanced analysis of the institutional conflicts and alliances within and between state agencies, the ruling party, the loyal progovernment teachers’ union, and the independent teachers’ movement, as well as her efforts to situate them historically and regionally.

Despite its numerous merits and impressive scope, some questions remain, mainly regarding the use of a study of independently organized teachers in Mexico to sustain general arguments about social movements under conditions of authoritarianism. Mexico is hardly prototypically authoritarian, and its government has long faced repeated social mobilizations, often bringing mobilized populations into the state. Moreover, as
Cook acknowledges, teachers in Mexico have their own unique history and organization, much of which owes to past mobilizations and state responses, that together make teachers rather exceptional on several accounts. They are considered a mainstay of the union movement but are grouped in a middle-class sector of the party separate from other key trade union organizations. They are public employees who, because of restrictions on workplace mobilization, have long relied on their organizational involvement in legitimate structures of the party-state to express grievances. Last, unlike most other organized occupations, they hold legitimacy and influence in almost all states and municipalities, not merely the capital city or other high-profile localities. In short, teachers hold a unique place in the institutional, class, and regional structures of Mexico. One cannot help but think that movement dynamics in general, and teachers’ successes in Chiapas and Oaxaca (states far from the center with long histories of regional opposition), owe to more than political opportunities and organizational strategies per se, as Cook seems to be suggesting.

If more attention had been paid to regional politics and to the literature on trade unions and public employees, we might have been pushed to think more about the ways that ambiguities or overlaps in teachers’ class versus social versus regional identities affected member allegiances, movement strategies, and state responses. Theoretically, we would have been in a better position to determine to what extent identity matters even in a political process approach, as well as to consider the fact that the emergence and success of social opposition among teachers may merely reflect the peculiar institutional structure and historically specific character of teachers or the Mexican state—but no matter. Even if this book says more about Mexico and teachers than it does about social movement dynamics under authoritarianism, that is surely no criticism. It is a solid achievement worthy of high praise.


Kelly Moore
Barnard College

Is the gulf between scientists and nonscientists widening, as C. P. Snow lamented in 1962 and as many natural and physical scientists now contend? Or is it narrowing, as postmodernist critics of science would have it? Steven Epstein’s smart and illuminating book provides evidence for the latter view. Through a careful chronology of the struggle to identify the causes of and treatments for AIDS between 1981 and 1995, Epstein convincingly argues that the distinctions between scientists and lay people are blurring. Using an “archeological and genealogical” approach, Imp-
pure Science shows how AIDS activists ironically contributed to analyses of the etiology and treatments of AIDS.

The first half of the book tracks debates among scientists who sought to explain the source of a mysterious illness that first appeared in 1981 and was seemingly restricted to gay men. This part of Epstein’s story is a solid chronicle of the victory of proponents of HIV as a cause of AIDS. The second, more theoretical, part of the book traces the struggle between scientists and AIDS activists to find treatments for AIDS. Far from hindering the search for answers, these struggles among and between AIDS activists and scientists were essential to understanding the etiology of and treatment of AIDS. Epstein identifies a paradoxical relationship: The critics of scientific researchers became highly important in producing scientific knowledge.

If AIDS activists played a bit part in analyzing the causes of AIDS, they played a major role in developing the treatments of AIDS. Activists have much to be proud of. They wrested drug trials from the seemingly fastidious but ultimately narrowly scientific criteria of medical researchers and pushed the medical establishment to use pragmatic and scientific criteria. They also gained the inclusion of more diverse subject populations and achieved widespread use of drug trials that included concomitant and surrogate measures of treatment effectiveness. These trials were symbolically and pragmatically important for AIDS activists. Scientists usually relied on “pure” subjects and single treatments in order to maximize their knowledge about the effects of a particular drug. Many activists and their constituents, however, saw scientists’ preferences for single-drug trials as unrealistic and self-serving. Since people with AIDS usually suffer from multiple health problems, they need simultaneous treatment if they are to survive.

Activists not only achieved specific victories for AIDS treatment, they also found “a seat at the table” (p. 284) of science: Scientific researchers came to respect, admire, and even envy, the scientific sophistication of some AIDS activists, who had designed and carried out their own drug trials, researched and understood the science behind various AIDS therapies, and participated in scientific conferences. As active contributors to the scientific knowledge about AIDS, activists earned the right to participate as members of the powerful AIDS Clinical Trials Group of the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Diseases. In doing so, Epstein argues, AIDS activists successfully challenged scientists’ ideological justifications of science as clean and pure, and, therefore, sacred.

These outcomes were all the more remarkable because they took place during the Reagan-Bush years when homosexuality was under strong attack from the Christian Right. To explain activists’ success, Epstein unpacks the concept of scientific credibility, the ability to speak with authority and garner trust from fellow researchers. We can see from Epstein’s chronology that activists gained credibility in four key ways: (1) by educating themselves so that they knew as much as, and sometimes more than, other AIDS researchers thereby making themselves into
“obligatory scientific passage points”; (2) by discrediting scientific claimants with whom they disagreed; (3) by giving credit where credit was due and thereby gaining status as fair-minded and rigorous rather than extremist and sloppy participants in the debate; and most important, (4) by yoking together moral and scientific arguments by arguing that one standard goal of scientific research—the acquisition of generalizable claims from “pure” subjects—was in conflict with a second important goal—to assist patients. By implication, Epstein suggests that these professionals were also highly dependent upon AIDS activists to legitimize their claims to service to those who are ill.

Just how far the democratization of science can proceed however, is not clear. Epstein dutifully reports that the white, gay, male AIDS activists who are his subjects had unusual amounts of cultural and economic capital, a strong tradition of activism, geographic proximity, and access to alternative media. It is not apparent whether these features explain most of why other AIDS activists, such as hemophiliacs, people of color, and women, gained neither scientific credibility nor even a fraction of the political successes of Epstein’s main subjects. It is also possible that the great overlap between the social characteristics of researchers and activists, AIDS activists’ direct actions, and/or the common goals of activists and researchers all played a part as well.

What remains clear from Epstein’s superb book, however, is that the active, contentious participation of those with AIDS and their supporters—the “politics” of science that so many scientists lament—had the consequence of advancing the understanding of the origins, spread, and treatment of AIDS. Activists’ efforts benefited all Americans as well, by advancing genuine progress in the democratization of health care and biomedical research.


Peter K. Manning
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Sociology, as Kenneth Burke (*Grammar of Motives* [Meridian, 1966]) might observe, reveres “strategic ambiguities” that reveal the duality of human conduct. Concern for these ambiguities directs attention to dramatic oxymorons such as “normal accidents,” “routine failures,” “technical culture,” and even “normal deviance.” Sociology is puzzled yet attracted to oppositional, often even binary, everyday life distinctions because these are flags for action, for deciding and accounting for practical resolutions in uncertain situations. These signifying terms should illuminate the dialectic between uncertain events and organizational roles, routines, cultures, and practices.
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Vaughan, in 10 chapters, 19 figures, two tables, three appendixes, 62 pages of single-spaced footnotes, an 18-page bibliography, and a 25-page index, succinctly presents an organizational case analysis of the failed Challenger launch of January 1986. (She mentions in passing that the explosion was widely seen on television and is widely affecting; perhaps that alone might secure it a place as a critical incident and a role in high politics.) Her argument is built “incrementally” (p. 73) between two versions of the eve of the launch (chaps. 1 and 8). She initially asked, why launch a design that was known to be flawed against engineers’ advice? She came to see that the launch decision was not a product of “mismanagement” and “production pressures,” explanations initially mooted, but the result of decision processes (normalizing deviance) shaped by the culture of the engineering work groups, the culture of production with its pressures to produce in an accountable fashion, and structural secrecy, bureaucratically induced by hierarchies, roles, and compliance.

She intended to link micro-macro processes within organizations and institutions, fashion a “historical ethnography,” and assemble a case of theorizing (pp. xiv–xv). In due course, she accepts the role of scarce resources, competition, and production pressures but dismisses them as definitively causal. These were present since 1981 and had been signaled by early cuts to the space program by President Nixon. Stating her problem definition, Vaughan raises doubts about typologies of calculative or non-calculative violators of regulations, and individualistic rational theories of decision making. In so doing, she unfolds her case like a matador.

The decision (not a decision but a series of decisions beginning years previously and located in a decision stream) was taken in the context of fairly well known but acceptable negative risks guided by tacit and written conventionalized rules and procedures and in light of the agency’s (and its agents’) scientific, technical, political, and bureaucratic responsibilities. She gestures toward these forces early when she writes, “The invisible and unacknowledged tend to remain undiagnosed and therefore elude remedy” (p. xv)—that is, they continue to drive policy decisions.

Vaughan’s analysis is based on a reading of massive archival records (some 9,000 pages), a presidential commission and the House investigation of the disaster, relevant literature, and interviews with some of the key actors. Interviews and testimony are quoted throughout. She includes some figures and copies of memos in the text and appendixes.

Chapters 1 and 2 set the original problem, chapter 3 discusses work group culture, while chapters 4 and 5 interpret the process of normalizing known risks (from 1981–86). Chapter 6 outlines the culture of production (the technical, engineering-based standards, rules of thumb, and practices of well-resourced engineers). Chapter 7, on structural secrecy, fleshes out the narrative of organization, field, and practice (my borrowed terms). Chapter 8 is a painfully detailed explication of how and why experts at Morton Thiokol recommended a delay of the launch and then reversed themselves. (This was based on divided opinions about the functioning of the O-rings, which caused the disaster.) Here, she provides an elaborate,
polished analysis of the critical teleconference between the Marshall Space Center and Morton Thiokol’s engineers on the eve of the launch. This, the centerpiece of the analysis, haunts the pages of the book.

This is a work of over 10 years, well crafted by a fine sociologist and well positioned to touch off debate on rational decision making, organizational culture (and “reliability”), and social aspects of risk and risk analysis. It extends the seminal works of Charles Perrow, James Short, Lee Clarke, and Steve Sagan and the elegantly stylized writings of Karl Weick. Her densely argued text obviates the “individual” decider, makes “deviance” highly context dependent, slides around legal questions of accountability and blame as embedded in bureaucratic and professional practice, and asserts the socially constructed nature of risk. More precisely, engineering culture, like many others, is premised on modulating the dialectic between risk and responsibility. Risk is assumed. The existence of statistically rare events, inferences based on small or limited samples, prohibitions upon risky and costly experiments that might compromise the integrity of the final product, and practical expectations to create, to build, to make manifest the imagination, must be understood and managed. They cannot be obviated or eradicated. In this precise sense, “deviance” is a misleading sponge concept because it disappears into the context of deciding. On the other hand, in a brief section, Vaughan pointedly chides Perrow (p. 415), arguing that his reified, technologically driven, actor-absent model of “normal accidents” omits the interpretive work that confers meaning to such axial terms as “loose coupling,” “risky technology,” “complex,” and “linear” and conditions collective action that affirm their presumptive reality. She urges naturalistic studies of decision-making processes, forms, and content.

After absorbing the detail of this impressive book, one ponders its genius. The central unexplicated concept is risk: it appears in her text as a negative, scientifically conceptualized matter, to be assessed if not measured, with the likelihood of negative consequences. Institutions deal with risk, reducing and mollifying its consequences, making visible its character and quality. But subjective and objective assessments adhere tenuously. While we are subjected almost daily to critical incidents worldwide, it is scientifically produced risk that preoccupies our times (e.g., air bags, mammograms, IUDs, secondhand smoke, and our hidden gene ensemble). Invisible, perhaps irreversible, vexing, common, and more subtle than death (which we deny facilely) and taxes, (which we postpone, avoid, shift, and manipulate), these products of new technologies are ambiguous. Risk, like the unity of mistakes, exists.

Vaughan richly categorizes “signals” (information) and how they were socially embedded in key decision situations but does not comment on the irony that, like a tree that falls in a forest, a signal may not be seen, heard, attended to, intended, or interpreted as read. This is the central paradox of an information-based analysis—the relationships between the coders, the code, and the unit (the signal) may remain creatures of the observer’s horizon. As Vaughan writes, quoting Becker, culture is only
apparently shared. Vaughan’s analysis of deciding, especially in chapter 8, is plausible and makes the dominant culture apparent. The process of deciding is inferred therefrom. The question one might ask, as did Karl Weick in his analysis of the Mann Gulch Fire (Administrative Science Quarterly [38 (1993): 628–52]) is, Under what conditions do organizational decision processes change?


Nico Stehr
University of British Columbia

That science is increasingly seen as an essentially contested enterprise (adopting William Connolly’s apt phrase) is not merely the result of recent work done by students of scientific activity and its economic, social, and cultural consequences in modern society. Even without or despite efforts to demystify ruling self-conceptions of the ways in which science gets done and becomes practical knowledge, the increasing penetration of the modern life-world by scientific knowledge and technical artifacts alone insures that modern science is, and increasingly will be, the object not only of skeptical and critical scrutiny but of more and more attempts to plan, police, and constrain scientific developments.

Steven C. Ward’s examination of these broad issues is largely restricted to the more familiar grounds of the philosophical and sociological aspects of disputes surrounding the status of knowledge claims within the scientific community; thus, he surveys four contemporary and contending approaches to knowledge: scientific realism (the modern episteme), postmodern textualism, social realism, and actor-network theory (or the new sociology of knowledge). He asks how the latter might assist in transcending (perhaps solving) the contest between modernists and postmodernists. Scientific realists argue that knowledge claims can be privileged and useful as long as they speak the language of their objects; postmodernists stress the choices of the subjects of knowing, while the critique of realism—with the help of some of the cognitive tools of postmodernism—has given rise to social realism or as the author calls it, the rhetorical turn in the critical analysis of science as text and practice.

The book also includes two brief chapters devoted to an examination of the role of knowledge in the classical sociology of knowledge as well as some of its more recent derivatives. These chapters tread well-known territory, except that some of the more insightful exegesis of the classics is not incorporated. The examination of the writings by Mannheim and Durkheim is somewhat arbitrary and thrives on catchy but inappropriate phrases. For example, Mannheim surely did not mean to treat natural scientists, logicians, mathematicians, and sociologists as exemplars of his
notorious notion of “free-floating intellectuals.” Although Mannheim accepts Max Weber’s conception of a distinctive nonpartisan scientific vocation, he assigns to that vocation an indispensable political mission with regard to the apparent crisis of mutual total distrust in the ideological field. Ward’s verdict is that all these strategies and their reciprocal criticism leaves a serious void: for example, “sociology still lacks an adequate account of knowledge or a successful strategy for dealing with the issue of reflexivity” (p. 91).

Naturally, and from the point of view of the proponents of scientific certainty, the critique that questions the ways that seem to assure objectivity and that even suggests that the only certainty is uncertainty or that scientific truth is just another ideology trying to universalize specific practices (i.e., the positions of feminist criticism or postmodernism) is quite troubling. This critique perhaps amounts to evidence of a nascent “antisemience” movement. However, why do we consider—as the author does—such a response to be an alarmist need to “reconfigure” the positions found in scientific realism, postmodern textual relativism, and the social realism (of the sociology of knowledge) or why do we need to transcend the alleged impasse of the modern/postmodern dichotomy? Is it necessary to reinvent Mannheim’s project to rationalize the irrational?

Despite the apparent sympathy Ward has for perspectives that insist that knowledge is a social construct, he wants to transcend their logical, moral, and political dilemmas in order to reconfigure truth with a view toward finding more solid ground. But he does not indicate on what grounds and why such a heroic Munchhausen act is necessary, let alone how such a project is capable of gaining credibility in the context of an essentially contested domain of discourse. The contributions Ward considers next offer a clue, at least in the case of the question of gaining legitimacy.

It is the actor-network theory’s unique approach to knowledge, truth, and reality discussed in the last and best parts of the book, that is adduced to heal the “spell of representation.” This theory offers a “new vocabulary for reconfiguring” these notions and ways of overcoming the impasse that has developed on the way toward a postrealist model of truth building.

Actor-network theory (i.e., the work of Bruno Latour) suggests that the weight of knowledge, its reproducibility and practicality, is a function of the power of its claimants. What is new about this approach to knowledge claims is (1) that it struggles to transcend entrenched conceptual dichotomies such as nature and society, (2) that it considers knowledge to be neither the cause of nature or society although knowledge is always social, and (3) that truth is contingent. Knowledge is weak or strong depending on the strength or weakness of its social networks.

The arena to which the philosophical and sociological debates Ward chronicles will likely shift and in which these issues will be debated and contested vigorously in the next decades, however, will no longer be the
Contingency Theory: Rethinking the Boundaries of Social Thought. By Gary Itzkowitz. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1996. Pp. 268. $54.00 (cloth); $34.00 (paper).

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Contingency Theory is an infuriating book. I was continually tempted to return it unreviewed. What held me back was that some of its arguments (summarized in 14 numbered paragraphs at the end of the book) are important. “Contingency” is the key word. Itzkowitz is convinced of the importance of chance and unpredictability in social life and, thus, that social science has long been on the wrong track in its search for causal and lawlike regularities. Open-ended becoming (my phrase) is the case at both micro and macro levels and in micro-macro interactions. Social theorists are thus, again, on the wrong track in their attempts to see the macro as necessarily made up of the micro or to see the micro as structured by the macro, or to see the micro and the macro as somehow one thing. Further, if everything becomes, the best that we can do is to study empirical phenomena; social theorists thus stand condemned for their predilection for hermetically sealed theoretical debates with one other. These are all points worth making and discussing; and if Itzkowitz is not terribly clear on them and does not go very far with them or deeply into them, it is not entirely his fault. In trying to emphasize contingency, he is swimming against a powerful tide.

On the other hand, the sheer pain of reading Contingency Theory will put off many people. This is a book that has never seen a copy editor. I have never encountered a published work so replete with spelling mistakes, typos, missing words, nonexistent words, grammatical errors, and contorted phrases. More substantively, the entire book exemplifies the kind of self-referential theoretical discourse that Itzkowitz condemns. Far from reporting on empirical research into the contingencies of the social, Itzkowitz expounds his position in the usual social theory style. In a typically forced and repetitive fashion, he takes on an almost endless list of other social theorists—from Hume, Kant, and Hegel, through Marx, Durkheim, and Weber up to the postmodernists, feminists, and ecologists, taking periodic detours through the history and philosophy of physics. In one or two paragraphs, he wheels some major or minor social thinker on stage, praises them for whatever he likes (an acknowledgement of the autonomy of the micro, say), criticizes them for whatever he does not like (failure to recognize contingency), and then wheels them off again. I was
left longing for Itzkowitz to make some interesting and constructive point in his own voice.

The one body of literature that Itzkowitz could have invoked for powerful support and elaboration of his position goes completely unremarked in Contingency Theory. Recent work in science and technology studies is the place to look if you want to find empirically grounded discussions of contingency and the open-endedness of the social world, nuanced thinking about levels of analysis that goes beyond the crude dichotomy of micro and macro, and even thinking about the relation between the material and social worlds (which, remarkably, this book does touch upon). But Itzkowitz, of course, travels in the standard theoretical orbit that leaves science studies in outer space.

_Book Reviews_

_Contingency Theory._

A well-known historical sociologist, John Hall, has written an extremely ambitious book, aiming to provide guidance on how the international system can and should be run in the next 10 years. Like his predecessor, Hedley Bull, he examines a number of mechanisms of international order, including the balance of power, the concert of great powers, liberal regimes, interdependence, and the exercise of hegemony. He also seeks to assess how well (or badly) the system was held together during the emergence of the European state system, the period from Westphalia to Nazi Germany, and finally the Cold War and after. Basically, he concludes that a durable peace depends upon a degree of ideological homogeneity among rationally calculating states. Ideological division must be transcended as it largely has been. In addition, the world can no longer afford the irrational excesses of Napoleon or Wilhelmine or Nazi Germany. The obtuseness of Stalin and Brezhnev was bad enough, but it did not lead to nuclear war and thus heeded an underlying rationality. The world is now in a multipolar state that cannot longer be held together by either American hegemony or a concert of great powers—the latter would be an imperial imposition directed at the Third World. What we face is the return to the balance of power in hopefully more favorable circumstances. This is true for two reasons. First, the existence of economic interdependence is now accompanied by a well-understood recognition of its restraints among policymakers. This was not true in 1914 or indeed, at any previous time. Second, the temptations of territorial population render it far less successful. Over time in addition, economic liberalization eventually opens the political system. This is good because authoritarian regimes are prone to start wars. “Every time pressure for liberalization is successful, the chances of war are reduced” (p. 174).
This optimism is more than balanced by developments in three continents. In Europe and America, all is quiet on the Western front. In Eastern Europe, democracy has yet to take hold and economic conditions are unsatisfactory. In the South, we face the potential of catastrophe. But liberal interventionism is not the solution nor is a return to a concert or to U.S. hegemony. Rather the world must find a new structure to give institutional “voice” to repressed Southern peoples. In its absence, nationalist separatism will flourish. This means allowing territorial change and secession. The more the right to leave is respected, the less it needs to be exercised. This does not mean that the world will come to consist of 8,000 states (currently the number of separate dialect-languages now in use). The more open and democratic the domestic system, the more easily minorities can co-exist within the political state. This will in any event be necessary for economic reasons, despite the decline in the territorial size of the nation. Finally, Hall contends that the capitalist and democratic North should assist the South by allowing the latter to sell in its market. It should share its capitalist wealth with Southern nations. The West should not lose its nerve; it should prescribe Adam Smith for the rest of the world.

Much of this book constitutes a laudable and necessary recipe for reducing violence worldwide. Hall does not understand, however, how useful a concert mechanism could be in inculcating the norms of Adam Smith internationally. His view of the current “encompassing coalition” of Great Powers is too akin to that of the 19th-century concert, which intervened for legitimist reasons in other nations’ affairs. The role of a concert today is to bring great powers together, preventing the outbreak of a new dispute and a new cold war between them. Through the establishment of relatively exclusive international “clubs” (WTO, G-7, NATO, EMU, EU, NAFTA, TAFTA, the Asia-Pacific Economic Community, etc.), nations can raise the standard of acceptable political and economic performance internationally. Today the high standards set for joining Europe’s European Monetary Union make it the most exclusive international club.

Another factor that Hall incompletely recognizes is that the balance of power has been reversed in economics. We know that political-military forces abhor a vacuum and act to offset a concentration of power. Economically, the reverse is true. A conurbation of successful economic power draws others in as the European Union is doing today, with Eastern European countries slavering at the mouth to join. In time the success of centralizing economics in North America, Japan and East Asia, and Europe will hold out attractive forces to both Russia and China. In order to join, however, they will have to meet much higher standards of openness, impartial enforcement of contracts, low inflation, an end to subsidies, and the establishment of fully convertible currencies.

Hall has written an outstanding book. Supplementary analysis, however, can relieve his bout of pessimism in the final pages. The South needs
political and economic reform before it can fully join the developed North.


William W. Grimes
Boston University

*An Anticlassical Political-Economic Analysis* constitutes the final work of Yasusuke Murakami, a prominent Japanese economist and polymath. It is fitting that the book is extremely ambitious. Indeed, it seeks both to reconceptualize economics as we know it and to offer a new way of understanding and structuring the international order. Not surprisingly, the book is a challenging, often rewarding, bit of reading.

The book unfolds in three separate but related themes, which Murakami ultimately brings together in a vast synthesis. The first theme is a philosophical discussion that concentrates on the possibility of a “true liberalism” that is not based on some form of progressivism. In this regard, he calls for greater pluralism of thought—a possibility that he identifies more closely with the “hermeneutic” Eastern style of thought than with “transcendent” Western-style thinking.

The book then moves to an extended discussion of the history of the nation-state system and of how the concept of unjust war (which justified balance of power) metamorphosed into a reassertion of just war (which justified total war) in the 20th century. The balance of power that resulted was fundamentally unstable, leading to hegemonic stability theory, which attempted to encompass political power and economic outcomes. Murakami characterizes hegemonic stability theory as being essentially a way of thinking about the problem of maintaining public goods in the international system. However, he concludes that hegemonic stability too is unstable in real life, as a result of his third theme, what Murakami calls “developmentalism.” This is perhaps the most concrete section of the book, and it provides the meat of the discussion that most readers will be looking for in “an anticlassical political-economic analysis.” It is based on his analysis of the economics of decreasing cost, which he believes is pervasive. Murakami argues that, over time, it is decreasing costs rather than increasing costs that best characterize economies. This has profound effects on economic analysis, as he demonstrates in three closely reasoned chapters. If costs in an industry decrease over time and with greater quantity of production, then long-term success will be tied to maximization of market. In other words without intervention, an industry with decreasing costs will be characterized by fratricidal com-
petition and natural monopolies, thus leading in the long run to stagnation. If economies are really driven by a dynamic of decreasing costs, then some of the ways in which Japanese industrial policymakers have justified their actions—including “excess competition” and developmentalism—are more justifiable than most American economists have been willing to admit. Murakami defines developmentalism as an economic system based on capitalism but that “makes its main objective the achievement of industrialization . . . and . . . approves government intervention in the market from a long-term perspective” (p. 145). He argues that developmentalism is bound to beat laissez-faire liberalism whenever they compete.

A discussion of the competition among national economic systems is where the second theme, the instability of hegemonic stability, reemerges. The post-war global political economy, which has depended fundamentally on the provision of the public goods of free trade and stable money by a hegemonic United States, is inherently unstable if national governments are using neomercantilist means to advance their own interests. Accordingly, Murakami offers a two-part solution. The first step is to redefine international public goods so as to encourage developmentalism while limiting the volatility it causes in the global economy. In place of free trade, he calls for the leading economies to freely provide investment capital and technology to the developing countries, even calling for the effective abolition of patents for developing countries. Murakami’s second proposal is for the introduction of “polymorphic liberalism.” This notion harks back to his initial philosophical discussion on the possibility of a “true liberalism.” Concretely, its several components include acceptance of a variety of different national systems (particularly developmentalism), a patchwork of overlapping regional security alliances, and nonexclusive regional economic integration. Murakami is especially adamant that regimes be rule based; one of the more important rules is that leading countries, including Japan, must abstain from developmentalism.

In the breadth and novelty of its conception, An Anticlassical Political-Economic Analysis parallels Adam Smith’s magnum opus. Like Smith, Murakami offers an original way of thinking about the creation of wealth. As in The Wealth of Nations, this understanding calls for fundamental changes in the ways in which nations organize themselves and interact with each other. Nonetheless, it is probably not destined for Smithian prominence. For one thing, it is not obvious that Murakami’s version of long-term decreasing costs is an accurate one (no numbers are offered) or that developmentalism is the best solution. Second, the developmentalism that Murakami advocates requires considerable political discipline and is likely beyond the abilities of many developing countries. Third, turning to his vision of North-South relations, not all developing countries are likely to feel comfortable with the vast investment from the North he prescribes nor are many technologically advanced countries likely to be willing to waive patents for the nations of the South.
Finally, despite the excellent translation by Kozo Yamamura, such a broad-ranging work makes for inherently difficult reading. Nevertheless, it is a valuable addition to an important debate.


Antoinette Burton
Johns Hopkins University

Given the recent turn toward empire in Victorian history, a book that promises to analyze the tripartite impact of popular democracy, capitalist interests, and imperial policies on late-19th-century British politics is tantalizing indeed. E. Spencer Wellhofer proposes to give a comprehensive survey not just of electoral patterns but, more particularly, of the ways in which party machinery adapted to the monumental constitutional challenges posed by a variety of political reforms and shifting socio-economic allegiances in this period. The year 1885 is an appropriate starting point marking, as it does, the immediate aftermath of the century’s Third Reform Act (1884) and the beginning of concerted parliamentary agitation for a legislative solution to home rule for Ireland (1886). Perhaps a less self-evident point of closure is the year 1910, especially because the four years leading up to World War I were arguably crucial to both the arc of “Victorian” politics and the shape of the postwar British electorate. If such periodization is intended as a challenge to traditional surveys of the period, it represents one of the few innovations offered by Democracy, Capitalism and Empire—which tends to replicate the Whig model of linear progression without complicating it much, if at all, with evidence of how the British political system was influenced by imperial commitments. What emerges is a synthetic and largely familiar picture of how elites responded to the exigencies of “arithmetic democracy” and how arduously they worked to contain what they viewed as its disastrously un-English effects.

Wellhofer frames his study around the question of what happened to English constitutional assumptions and practices once class interests (laborers and agricultural workers) and regional ethnic questions (Scots, Welsh, and Irish nationalisms) made their way from the margins to the center of Victorian politics. To do so is to imagine that these subjects were not already implicated in the political settlements that preceded the late 1880s or, indeed, that the presumptions of “English” supremacy that underwrote them had not been a source of contest and conflict from Waterloo (1819) onward. One effect of this approach is to view demands articulated by Celtic nationalists as mere corollaries of liberal dissent at the center rather than as legitimate (if naturalized) claims upon a “British” state, which masqueraded as the cultural representative of all Britons.
but, in practice, stood for a deeply anglocentric tradition. To be sure, *Democracy, Capitalism and Empire* does rematerialize the constitutive role that the Celtic fringe played in the shaping of English politics in the late Victorian period without privileging Ireland as the primary nationalist site, as is often the case in overviews of this kind. And yet, even this emphasis goes in and out of focus leaving readers with the impression that Welsh, Scots, and Irish agitators were little more than gadflies on the central state and party apparatus. In fact, based on the evidence presented, those players may be viewed as an array of “internal others”—both actual and symbolic—against whom late Victorian definitions of civil society and democratic community were imagined, measured, and admired.

Wellhofer is not, admittedly, as interested in political culture as he is in the more mechanical—and, it must be said, quantifiable—functions of political machinery. Readers interested in models that track the statistical results of electoral returns and the path coefficients of the party system at critical moments across this period will not be disappointed—except if they are looking for diagrams that take us beyond the rather predictable axes of class affiliation and, more rarely, regional specificity. What is gained by the kind of attention Wellhofer focuses on the non-English dimension of this story is mitigated, unfortunately, by his almost complete neglect of the imperial context. In part because he uses the same outdated core-periphery model for empire as he does for Celtic political movements, colonial policies scarcely impinge on his narrative, and when they do, it is so fleetingly that the claim for empire as a constitutive influence on metropolitan politics implied by the title simply cannot be sustained. Given the rise of the Indian National Congress in 1885, not to mention the kind of coalitional politics undertaken by colonial nationalist leaders and Irish radicals during the crucial decades of the 1880s, this failure is more than benign neglect or even an opportunity lost. It represents an unself-conscious, but nonetheless politically significant, misunderstanding of how intimately related imperial policies and “domestic” concerns were in fin de siecle Britain. It signals an equally telling failure to appreciate how inadequate the category of “British” is for understanding the complexities of the metropolitan political landscape then and now. The quest to rewrite the narrative of Victorian high politics so it accounts for the expansion of democracy in dialectic tension with empire and other capitalist interests is an admirable one, but it requires a rigorous critique of the frameworks of Whig, if not national history, in which this study is invested.

Alberto Spektorowski
Tel Aviv University

French Revolutionary Syndicalism and the Public Sphere is an original and highly documented book that explores the evolution of French syndicalist organization, Confederation Generale du Travail, from left revolutionary discourse and support of federalist control of industry to a rightwing productionist approach, emphasizing instrumental rationality and national and increased material output through expert and central direction of the economy. Kenneth Tucker’s accomplishment is not limited to pure historical reconstruction and interpretation. Through analysis of the ideological evolution of the Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT) and its interaction with the French public sphere during La Belle Epoque (1900–20), the author uses history as a cultural resource to make a point about present-day social thought and social movements.

French syndicalism, similar to new social movements today, emphasized direct democracy and small-scale organization and was suspicious of massive bureaucratic attempts to transform society. Although this early proletariat discourse owed its moral sensibility to religious republicanism and utopian socialist sources, Tucker correctly emphasizes the direct impact of modern theories of social science on its development. Durkheim’s vision of social solidarity and communitarian republicanism along with theories of industrial productionism, moral progress, and solidarity provided the syndicalist model with a base for a humanitarian and responsible socialism. However, this Durkheimian model of social solidarity, uniting the liberal and proletarian public spheres in France, soon vanished. Tucker, though, directs his efforts through a historico-cultural analysis to explain this shift from socialist republican discourse to a mecaniste and productionist approach in the CGT. He also attempts to convince the reader of the importance of preserving the syndicalist legacy, which, according to him, preceded the development of social movements in present times and faced one of the dilemmas that new social movements confront today—namely, that of integrating democratic practices with the requirements of more systematic international forms of integration (p. 131).

One of Tucker’s conclusions is that despite the integrating trend of modernization, the social republican discourse of French syndicalism created its own cultural field. This contributes to a more pluralistic and democratic idea of modernity based on the diversity of cultural traditions and on the existence of new networks of structured social relations concretized in different autonomous yet interdependent fields, each with its own logic. Following this line of thought, Tucker is determined to challenge some of the most important critical perspectives of syndicalism in general and
of French syndicalism in particular. A general Habermasian, for whom
the evolution of syndicalism could be understood as part of the refeudal-
ization of the public sphere, critique is employed. Accordingly, an over-
burdened public sphere could not maintain its democratic structure and
increasingly gave way to neocorporatist politics. This Habermasian ap-
proach intersects with C. Maier’s view that the decline of parliamentary
power is attributable to the emergence of a corporatist society and a new
language of technological labor in post–World War I Europe. Tucker
agrees with this general productivist and bureaucratic trend; however,
his study emphasizes the spaces of cultural resistance to instrumental ra-
tionality remaining in the French proletarian public sphere. In addition,
most of his study attempts to elaborate another nonstructural explana-
ton of the noted shift from a revolutionary syndicalist to a productionist dis-
course at the CGT.

A different type of argument to which Tucker pays somewhat lesser
attention is also elaborated on by some students of fascist ideology. The
students have made a case based on the fact that fascist ideology has, in
great part, originated from the revolutionary ideas of French syndicalism,
especially from Sorel’s “antimaterialist revision of Marxist thought,” to
which Mussolini himself owed his intellectual evolution (e.g., Zeev
Sternhell, Mario Sznajder, and Maia Asherri, Naissance de l’ideologie
fasciste [Fayard, 1990]). These latter theses explained the shift from the
discourse of revolutionary syndicalism to national syndicalism, by focus-
ing precisely on the revolutionary potential embodied in the discourse of
revolutionary syndicalism. The worker union served as a productionist
unit on the one hand and as a revolutionary school on the other, where
a new man (a synthesis between a heroic worker and a warrior) and a
new culture were created. However, the myth of the combative syndicate
representing an “association of free workers” is substituted with the or-
ganic “free nation,” which encompasses the “productivist” forces of the
country. The new national-syndicalist state represents, at a higher level,
the spirit of a heroic community embodied in the syndicate. This prod-
tivist society contrasted with the idea of a liberal or a social democratic
bureaucratic state; it also rejected Durkheim’s attempt to reunite the
liberal and proletariat public sphere on the basis of moral solidarity on the
one hand and social science on the other.

As mentioned, Tucker makes a great effort to respond to these lines
of thought, especially to Habermas. Tucker traces the CGT’s move to-
ward a seemingly quasi-corporatist perspective in 1914 as the result of
two fundamental causes. As new elites came to power, the dynamics of
the proletarian and liberal public spheres changed: a new type of prole-
tariat, tied to expertise rather than radical oratory, emerged. Both Merr-
heim’s and Jouhaux’s theories of technocratic positivism developed as a
result of their conviction that the future of French syndicalism should
be unity and centralization. However, differing slightly from Habermas,
Tucker argues that the version of corporatism advocated by Merrheim
and Jouhaux was much more of an ideological achievement than a result
of structural constraint (p. 185). Despite the fact that during the prewar years France’s political and economic concentration was only in its infancy, Merrheim and comrades developed a vision of an inevitable future of French economy and syndicalist organization based on the consequences provoked by large-scale economy and informed by values of competence and increased production. The war experience and its aftermath confirmed both syndicalist leaders’ convictions. In fact, after the war a new public sphere was delineated as a result of these new trends in the national economy. Many capitalist and syndicalist elites called for a more productive and technocratic society on the one hand and the establishment of new social rights on the other. The central aims were to integrate the workers into the polity and to create a more socially responsible welfare capitalism. The CGT program of 1918 expressed this trend: No more ouvrieriste ethics or general strikes; there was a new focus on concrete reforms benefiting labor and national productionism. In other words, the new language of technical efficiency tied increased productivity to a strongly social democratic program. Tucker is correct in admitting that this productivist labor was not totally integrated into a new refeudalized public sphere, in Habermasian terms (p. 205). Indeed, earlier themes of moral transformation, direct democracy, and decentralized organization remained an integral part of the workers’ union legacy in France and saw a revival in the postwar years, especially with the emergence of social movements in the 1970s and 1980s.

However, one might wonder what was wrong with a democratic corporatism based upon a technocratic efficiency approach and the introduction of the workers into the democratic public sphere. Despite Tucker’s efforts to criticize this key piece in the syndicalist ideological development, it seems that French democracy benefited strongly and precisely from democratic welfare and technocratic evolution. One could wonder as well what was so impressive about the Sorelian tradition, which is rooted in the idea that the workplace is a new school of solidarity and revolutionary struggle. Although this revolutionary spirit fascinated left-wing and radical democratic intellectuals, who searched for alternative ways of nonbureaucratic and direct democratic paths of action, it has also fascinated many protofascist intellectuals and integral nationalist groups that identify with this spirit. In other words, while it is correct to say that Durkheim’s critique of instrumental rationality and his belief that socialism had to forge a new solidaristic culture informed one side of revolutionary syndicalism, the other side, based on direct action and the myth of violence, was informed by Sorel. As Tucker also confirms, Sorel saw the future of society as grounded in the ethics of producers. He did not believe that mechanisme, or technological development, contrasted with the revolutionary solidarity emerging in the working place. However, this does not make Sorel a supporter of a more democratic and aesthetically pleasing workshop as Tucker suggests (p. 147). In contrast to the democratic syntheses between technocratic advancement and social welfare inspired by Durkheim, who actually strove to save the demo-
cratic republic, Sorel’s concept of technology and the idea of a working place communitarian spirit were associated with the idea of a heroic non-democratic society. Sorel’s *Reflections on Violence* did not present unusual ideas to the syndicalists. He reflected on the crisis of bourgeois civilization and all its moral and political values. He praised the myth of violence and direct action, and he reflected on one of the most important themes raised by revolutionary syndicalists, such as Victor Greffuelhes and Emile Pouget: Syndicalism and democracy are irreconcilable, because the latter, by means of universal suffrage, gives control to the “ignorant . . . and stifles the minorities who are the flag bearers of the future” (Emile Pouget, *La Confederation general du travail*, 1909).

For some analysts of the development of fascist ideology, the organic conception of the syndicate and the total rejection of democratic society and bourgeois civilization became the common ground associating radical revolutionary syndicalists with right-wing nationalists. Tucker is attentive to the ideological encounters between French syndicalism and integral nationalists like L’Action Française. His explanation accounts for L’Action Française and Charles Maurras’s support of worker strikes, as well as for the positive response by some syndicalists to this ouvrieriste turn (p. 163). Gustave Herve, the editor of *La Guerre Sociale*, Pautaud, the president of the electrician’s union, and Sorel during a brief time had been seduced by Maurras’s integral nationalism. Both sides believed in direct action and both sides despised the republic and everything it symbolized. In sum, although it is possible to agree with Tucker that the legacy of revolutionary syndicalism informed the theory of the Russian soviets or R. Luxemburg’s belief in the self-managing capacities of the workers and that its antibureaucratic spirit was perceived in later democratic and social movements of the 1960s and 1980s, the revolutionary syndicalist legacy seems to be much more complex. The fascist political tradition also embodied a distinct concept of democracy, one that did not rely upon the individualist, materialist, and rationalist bases of liberal democracy but on a distinct type of mobilized, heroic, and combative society. Tucker is attentive to some of these problematic developments. As he admits, contemporary identity politics’ reproduction of the syndicalist fetish of class purity—though often pointing to race, ethnicity, and or gender as focal points—also build upon some of the syndicalist cultural legacy (p. 215). Building upon these conclusions, several students of fascism would agree that Sorel’s legacy has been important but not essential for contemporary socialist thought. Fascism, at least the “fascism of the first hour,” owed its theoretical basis to the legacy of revolutionary syndicalism.
Book Reviews


David Dessler
College of William and Mary

Martha Finnemore draws on sociology and sociological organization theory to demonstrate the influence of norms on state behavior in world politics. Her central argument is that states are taught to accept new norms, values, and interests by international organizations. Finnemore’s target is mainstream international relations theory in political science. Such theory either ignores the processes through which states define their interests (as in “rationalist” theory that simply posits state interests in order to explain state behavior), or if the theory problematizes state interests, it neglects the role of international normative structures in explaining them (as in liberalism, which accounts for state interests by looking at preference aggregation within states). Additionally, international relations theory presumes that state decisions are driven everywhere by an instrumentalist or consequentialist logic. Finnemore’s constructivist approach challenges international relations theory on all three of these points by explaining state interests and actions as the product of socialization to norms, rules, understandings, and relationships at the international level.

Finnemore develops her argument through three case studies. The first case considers the creation of science bureaucracies during the 1950s and 1960s within a number of small, poor, and technologically unsophisticated states. These states did not need science bureaucracies and were not reacting to domestic demand for them. Finnemore explains their actions in terms of a general redefinition of the norms and expectations regarding the state’s role in science during this period. The activities of UNESCO figure prominently in this account. For internal reasons, UNESCO popularized the new bureaucratic innovation pioneered by Great Britain, the United States, and France, and it assumed responsibility for “teaching” states how to fulfill their new role in science. UNESCO aggressively advised states on the best way to structure their science bureaucracies, heavily lobbying key domestic actors in some countries to secure adherence to the new science norm.

The book’s second case concerns the development of humanitarian norms in warfare, specifically, the establishment of standards of treatment and neutrality status for noncombatants, particularly the wounded and medical personnel. In this chapter, Finnemore focuses on the origins of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Geneva Conventions. She notes that, because humanitarian norms require states to restrain their use of violence during war—a time when the vital interests and even the survival of states are at stake—theories that ascribe only power-based interests to states offer no explanatory hold. Her case study
reveals that the impetus for the development and adoption of these norms came not from states but from the actions of private citizens.

Finnemore’s final case study examines the shift in international development goals from a nearly exclusive focus on raising GNP and per capita GNP to an emphasis on poverty alleviation in the late 1960s and 1970s. This shift, the author argues, cannot be explained by domestic political changes within states nor can it be attributed to the initiative of states. While development experts in universities and multilateral lending organizations did play a role in preparing the intellectual groundwork for this normative change, Finnemore argues that the impetus for the shift came from one individual, Robert McNamara, and that its precise form was determined by the structure of the organization that he headed after 1968, the World Bank. In Finnemore’s account, the bank “sold” poverty alleviation as an essential component of development policy to its member states through a mixture of persuasion and coercion. The author suggests that the institutionalization of the global antipoverty norm mirrors the normative change in the late 18th and 19th centuries at the domestic level that led to the rise of the welfare state.

Finnemore’s book is beautifully written and carefully argued. She is the first scholar of international relations to offer a sustained, systematic empirical argument in support of the constructivist claim that international normative structures matter in world politics. Her book will be of interest not only to students of international relations but to all social theorists concerned with the relation between interest-based and norm-based explanations of human behavior. True, Finnemore does not consider cases of “high politics” (involving war, revolution, and catastrophic economic dislocation) in her empirical analysis, and mainstream international relations theorists will be tempted to argue that a rationalist, utility-maximizing theory remains the most appropriate framework for understanding behavior there. These scholars may suggest that the sociological or constructivist approach that Finnemore champions is appropriate only for the analysis of marginal issues and problems in world politics, but such an argument will be hard to sustain in light of Finnemore’s pioneering study. Her work questions the value of any explanatory framework that ignores or suppresses questions about the origins of state interests in international relations. World politics, after all, is as much a struggle to define these interests as it is a competition to defend them.

Peter Rutland
Wesleyan University

This book analyzes the Czech perception of themselves as a nation: a shared identity that has survived three centuries of life in states run by “alien” rulers. The author, Ladislav Holy, left Czechoslovakia in 1968 and made his career in Britain as an anthropologist of African cultures. The main focus of the book is on the strong shared perception of an unbroken tradition of Czech history in which the Czechs, an advanced, cultured nation, repeatedly fall foul of their more powerful neighbors but nevertheless manage to preserve their common identity and emerge unscathed. The core of the book is a succinct summary of this invented tradition scattered with many interesting details.

Westerners who are not familiar with the Czechs but who have heard of Vaclav Havel and the “Velvet Revolution” probably think that Czechs are less “nationalist” than their Polish or Hungarian neighbors. Holy demolishes this illusion, noting that the opposition in 1989 defined themselves primarily as Czechs standing up for national freedom from an occupying power rather than as citizens demanding individual rights (p. 49). Czech nationalism tends to be tacit rather than explicit—but it is a powerful presence to anyone who looks closely. The author stresses the paradoxical features of the Czech national mythology. Czech nationalism has resurfaced as a political phenomenon at precisely the same time that Czechs are striving to “return to Europe” and, concretely, to enter the European Union. This reflects the fact that they see their nation as an embodiment of universal values of tolerance and culture—the presence of which, they believe, distinguishes them from their European neighbors. While they have mostly defined themselves vis-a-vis the Germans, more recently the Slovaks, seen as rural, backward, and “Eastern” (p. 6), have become the dominant “other” against which they identify themselves.

Complicating the picture is the fact that most Czechs have a negative image of the typical characteristics of Czechs—even while at the same time they have a proud and positive evaluation of the qualities of the nation as a whole. Holy explains this paradox by arguing that, despite its apparent commitment to universal European values, Czech nationalism is, in fact, inimical to individualism and includes a strong dose of egalitarianism (chap. 2). This stems from the fact that for much of Czech history the landed and merchant classes belonged to different ethnic groups (Germans and Jews). Holy implies that, despite the fact that the Czechs enthusiastically embraced market reform after 1989, theirs is not an example of liberal nationalism based on civic values.

Holy’s account rings true as a general characterization of the Czech
perceptions of their nation’s history. However, the book appears to be heavily based upon published debates among the Czech intelligentsia and does not draw upon popular culture, such as movies or television. The book does not offer an analysis of social rituals and the salience of national identity in daily life; one wonders how far the perceptions of historical identity really penetrate into Czech society. In the public opinion surveys on national stereotypes that Holy quotes, for example (p. 75), one-third of the respondents refused to identify any feature as particularly Czech, and in 1992 the most commonly cited feature (envy) was only picked by 28% of respondents (only 12% in the 1990 survey). There is no discussion of the different understandings of nationalism among different social groups or variations in the way different politicians use nationalist rhetoric, except in the context of the breakup of the federation in 1992. There is no mention of the radical nationalist Republican Party, which regularly gathers 8% support in elections, and barely any discussion of Czech attitudes toward the Romany minority—the main target of the Republican skinheads.

The subtitle of the book, Post-Communist Transformation of Society, is a bit misleading. In general, the book ends in 1992, a mere three years after the revolution. Given that continuity in shared historical mythology is a major theme in Holy’s work, it would have been interesting to read his analysis of the changes in Czech society since 1989 and whether this process has altered their views on historical identity. Who will the Czechs, having separated themselves from the Germans and now the Slovaks, choose as the “other” against which to define themselves? There is now a lively debate, for example, over the possible threat to Czech identity from the post-1989 American cultural invasion.

Holy does not directly address the question of whether the Czechs really are different in their construction of historical identity from, say, Poles or Hungarians. For example, his brief discussion of the Velvet Revolution overlooks the fact that it came immediately in the wake of massive public protests in East Germany, which spilled over into the streets of Prague as German refugees besieged the West German embassy. In other words, Czech demonstrators were not so much expressing a unique historical yearning for national freedom as joining an East European protest. Also, looking at social developments since 1989, one suspects that the dominant social value is consumerism rather than nationalism.

Donna Greschner
University of Saskatchewan

The Clash of Rights is a masterful and disquieting analysis of the politics of rights in a democratic state. For their inquiry, these three political scientists (Sniderman, Fletcher, and Russell) and one psychologist (Tetlock) chose Canada primarily because of the 1982 addition of the Charter of Rights and Freedom to its constitution. While containing provisions of special importance in Canada, such as language rights, the charter also articulates values at the heart of liberal pluralism, such as liberty and equality. In 1987 the authors conducted extensive interviews with ordinary citizens and elites on many issues pertaining to the politics of rights. They employed sophisticated survey devices, such as the counterargument technique and quota-beneficiary experiment, and separated political elites by partisan affiliation. Sniderman and his fellow researchers then use the abundant information about the value commitments of citizens and elites “to pursue more fundamental questions about the politics of liberal democratic rights” (p. 3).

The authors’ findings are gripping and provocative; I note three major ones. First, not surprisingly, liberty often conflicts with other values, such as order and tolerance. However, elites will forgo liberty as willingly as ordinary citizens if presented with competing arguments. This discovery shakes the conventional faith in elites as the custodian of democratic values against popular hostility. While the New Democratic Party and the Parti Québécois consistently adhere to progressive positions even when confronted with electoral rejection, other partisan elites do not. The authors conclude that “the fallacy of democratic elitism consists exactly in its indifference to which partisan elites prevail” (p. 51). Second, equality produces passionate debate not only because it may conflict with other values but because it admits to competing conceptions, which also “lie ideologically at opposing poles” (p. 12) and work to the advantage of the political right as well as the left. Moreover, citizens and elites may hold different conceptions of equality simultaneously in their belief repertoire, with the specific context of importance in their consideration of issues such as affirmative action programs.

Third, citizens’ views about governance and legitimacy—who should have the final say in policy decisions, the courts or legislatures—have considerable uniformity across Canada. The charter, with judicial review of entrenched rights, has acquired widespread support among both English and French Canadians except with respect to its language rights. In opposition to the now standard depiction of the charter as unwelcome to Quebec citizens, the data shows that “the Charter, considered as a
political symbol in the general public at the time of its adoption, was consensual, not divisive” (p. 253). However, in sharp contrast to this consensus is a deep division among elites about the instrumental uses and consequences of the charter. Furthermore, the commitment to language rights (one variant of group rights) is volatile and fragile for ordinary citizens and elites alike. Again, the research disproves the thesis of democratic elitism: “Legitimacy must thus be time-subscripted: a readiness to respect claims to rights—and perhaps particularly to group rights—is a variable, not a constant” (p. 233). Moreover, group rights are inherently susceptible to manipulation by political elites for their own partisan purposes. “Without minimizing the risks begot by the public’s ignorance, we take as a theme of equal importance the dangers begot by elites’ pursuit of both power and ideology” (p. 13).

Already I await with anticipation a follow-up study. Much has happened in Canada since 1987, including the failure of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords. The avowedly separatist Bloc Quebecois is the official opposition at the time of this writing, and the right-wing Reform Party has significant parliamentary power. More notably, in 1995 Quebec citizens voted in another referendum, deciding by a razor-thin margin to remain in the existing federal structure. While the authors discuss many postsurvey developments, such as Meech’s demise, their data predates the political turmoil of the past decade. Nevertheless, these recent events illustrate further the book’s conclusion about the “inherent and inescapable volatility” (p. 257) of liberal democracy and the dynamic quality of democratic values. Some outcomes, such as the decisive rejection of the Charlottetown Accord by ordinary citizens in the face of overwhelming endorsement by elites, would not have surprised Sniderman and his colleagues. While their analysis signals problems with future constitutional negotiations conducted by elites, it also provides optimism about the capacity of citizens to deliberate about democratic values. In a complete twist of conventional democratic theory, which exalts elites as the guardian of core values, one may infer from this study that ordinary citizens may need to save the liberal pluralistic project of Canada from elites, especially partisan elites engaged in the contest for governmental power.


Ivan Light
University of California, Los Angeles

Driedger begins his survey of Canada by declaring his book “unabashedly multi-ethnic and pluralist” in orientation (p. xiii). His book ends with the declaration that “Canada is a pluralist multi-ethnic society” in which ever more people are “willing to accept and work for equality, justice, and opportunity for all” (p. 309). Sandwiched between the beginning declara-
tion and the ending declaration, where he lets his hopes hang out, Driedger’s substantive text provides a well-informed, dispassionate, and factual survey of race and ethnic relations in Canada. Although the book is clearly aimed at Canadian undergraduates who want to learn about their own country, other readers will also find it a painless way to learn something about Canadian race and ethnic relations. They will also find this book a useful shelf reference to the Canadian research literature of the last 20 years.

To ground his empirical survey in the appropriate literature, Driedger opens with 50 pages (two chapters) of the history of race and ethnic relations in social theory. He devotes 17 obligatory pages to Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, who had little to say about race and ethnic relations, then moves on to the Chicago school, Milton Gordon, Pierre van den Berghe, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, Edna Bonacich, and others. We learn that Canada’s ethnic groups have assimilated more slowly than those of the United States, possibly because of the greater stress the United States has placed upon assimilation (p. 29). Despite Jeffrey Reitz and Raymond Breton who have convincingly dissented from it (The Illusion of Difference [C. D. Howe Institute, 1994]), this opinion still prevails in Canada. Indeed, the claim, if true, offers a solid theoretical reason for studying Canada.

Part 2 of the book continues with a demographic and geographical survey of Canada’s population from the 19th century to the present. Canada is a vast country whose regions have more distinct ethnoracial profiles than do the regions of the United States. Obviously Quebec is preponderantly French, but it is not just the charter groups, English and French, that cause Canada’s regionalism. Aboriginals are relatively more numerous in the northern territories and visible minorities in the West, and other Europeans are in the Great Plains provinces. Here, as elsewhere, Driedger’s text contains numerous detailed and current maps.

The third part of the book deals with ethnic identity in Canada. This is not a boring subject. Quebec nationalism, Meech Lake, Bill 101, and the 1995 referendum open the discussion. However, Driedger gives fair and reasonable attention to the excellent and extensive Canadian literature on ethnicity outside Quebec. This literature lacks the drama of Quebec nationalism, but it provides rich detail about the other ethnic groups that make up the Canadian mosaic. The exception is the British Canadians, who are amply featured in Driedger’s stratification section but do not appear in the ethnic identity section of Driedger’s book. I fear that this exclusion reflects the dubious but pervasive assumption that ethnic and non-British are synonymous in Canada.

Ever since John Porter (The Vertical Mosaic [University of Toronto Press, 1965]), Canadians have been fascinated with their country’s distinct stratification. This is the topic of part 4. The empirical detail is quite high. One table shows how many ministries were held by British, French, Scots, and Irish politicians between 1867 and 1966. Another table (table 8.4) allows interested readers to look up and compare the relative prestige
of ethnic groups in French and British Canada. Chapters on residential segregation include maps of major Canadian cities with ethnic neighborhoods indicated. A chapter on race and racism revisits the Hooten phenotypical criteria of the Caucasoid, Mongoloid, and Negroid races, then moves on to immigration and racism today. The purpose of this visit escapes me as Canadians do not need reminding that races have different colored skins.

Part 5 examines the provisions made for human rights in Canada. Some of the discussion juxtaposes Canadian, U.S., and UN declarations and legislation bearing on human rights. One learns that Canada guarantees human rights to her citizens—not a surprising fact. Of course, legal guarantees do not confer equality of treatment in daily life. Reviewing existing studies, Driedger's most interesting sections contain scales that enable readers to ascertain in considerable detail just what fellow Canadians think of their ethno-racial group. There are a few amusing surprises. For example, 75% of Canadian high school students would be willing to marry an American, and only 65% would marry a Brit. On the other hand, some empirical results are unsurprising, if obnoxiously graphic. Ethnic jokes are equally directed at Jews and Poles, the most favored ethnicities, but Jews receive by far the most hate literature, physical attacks, and vandalism.

Driedger has assembled current human relations literature from the existing archive. His survey is up-to-date, detailed, and convincingly illustrated with graphic aids. The level of theorizing is low and its quality pedestrian. But the point of this book is not to reinterpret Canada to the Canadians; it is simply to assemble useful documents that synthesize the existing literature on ethnic and race relations in Canada in a package Canadian students will read and instructors will assign. The book makes interesting reading and succeeds in its modest ambition.


David Chaney
University of Durham

As the title suggests, Mark Gottdiener’s book is an account of cultural change in contemporary America: in the second half of the 20th century the appearance of public spaces in a variety of settings is increasingly no longer the result of chance accumulations of particular activities but has been designed to conform to a thematic vision. Going beyond the role of architects in designing buildings, a new class of designers (should I call them imagineers?) uses a symbolic vocabulary to create total environments. The examples he cites of these types of public spaces are shopping malls, airport terminals, casinos, theme parks (both Disneyland and Dis-
ney World and other leisure settings such as sports stadia), and, rather puzzlingly, memorial settings such as the Vietnam Veteran’s memorial site in Washington, D.C., and museums of cultural themes such as slavery.

Charting this trend is not really an innovation; it has become a staple theme of those who detect, in the conjunction of trends in leisure and consumer culture, a new postmodern era. Gottdiener does not survey this literature, for example, he does not cite Umberto Eco’s provocative analysis of some of the same environments (Travels in Hyperreality [Picador, 1987]) but is instead concerned with presenting his own analysis in a way that avoids much of the jargon of cultural theory. It seems to me that there are two distinct strands to Gottdiener’s analysis: a historical account and an analytic account. The latter is considerably more successful than the former, which builds on a necessarily absurdly generalized survey of features of world history and cultures to culminate in a tendentious account of the built environment in the 20th century. The essence of the argument is that modernism, in alliance with developmental trends in capitalism in the first half of the century, stripped the public environment of symbolic adornment. In the second half of the century mass suburbanization, again allied with capitalist necessity to constantly stimulate consumer demand, has generated the flowering of thematic design I have summarized. In such a short book these arguments are inevitably compressed to the point of caricature, and one’s dissatisfaction is compounded by avoidable howlers. For example, “during the eighteenth century, the life of the dandy, involved dressing flamboyantly, pursuing women, especially the wives of wealthy capitalists, sleeping late, and never, never working for a living” (p. 53). On the same page there is an amusing (what I assume to be a copyediting) slip when “aesthete” is used for “ascetic”: “Members of the early Protestant sects that Weber recognised as possessing the strongest affinity to capitalist functional requirements were aesthetes.”

I have hinted at an important strand in Gottdiener’s analytic account by suggesting that for him there is a materialist logic to cultural change. In effect this picks up themes that Gottdiener develops from the French social theorist Jean Baudrillard, that in late capitalism goods are no longer marketed or sought for their intrinsic utility but instead for their symbolic connotations. These symbolic associations are promoted through a combination of mass advertising and highly stylized commercial venues offering a generalized corporate benevolence as well as the (partial) satisfaction of desire: “now businesses are increasingly building environments as themed spaces . . . People increasingly enjoy these symbol-filled milieus . . . for their own sake as entertaining spaces” (p. 76). The logic of theming is therefore ideological; it works to promote the interests of commercial elites. But Gottdiener describes the mode of ideology as hegemonic because the pleasures of themed environments cannot be completely controlled by their designers. They offer spaces for the realizations of fantasy otherwise denied by the conformity of suburban estates: “We are compelled to visit the mall for shopping or the theme
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park and casino for a vacation, because it is within these environments, after many years of media conditioning, that we feel most like ‘ourselves’" (p. 128). Themed spaces offer security from what have become the uninhabitable centers of major cities, but the price is that we give everyday life over to “the plethora of popular culture symbols that now pervade our environment... Our everyday lives currently occur in thoroughly commodified spaces, whether we are alone or in a place of public communion” (p. 144).

It is difficult to avoid giving the impression that this is a dystopian vision, although the full flavor of the book is more ambivalent—an ambivalence that underlies the more central weakness of the enterprise. The use of imagery in creating simulated social environments is an important theme in contemporary culture, but we need both a more sophisticated historiography and a more detailed sense of the dynamics of what I have called elsewhere an aesthetics of representation to avoid the superficial confusions of this account.


John Boli
Emory University

A cultural historian at the State University at New York, Buffalo, Tamara Plakins Thornton has penned in elegant style a volume that both enriches the intellect and satisfies the aesthetic palate. Her subject is handwriting, her period the past three centuries, and her study a wide-ranging investigation of handwriting’s cultural roles and meanings. She knowingly explores such topics as the evolution of European scripts, the history of the printing press in Colonial America, the rise of graphology, and trends in handwriting instruction methods. At every step she reveals the importance of each topic for understanding both handwriting forms as such and the social significance of the cultural elements implicated in handwriting. She also does the reader the very useful service of ending each chapter with a concise summary that fixes her detailed material in the larger frames she constructs as interpretive windows on the handwriting world.

This book brims with insightful analysis. For example, in the colonial period, handwriting was formalized status. A limited number of “hands” were available, suiting the merchant, the lawyer, the clerk; male hands differed from female, gentle hands from coarse. As in most places, writing was dissociated from reading and mostly a male preserve, a measure of a man’s integrity and reliability but, for writing women, a decorative art. Writing was “self-presentation but not self-expression” (p. 41), for it allowed for no subjectivity in its practice. Yet writing was more personal.
than print, whose rigid, anonymous forms masked the character and intentions of authors. Publications therefore often appeared in sizable numbers as handwritten copies.

In the 19th century the subjective dimension of handwriting flourished. Victorians concerned about self-discipline and bodily control made of handwriting an exacting physical endeavor (the Spencer method) that would keep the subjective firmly in hand. Individuality grounded in the newly popular concept of the unconscious emerged as a presumed determinant of handwriting style but largely to the detriment of the individual, for early rationalized forms of graphology sought above all to unmask forgers and other criminals. In counterpoint to this scientized movement, romantic notions of glamorous unconventionality in a world of industrial regimentation yielded autograph collectors and a cottage industry of handwriting analysts divining clues about the suitability of prospective mates.

The 20th century opened with a scientific attack on graphology as character analysis but with considerable effort (by Thorndike, among others) to add handwriting tests to the array of assessments of intelligence. In schools, the Palmerian method from the 1880s, a simple, rapid style emphasizing the physiological components of writing, marched triumphantly across the land. Intending to help “reform the dangerous, assimilate the foreigner” (p. 174), educators used penmanship to foster discipline and conformity. Yet the tension between uniformity and individuality continued, with expanded interest in graphology and autographs, rising gender equality as men’s and women’s hands became more similar, and psychological analyses that depicted handwriting individuality as categorical and genetic.

As I have indicated, Thornton’s prose pleases greatly; the book is a reader’s joy. Mellifluous, precise, a ready mot juste at every turn, her writing tells her tale with strong images and effortless clarity. A sample, summarizing the reaction to 19th-century women’s acquisition of the ability to write: “The only solution seemed to be to dip the female pen in invisible ink, to define women out of the world of writing altogether” (p. 71). Another sample, describing popularized graphology enterprises of the late 19th century that celebrated rather than condemned handwriting individuality: “These are mere whispers heard amid the cries of duplicity and danger, but they suggest that even at the end of the nineteenth century, men and women were drawn to the fact of individual difference for purposes other than surveillance and exposure” (p. 107). Thornton’s gifts as scribe and word painter are exceptional.

Against such praise, minor exceptions can be raised. One, more illustrations would improve the exposition, particularly with regard to the styles and methods discussed. Two, although the book avoids the common pitfall of telescoping events (ever thickening detail as the focus shifts closer) by concentrating its lens on the middle period, recent decades receive too little attention. Surely Thornton’s epilogue on the “symbolic functions of obsolescence” could say a good deal more.
A final, weightier issue must be mentioned: themes and arguments are rather period specific in this telling. Readers would benefit from a more systematic effort to develop the theoretical import consistently throughout the book. Control, self-control; conformity, individuality; self-display, self-development; objective institutions, subjective expression: Thornton would do well to allow her penetrating mind to elaborate more explicitly on the general processes reflected in her materials. Though this would alienate some of her disciplinary colleagues, I suspect that theory-minded sociologists will benefit more from—and better appreciate—her sparkling efforts in any case.


George Lipsitz
*University of California, San Diego*

In this imaginative, insightful, and thoroughly original study, Marita Sturken asks and answers important questions about collective memory, popular culture, and politics. Through semiotic, social, and ideological investigations of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, the AIDS Memorial Quilt, and a variety of other images and objects that people use to address, understand, and interpret traumatic events and experiences, Sturken shows how images and material objects sometimes serve as mechanisms for confronting events and experiences that might be too horrifying to engage in any other way. She reminds us that remembering and forgetting are not just things that we do as individuals, rather, that our collective civic life often revolves around complex collective negotiations about what will be remembered and what will be forgotten.

Sturken’s objects of study encompass a broad range of visual representations, and she offers especially interesting readings of photographs, films, and televised images of the Kennedy assassination, the Challenger explosion, and the Rodney King beating. Her most unusual and most profound contributions, however, come from her investigation into the ways in which political culture in the United States has been shaped in recent years by the production, circulation, and reception of complex and conflicting images of both the Vietnam War and the AIDS epidemic. Many of us might initially think of these two tragic and horrifying historical events as belonging to separate spheres of existence and representation—the war as political and public, the epidemic as private and personal. Sturken shows us, however, the inadequacy of these kinds of divisions. She describes how elected officials, media marketers, and social activists have all struggled (albeit for different reasons) to emphasize the private and personal consequences of the war in Vietnam, while at the
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same time stressing the public and political dimensions of the epidemic. Ironically enough, the processes set in motion to memorialize the war through the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, with its dearth of political symbolism and its emphasis on the names of individual members of the U.S. armed forces, allows the war to occupy public space largely as a repository of private and personal grief and remembrance. Conversely, the success of the AIDS quilt in deploying the private and personal grief of individuals to claim public attention and resources from a society previously unsympathetic to the epidemic’s victims because of their presumed sexual orientations led to changes in scientific procedures and government funding in response to coordinated political pressure.

Among many impressive achievements in Tangled Memories, perhaps the most lasting will come from Sturken’s demonstration of the possibility, indeed of the necessity, of studying political culture as the product of the interaction of diverse realms, including commercial culture, the state, and social movements. It has become commonplace even among interdisciplinary scholars in recent years to study the cultural politics of the state, of social movements, and of commercial culture as if they existed in separate spheres. Yet, in actual social experience, cultural productions in these spheres function as nodes in a network, mutually constituting one another even as they sometimes compete for the same constituencies. Memories of the Vietnam War generated by the state cannot be detached from memories that emanate from commercial culture or from the social activism that accompanied the war. Similarly, cultural struggles over collective memory and the AIDS epidemic initiated by grassroots activists always exist in dialogic relation with commercial culture’s representations of sexuality, disease, and social identities as well as with the words, images, and actions deployed by politicians on these same issues.

Sturken’s sophisticated research framework and her impressive skills as an interpreter of political, social, and cultural issues all make this a breakthrough study—the kind that forces future researchers to take on tasks of greater ambition and, consequently, greater achievement. She shows that historical remembrance cannot be taken literally; the monument erected to “remember” deceased U.S. veterans of the Vietnam War can also erase acknowledgement of the 3 million Southeast Asians killed in the same conflict. At the same time, the traumas inflicted by the Vietnam War and by the AIDS epidemic have also been remembered because they serve to arbitrate broader fears and anxieties about changes in gender roles and about the authority of science. In addressing these issues—and many others—Sturken shows how acts of remembering and forgetting are neither innately emancipatory nor innately constraining.

Projecting our anxieties back to the past may enable us to view things in the present more clearly, but we can also use the past as a way of hiding from our own problems and concerns. Sturken shows us that the tangled nature of our memories has as much to do with what we have not addressed in the present as with what we are still trying to process.
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from the past. Her eloquent, carefully argued, and well-reasoned book augments our understanding of the past and its horrifying traumas to be sure, but its greatest contribution comes from its simultaneous ability to arm us with insight about and to understand the complicated challenges we face in the present.


Michael P. Steinberg
Cornell University

If you are a social theorist interested in the cultural construction of subjectivity and in the personality of Max Weber as paradigm of the fin de siècle crisis of modern subjectivity and its relation to the founding of disciplines (such as sociology), then you must give an invested reading to Eric Santner’s groundbreaking and intensely challenging new book. Santner’s portrait of Daniel Paul Schreber (1842–1911) is presented within an intricate collage that incorporates briefer treatments of Freud, Kafka, Richard Wagner, and Walter Benjamin, elaborated in a theoretical frame derived from arguments about the social interpellation of the modern subject as developed by Lacan, Althusser, Foucault, and Zizek. It is an extraordinarily elegant argument about the crisis of fin de siècle European subjectivity with a broader claim about the structure and burdens of modern subjectivity in general.

Santner understands “the central paradox of modernity” to be “that the subject is solicited by a will to autonomy in the name of the very community that is thereby undermined, whose very substance passes over into the subject” (p. 145). Max Weber had a similar take on modernity, which he attributed to secularization or disenchantment. The profoundly welcome and analytically promising variation at work here is the depiction of modernization and modernity as scenes of reenchantment: that tendency of the subject to claim autonomy while modeling itself on displaced sacred authority, such as the state. The authority of the state has a central presence in the Schreber story, but what is especially interesting is the emergence of undisguised religious identifications and phantasms. Thus, whereas the dislocations of modern subjectivity produce mass psychoses such as anti-Semitism, such psychoses also carry powerful self-identifications with the objects of culturally and ideologically produced abjection. In this light, it makes little sense to talk about the “self-hating Jew”; it makes much more sense to talk about the ideologically available stereotype of the Jew for the purposes of abject identification, on the part of Jews as well as non-Jews. The problem is the self-hating modern subject, who, in the case of Schreber, comes from the Protestant patriciate.

Daniel Paul Schreber was the son of Daniel Moritz Schreber, who re-

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mains notorious even in today’s Germany as an originator of the cult of the correct body, which made physical respectability into a form of literal self-imprisonment. Daniel Paul grew up a prime object of his father’s experiments, including straps and bars to induce upright sitting and immovable supine position in bed. One could scarcely conjure a more perfect scenario for the Wilhelmine superego. In 1893, following his investiture as presiding judge of the Saxon Supreme Court, the “young” Schreber fell into a psychotic illness that would plague him for virtually the rest of his life. That illness produced a text, his 1903 Memoirs of My Nervous Illness. Original and crucial to Santner’s analysis is the focus on Schreber’s descent into mental illness at the moment of his investiture.

Illness—in this case, paranoia—and its narrative become, in Santner’s analysis, a secret passage out of the iron cage created by the enforced repetition of the system of power’s rules. In paranoia and its symptoms, the son finds a way not to become the father, the judge not to become the voice of the state that has empowered him. Where previous readers of Schreber (such as Elias Canetti) understood his paranoia as a prehistory of fascism, Santner finds in it a potential for the “avoidance” of the “totalitarian temptation” (p. xi).

Schreber’s symptoms included patterns of identifications with stereotypes of cultural abjection, chiefly women and Jews. The book’s final chapter, called “Schreber’s Jewish Question,” decodes Schreber’s Jewish identification in the contexts of other discourses of symbolic Jewishness, from Freud’s Moses and Monotheism to Kafka’s Metamorphosis, in an extraordinarily rich display of the conundrums of symbolic meanings of Jewishness in the central European fin de siecle.

The book makes two broad claims about modern subjectivity, and on each of them I find myself going halfway in agreement with the author. The first claim is that the Schreber case offers a paradigm for the modern interpellated subject. Here I would ask for more historicization and argue that the overwhelming assault on subjectivity characteristic of the European fin de siecle, particularly of its demand that subjects understand themselves in the image of national power, legitimacy, and respectability, generated a degree of psychic crisis not necessarily applicable to earlier modern contexts. The second claim is that the Kafkaesque erasure of functional subjectivity can be inverted by a personality that functions through symptoms alone—indeed that ethical and political integrity, even heroism, can emerge from a delusional personality. (Santner reads Schreber’s own text in a highly refracted manner—as a commentary on Freud’s reading—and thus forecloses on a less mediated interpretation of Schreber’s own narrative voice as a referendum on a reemergent subjectivity.) Here I would want to hold back—to suggest that after Weber, Freud, and Foucault, we can understand subjectivity as unfreeable from the pressures of interpellation and its resulting symptomatologies, but that the survival or remaking of an extrasymptomatic subjectivity is necessary for ethical and political functioning. Thus my first caveat with this
powerful paradigm is a historical one, my second, an ethical and political one.

To the historian, the Schreber story reads fascinatingly as it tracks the problems generated, for a Protestant cosmos, by the compulsion to switch the cultural “other” from Catholicism (which in 1870 could still be projected as the source of traditional social and cultural power in central Europe) to the Jews (in which case the projection of otherness was clearly a pretext for persecution). There is the following method in Schreber’s madness: to play out his Protestant anxiety, Schreber fantasized, in a vintage Prussian and Saxon manner, about being persecuted by Catholics, but for the sake of emotional authenticity, he had to identify with the abject position of the Jew. Santner elaborates powerfully the elements of Schreber’s self-delusion as an inversion of Martin Luther, who also appealed to the Luciferian rhetoric of the refusal to serve. The resulting Luciferian “fall” into abjection is prescribed culturally as the fall into the fin de siècle conundrum of degeneration, femininity, and Jewishness. There is a brilliant political gesture in this picture: the unmasking of the bogus trope of the “self-hating Jew” as the self-hating fin de siècle subject.

Santner’s analysis of Protestantism as a cultural system is multiply deflected into a brief account of Schreber’s own references to the Kulturkampf of the 1870s (p. 103). Much more thought is needed in order to come up with an analysis of a crisis of Protestant subjectivity (the crisis of Schreber and, more significantly, the Max Weber of the 1890s), which is a crisis of the word-identified ego. Weber, unlike Schreber, emerges from this crisis with a renewed ability to name—in his case, to name a new discipline: sociology. Freud responded to fin de siècle crisis with a similar volition, by naming the new discipline of psychoanalysis. But the cultural and ideological contexts of these disciplinary foundations are profoundly different. The Protestant, word-based culture of Weber and Schreber counters the image- and representation-oriented context of Freud’s Catholic Austria. In the technique of dream interpretation, Freud explicitly transforms images into words, thus enacting a kind of Protestantization and Judaization of an image-based symbolic order of reality. (In the Austrian context, the prime analogue to Schreber—and to the discourse limited to the symptomatic—is Otto Weininger, whose treatise, Sex and Character, was published in 1903, the same year as Schreber’s Memoirs.)

Santner’s important and incisive purpose is to chart the prehistory of the paranoia that became the mass-psychological predisposition to fascism. But in the world of paranoia and the purely symptomatic, the rejection of totalitarianism is difficult—perhaps impossible—to differentiate from its ratification. Santner’s sympathetic take on Schreber as a critic and victim is not enough to make him into a hero. The paranoid personality, as it is presented here, offers no integrity, that dimension of subjectivity that remains capable of reasoning and acting. A functioning subjectivity must be produced both by the self and by the surrounding culture.
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A context, such as fascism, that denies subjectivity in principle makes the slightest glimmer of its survival a heroic act.

Paranoia describes both the fascist mentality and its resistance. Just as the same paranoia produces at once National Socialism and its critique, the same “descent” into phantasmatic identification with women and Jews produces at once a sympathetic, empowering engagement with femininity and Jewishness and a reenactment of misogyny and anti-Semitism. Where is the space for political differentiation and political action—for the ability to think ethically and politically? Schreber may survive, as Santner asserts, “by momentarily refusing to make sense of it all and by himself becoming a player in the ruination of meaning” (p. 93). But how can he be understood to function, and how can a model of subjectivity conceived in his image be said to be one that functions?

Santner signals one way out of this trap, which is both deeply humane and incomplete. It is the suggestion that the knowledge of abjection—as admitted and, literally, published, by Schreber—can serve as a critique of that denial of abjection through which power confers legitimacy and demands obedience. Thus the knowledge of abjection is ethically required by a reality principle that refuses to repress the very existence of abjection. But that knowledge must exist as a function of the distance of the thinking ego to the perceived and even self-identified dimension of abjection. Santner’s reading of Kafka’s Gregor Samsa in The Metamorphosis serves as a summary of Santner’s Schreber: “[his] fall into abjection can be approached as a symptom whose fascinating presence serves as a displaced condensation of larger and more diffuse disturbances within the social field marked out be the text” (p. 129). But can Schreber be always both Gregor Samsa and Kafka? Or do we read Kafka both because Kafka is Gregor Samsa and, more fundamentally, because he is not?


Victor W. Marshall
University of Toronto

Katz offers us an analysis of “how gerontology has made the problems of aging amenable to the strategies of contemporary knowledge-production” (p. 117). The book can thus be read as a study in the sociology of knowledge or of science. The major intellectual payoff is the attention drawn to the interplay between the social constitution of disciplines and fields and the ways in which that constitution creates the object (or as Foucault and Katz would say, the “subject”) of their knowledge-constituting practices.

A lengthy introductory chapter provides a clear, balanced introduction...
to Foucault’s and Bourdieu’s theories. Katz also draws on other contemporary critical and feminist theorists to construct an analytical apparatus that he puts to good use in the rest of the book, which is fashioned as a contribution to critical gerontology.

The first substantive chapter examines the ways in which old age has been disciplined in relation to the body. It does so by an examination of medical thought from the ancients to the early stages in the development of geriatric medicine. The second substantive chapter examines the elderly population through administrative apparatus and the social survey, and the third examines gerontology and geriatrics texts. All of these subjects are related, because all reflect different social processes that constitute “the aged” as well as those who administer, service, or study them.

In chapter 4 Katz, through the lenses of Foucault and Bourdieu, seeks to understand how gerontology can be a field outside of traditional disciplinary criteria. He argues that multi- (trans-, inter-, cross-) disciplinary efforts act against the thrust of disciplinarity and are potentially counter-disciplinary (p. 109). Disciplinarity and multidisciplinarity co-constitute each other dialectically in setting and shifting boundaries. Katz notes that few fields are as committed to multidisciplinarity as gerontology but examines the “disciplinary construction of multidisciplinarity” (p. 4) in this book, including the fact that there is more mutual tolerance and respect for other disciplines than genuine interdisciplinary collaboration. For all his emphasis on social processes that are somewhat abstractly formulated in Foucauldian or Bourdieuan language, when he seeks to explain how multidisciplinarity came to be so ideologically central to gerontology, Katz perhaps gives undue credit to the leadership of one individual, E. V. Cowdry, who edited an important multidisciplinary collection (Problems of Ageing: Biological and Medical Aspects, 2d ed. [Williams and Wilkins, 1942]). A greater emphasis on the organizational imperatives of the Social Science Research Council (which could hardly foster a unidisciplinary development but had much to gain from fostering a multidisciplinary one) might have been more in line with Bourdieu, as would an analysis of the mutual gains each of the cognate disciplines sought in collaborating.

Methodologically, the case is made in successive chapters by focusing on selected scholars, texts, research institutes, focal research topics, and publications. This requires readers to make judgments about “representativeness”—not in any statistical sense but in assessing fairness and the symbolic representation of a field. I find remarkably little to quibble about in his selectiveness. The very logic of the book denies that there could or should be one faithful account, and Katz makes a strong case for his approach in contrast to the “progress of science” study of the growth of a discipline.

The comprehensive and theoretically grounded research leads to an impressive work of scholarship that both answers and raises questions. Well into this scholarly book, Katz discusses some of the major multidisciplinary research studies that have been important landmarks in the...
growth of gerontology as a field and asks, Did they “actually discover the processes of aging, or did they organize such processes in ways that were scientifically recognizable and functional within the specific confines of the gerontological web?” (p. 116). Katz’s perspective permits only one answer to this question: Knowledge is not “out there” to be discovered; knowledge is socially constituted through a process that coproduces that which is known and the knowing discipline or administrative apparatus.

Katz does not want old age to be disciplined and seems to be happy that it resists it: “Old age undisciplines gerontological knowledge in two ways: first, the realities, experiences, times, and spaces of old age defy conventional attempts to understand it; second, the indefinite, imaginary, and impossible character of old age itself destabilizes attempts to fix it” (p. 139). Yet he states that “gerontologists have bettered life in old age” (p. 135). Does he then want gerontology, but not old age, to be disciplined? Can gerontology be disciplined without disciplining old age?

This book is for serious scholars in several areas, including advanced graduate students. The 21 pages of notes add to its seriousness but are informative and should not be missed. Because it both explicated and tests through usage a Foucauldian analysis, this book’s appeal extends well beyond gerontologists and life course theorists to anyone seriously interested in questions of theory and its usefulness.


Frank F. Furstenberg
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A steady stream of books has appeared on the disintegration of the nuclear family, the decline of marriage, and the deterioration of children’s well-being. No doubt *Life without Father*, David Popenoe’s latest salvo on the consequences of men’s retreat from family life, will take its place alongside the rest. The book is at once a compendium of social science research on the paternal role, a passionate appeal for resurrecting men’s authority as parents, and a list of prescriptions for rebuilding marital commitments and restoring the paternal role.

Sociologists of the family (historians as well) may find fault with the uneven quality of Popenoe’s portrayal of scholarly findings and dispute the bold claim on the jacket cover that the book offers “compelling new evidence that fatherhood and marriage are indispensable for the good of children.” In fact, the evidence is neither original nor especially compelling. Nonetheless, the book makes for interesting reading, for Popenoe writes well and has the great virtue of telling it as he believes it should be—even if he does not always do such a good job of telling it as it is.
Popenoe’s interpretation of family change here is much closer to main-line interpretations than in some of his earlier writings. There is far less ranting about family decline than in Disturbing the Nest (Aldine de Gruyter, 1988) and a more sober and balanced historical account of the social, economic, and cultural changes that have destabilized the conjugal bond and limited parental authority over children. Yet, when he comes to say what these changes have meant for children, the link between the changes and the presumed consequences is suspect to say the least. Popenoe tells us in his chapter on “The Human Carnage of Fatherlessness” that “evidence indicating damage to children has accumulated in near tidal-wave proportions” (p. 77). But how is Popenoe to explain that the tidal wave of damage to children was being first felt in the very era, 1950–1964, when children were raised in nuclear families? Moreover, during the following decade, when according to Popenoe all hell broke loose, this cohort of children from stable families were marching on the streets, experimenting with drugs, and openly admitting that they were sexual creatures. And as they got older, they were among the first to drive the age at first marriage up to new heights.

In the Victorian era, which he singles out as the apogee of family stability and social civility, a significant minority of children lost a parent while they were growing up. This was also a time when a goodly fraction of American children were placed in fosterage or sent out of the home to work. Popenoe needs to make sense of the seemingly improbable link—at least at a macrosocial level—between growing up in two-parent households and the behavior of children. One suspects that the stability of the family and the welfare of children may be linked to a common set of cultural, social, and economic conditions.

To bolster his argument, Popenoe assembles what slim evidence exists on the benefits of the biological father in the home. This is not to say that he is wrong to presume that the presence of a biological father benefits children. However, he consistently ignores the enormous variability that exists within family types that swamps the variability between family types. All the literature points to moderate, albeit important differences. To convert those relative differences into the proposition that fathers are indispensable for the welfare of children is at best a gross exaggeration of what the social science literature tells us.

We know that children thrive under conditions of nurturing, support, constancy, high expectations, and reasonable standards. How much these conditions are correlated, much less created, by the presence of a father is a matter of urgent research interest, but it has hardly been settled by the data as Popenoe claims.

Popenoe also confuses the advantages provided by fathers who provide quality care and the mere presence of biological fathers in the home. To the extent that biological fathers are more likely to offer this care than alternative parent figures (single mothers, stepfathers, grandparents, lovers), biological fathers may be superior to other coparents. However, researchers really have not yet convincingly established this proposition.
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When committed fathers are present, are they superior to the benefits provided by an equally involved grandparent, lover, or stepparent? It is necessary to compare, not just all stepfathers, but the subgroup of skilled and committed stepfathers with their counterparts in nuclear households. Also, in making this comparison, we need to net out the negative effects of divorce on children that occur prior to the establishment of stepfamily households. If the damage were already done, it would be incorrect to attribute the child’s problems later in life to the presence of a stepfamily.

Popenoe is correct to remind us, as he does in a chapter devoted to “What Fathers Do,” that we dare not neglect biological evidence. However, evidence from biology must include behavioral genetics and comparative studies of primates as well as evolutionary biology, a strand of scholarship to which Popenoe seems unduly attracted, no doubt because he believes it shores up his argument. Variation in father-related roles, Popenoe observes, is enormous both across culture and historically in Western society. If there is a lesson to be drawn from anthropology, history, or biology, it would certainly not suggest that the Victorian family represented the pinnacle of evolutionary and cultural development though it might indeed tell us that, for social systems to survive, they must do a good job in providing for children and equipping them to make contributions as adults.

I share Popenoe’s assessment that American society is not doing an adequate job of caring for its children. We have managed to create the worst of all worlds by assigning tremendous importance to the role of biological parents but granting them little social and economic support to assume the responsibility of child care. We have been unwilling to support alternative family forms with cash and institutional assistance for fear that they will further weaken marriage. This perverse policy has emiserated children by both failing to support marriage and failing to support its alternatives. Instead, we publicly bemoan the fate of the family and blame parents for their lack of commitment to children.

Is there any evidence that parents are less committed to children than they were at mid-century? Do parents spend more time and resources on themselves and less on their children? Do those without dependent children spend less on other people’s children than we did a half century ago?

Readers of Life without Father are told that restoring fathers to the family requires nothing less than the “cultural revitalization of marriage.” Popenoe’s prescriptions range from rebuilding local communities to promoting promarriage values and everything in between, including postponing premarital sex, delaying marriage further, granting parental leave, reinstituting stricter divorce statutes for couples with children, reforming welfare by creating jobs, and so on. Oddly enough, little of it is aimed at reshaping the political and economic culture that creates many of the problems that all us. Despite acknowledging that the radical form of consumer capitalism in this country lies at the heart of the issue of strength-
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ening the family, Popenoe clings to the belief that marriage could be re-
stored with a heavy dose of values and a light touch of economic reform.

**Ambition and Accommodation: How Women View Gender Relations.** By
Roberta S. Sigel. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pp. x+240. $48.00
(cloth); $16.95 (paper).

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Are contemporary women postfeminists, for whom discrimination is an
infrequent and minor event, heralded in popular media (Laura Shapiro,
“Sisterhood Was Powerful” *Newsweek* (June 20, 1994): 68–70)? In an
era of backlash to feminism (Susan Faludi, *Backlash: The Undeclared
War against Women* [Crown, 1991]), do women reject feminism? Or are
they closeted feminists who avoid the label while privately endorsing the
women’s movement? Or have contemporary women crafted a new con-
figuration of perceptions about gender relations and feminism?

To answer these questions, Sigel conducted an original research project
involving 650 New Jersey residents. Her findings suggest that contempo-
rary perceptions about gender relations are more complex than either the
postfeminism or the backlash images suggest. Women are “ambitious”
because they seek equality in their everyday lives while recognizing that
discrimination is pervasive; they are “accommodating” because they re-
ject collective, policy-based strategies in favor of nonconfrontational indi-
vidual coping mechanisms.

Initially Sigel’s findings may appear to be common sense, but readers
who delve into Sigel’s book will soon realize that these general findings
are only the tip of the iceberg. What Sigel offers readers is a well-written,
highly textured account of the nuanced crosscurrents and contradictions
of contemporary views of gender relations that is both conceptually an-
chored and methodologically sophisticated.

Sigel deftly provides an appropriate theoretical framework focusing on
three primary concepts for this study of attitudes about gender relations.
First, Sigel uses an institutionally defined “gender perspective” that lo-
cates power dynamics at the center of social construction of gender. Sec-
ond, according to the concept of “relative deprivation,” comparing one’s
group to other groups who are receiving rewards to which you feel enti-
tled can lead to a sense of anger that, in turn, promotes participation in
struggles to reduce the extent of deprivation. Third, current models of
group consciousness (A. Miller, P. Gurin, G. Gurin, and O. Malanchuk,
“Group Consciousness and Political Participation” *American Journal of
Political Science* (1981):494–511) assume that people who are aware of
and upset by systematic injustice are committed to and participate in
struggles to eliminate inequality. Because these models do not fit the
women in this research, Sigel creates the concept of “minority conscious-

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ness” to describe the substantial portion of women who see themselves as part of a disadvantaged group; they are angry over pervasive discrimination and want equality but do not endorse political, collective solutions.

A chapter on methods effectively discusses the advantages and disadvantages of combining telephone interviews of 400 women and 200 men with single-sex focus groups of 50 women and men in a single research project. Two advantages seem particularly noteworthy. First, themes emerging from the focus groups were used to construct the questionnaire, approximately 80 questions. Second, combining quantitative and qualitative methods not only permits cross-verification of attitudes, but it also elucidates the nuanced eddies, backwaters, and whirlpools of contemporary attitudes in a transition period.

The discussion of men’s perceptions, for example, reveals the effectiveness of this design. While less supportive than women, between 23% and 57% of men in the telephone survey acknowledged that gender discrimination exists (p. 145). The survey results, however, exaggerate the men’s support of gender equality compared to their comments in the focus groups: Men seldom raised the topic of discrimination, limited the possibility of discrimination to encounters in work settings, justified the continuation of existing gender relations, did not consider women working the second shift a problem, and tended to endorse traditional family structures. Thus, men were ambivalent about recent changes and had made few substantive attitudinal, much less behavioral, changes supportive of egalitarian gender relations.

In contrast to men, the majority of women acknowledged in the survey that pervasive discrimination exists. In focus groups, women openly discussed their personal encounters with discrimination and their anger over their experiences, particularly regarding the second shift and the disrespect of having their opinions and contributions ignored. Yet, in the survey women were almost equally divided over whether the government is doing enough to improve the position of women, and they ignored a number of feminist issues, such as abortion and sexual harassment, in focus groups. Sigel explains this apolitical response in terms of the adoption of two protective coping mechanisms—a “not-me syndrome,” in which women consider themselves exempt from pervasive discrimination, and a “refuse-to-be-bothered strategy,” in which women accept discrimination as a “fact of life” while individually struggling against it. Rather than coping by compliance, confrontation, or collective action, the women in Sigel’s study preferred an accommodation-for-a-purpose strategy of avoiding confrontations with men while individually struggling to “make it” in a sexist society.
Debated time and time again as one of the most divisive issues in American society, abortion in its many sociologically relevant dimensions remains poorly understood. The state of abortion research is a rather sad instance of our discipline’s occasional lack of attention for issues that passionately move broad segments of society. With *Doctors of Conscience*, sociologist Carole Joffe has added to the sparse scholarly informed abortion literature. We should be grateful for the author’s effort. But, unfortunately, there remains much to be desired about the results.

Based on interviews with 45 abortion providers, *Doctors of Conscience* presents an analysis of abortion services in the years before and after the Supreme Court decision of *Roe v. Wade* in 1973. The central argument of the book is that abortion was an inevitably risky enterprise before *Roe* and that it stayed an activity at the margins of mainstream medical practice in the period thereafter. The author presents various case studies as illustrations to indicate how abortion providers worked before and after 1973 and how they sought to legalize abortion in the days before *Roe*. Most striking is that the medical treatment of abortion after legalization of the practice did not gain much attention in professional health training and never received much support from within the medical profession. Thus, the freestanding abortion clinics represent the failure as much as the success of legalized abortion because they are as specialized in their work as they are marginalized from mainstream health care. The author concludes that, in order to secure women’s rights to abortion, the medical community should be more actively involved in supporting abortion services.

This book has its merits. It supports the argument that the history of abortion in the United States is surely not alone a history of *Roe v. Wade*. However relevant, the Supreme Court’s decision cannot be assumed to have had the impact on abortion access a legalistic outlook would naively imply. An analysis of the profession of abortion, indeed, adds to the value of the notion that rights are never secured through court activity and legislation only. The relative continuity in the medical profession’s ambivalence towards abortion, furthermore, suggests how misleading the histories are that portray a one-sided picture of greedy abortion butchers before 1973 and of respected professionals thereafter.

Regrettably, the weaknesses of this book are many. Most clearly demonstrating the tremendous bias and methodological flaws of this work, the bold conclusions and predictions follow an analysis that is based on interviews with only abortion providers who were doing their work for reason of a self-proclaimed compassion for women seeking abortion.
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The story told is inevitably one very sympathetic to the providers. The author acknowledges the limitations of her sampling methodology (p. 156) but totally fails to address the consequences. Instead, the perceptions of a select group of providers are relied upon to draw conclusions on the state of abortion services. The author overlooks that, while self-reports are perfectly acceptable for research on motivations and experiences, they are insufficient when trying to account for the conditions and implications thereof.

This book is theoretically not grounded, not in the sociology of health nor in the sociology of social movements, not in the sociology of law nor in political sociology. It for the better part presents a fragment of a history of abortion, one that, moreover, conveniently fits the author’s personal agenda. Explicitly mentioning her personal beliefs, the author occasionally touches upon sociologically significant themes but fails to address these to any satisfactory degree of sophistication (see, e.g., p. vii; chap. 7). Most notably, the discrepancy between legality and accessibility is often hinted at throughout this book but never sufficiently explored. We learn, for instance, that the availability of abortion services is uneven across the United States, but we do not learn of the factors that condition this state of affairs. Some of the providers interviewed are said to have played an active role in the repeal and reform movement in the 1960s, but there is almost no analysis of how the medical profession actually influenced changes in legislation. Some statements in this book remain without argument or proof, for instance, when the author claims that there is “no question” that the violence surrounding abortion has a chilling effect on its availability (p. 5). In her conclusions, Joffe is swayed to argue that the impact of abortion’s marginalization in mainstream health care can be overcome by educating and reforming the medical profession. But, while suggesting this empowerment through professionalization, she makes no mention of the created dependencies on reproductive technologies and does not mention the alienating effects of professionalism and medicalization.

Lacking a theoretically substantiated research agenda and a useful methodology, this book is unlikely to appeal to sociologists. However, participants in the popular abortion debate—regardless of what side they are on—may fare much better. Those who seek to secure women’s reproductive freedoms will find in this book further support for their conviction. Those who struggle for the dignity of fetal life will once again find an easy prey against which to position their viewpoint. For anyone interested in the sociology of selected aspects on abortion, Joffe’s book presents one more item in an ever-increasing mass of primary materials. Perhaps that was the author’s intention.
On one level, each of the main essays in States of Injury makes its own discrete, cutting point. In one essay, for example, Wendy Brown criticizes feminists who blame postmodernist theory for the practical fragmentation of identity, diffusion of power, and instability of place in the contemporary period. In another, she exposes the toxicity of demands by subordinate groups for social recognition and restitution. She chides Catharine MacKinnon for treating sexuality as if it were rigidly dualistic, sadomasochistic, and the basis of gender power everywhere. She explores the paradox that, for groups trying to achieve the full status of personhood, winning individual rights ensures the erasure of their collective situation and winning group rights ensures the reentrenchment of their marginal identity.

Brown also probes the tension between liberalism’s explicit valorization of public equality, liberty, autonomy, rights, the individual, self-interest, and contract and its implicit dependence on private difference, encumbrance, duties, selflessness, the family unit, and passive consent. What happens when women, who sustain liberalism’s implicit goods, reject them for liberalism’s explicit ones? In her final chapter, Brown looks askance at demands that the state act to equalize social relations, underlining the state’s masculinism and the way state interventions in society entail state normalizations of society.

On another level, States of Injury etches out a provocative overarching position on power, resistance, and freedom in the late-20th-century United States. Brown’s greatest methodological feat is to dive for pearls in Karl Marx, whom almost everyone these days has forsaken but whose ideas, as Brown reveals, provide a strong antidote for the rancor of identity politics, the self-satisfaction of liberalism, and the blind spots of a Foucauldianism she otherwise upholds. Brown makes an especially brilliant move when she returns to Marx’s essay, “On the Jewish Question,” drawing on this still unsurpassed critique of liberalism to capture the conundrums confronting identities that strive for emancipation in a liberal frame.

Brown’s bravest substantive feats are forecast in her fine introductory chapter, which is nicely haunted by shades of Marx, Nietzsche, Weber, and Foucault. Brown reveals resentment to be a motivating impulse of contemporary radical politics, manifesting itself in the call for the victimizer’s guilty conscience and, thus, oddly enough, in the desire for the continued relation of victimization that gives the victim his or her moral edge. She shows how the politics of resentment contributes to the disciplinary and regulatory power of the state. Brown emphasizes the need
for a radical reclamation of freedom but acknowledges its difficulty too, given liberalism’s appropriation of freedom as its own idea, conservatism’s lambast against all freedom “other than free enterprise” as “selfish” and “infantile” (p. 9), and postmodernism’s portrait of the free subject as nothing but an effect of subjection. Brown assails identity politicians for capitulating to liberalism’s fetishization of the individual by equating subjective feelings of empowerment with real freedom and power. She assails critical theorists for replicating liberalism’s idealism by looking for freedom in a civil society supposedly autonomous of economy and state. She holds that the current inattention of democrats to economic domination and their preoccupation with sexual, racial, and ethnic identities at once obscure and express class power. Finally, Brown presses us to see that while the idea of a dialectic of history is no longer persuasive, the idea had the virtue of fostering optimism about social change and a positive, not merely resistant political will. It is up to us, she hints, to find a better way to accomplish the same trick.

There are, inevitably, flaws in this admirable book. Brown displays the postmodern habits of ridiculing the moralism of others while insisting on the rightness and goodness of her own ideas and of highlighting the topic of style but disregarding it in her own uninviting prose. Despite her assimilation of Marx, she often reduces everything to discourse. For example, while she skillfully details multiple modalities of the state, she ignores its modality as alienated social power that might be retrieved and used for the common good. That the state is irrevocably masculinist in all its aspects is, coming from Brown, an oddly “totalistic” and paranoid view. These irritations aside, Brown’s formidable book, States of Injury, will give theorists and activists a vigorous intellectual workout. Politically, alas, they might well be confused about where Brown thinks the space for radical democratic politics really lies now that she has nixed the struggle for rights, identity politics, civic association, and popular pressure on the state as well as revolutionary action, the alternative that no one proposes anymore.

Gendering the Middle East: Emerging Perspectives. Edited by Deniz Kandiyoti. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1996. Pp. xii+177. $39.95 (cloth); $16.95 (paper).

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For a change, the subtitle of this book, “Emerging Perspectives,” is legitimate. The main title points to a recalcitrance in our sociological, Middle Eastern, and gender/women’s studies scholarship to remark that an area, a topic, a group, is “gendered.” This collection is only one among a burgeoning field that claims to subvert sexism, racism, classicism, and Western ethnocentrism. What fresh perspectives can we expect?
In scanning the backgrounds of the eight contributors to this collection of seven essays and an introduction, one realizes that a majority of the contributors are writing from within or from the rift, and sometimes from exile. These seven authors, in addition to Deniz Kandiyoti, represent varied fields (history, sociology, anthropology, international relations [politics], and English) and positionalities (Turkish, British, Iranian, Dutch, North American, Israeli, and Egyptian descent and residence). This is, however, still a European-derived set of essays in the sense that the work emerged from the Middle East Study Group in London.

Yet, for all of its diversity, this is not an equal representation collection nor one that engages in artificial tokenism. There was a more important set of goals. Contributors were asked to interrogate the canons of their disciplines, to use “gender analysis as a tool for social criticism” (p. ix), and to engage in feminist analytic intervention. That the collection favors Iran (two essays), Palestine (including Palestinian diaspora studies), and Israel/Palestine, with only one essay on Egypt, does not matter here.

Kandiyoti informs us that the task of postcolonial scholarship, which analyzes the relationship between Western imperialist discourse and colonized subalterity, is to interrogate the points of intersection, dialogue, and confrontation among discourses emanating from distinct sociohistorical locations, especially when these are situated outside the West (pp. 1, 19). In the overview essay, “Contemporary Feminist Scholarship and Middle East Studies,” Deniz Kandiyoti explores the “discursive limitations” (p. x) of existing scholarship, offering critiques of three phases: (1) combating androcentric bias, (2) accounting for the subordination of women, and (3) shifting from the concept “woman” to the concept “gender.” The current phase may be described as both post-Orientalist and poststructuralist, and Kandiyoti leaves us with provocative questions about future directions.

Joanna de Groot’s chapter, while critiquing “three moments” in gender studies, epitomizes some of the new directions she suggests. The “three moments” are recuperative (making women visible), redefinitional (new accounts of the institutions and conditions of women’s lives), and transformative (a project “in which the actual frameworks of social, historical, and cultural analysis are being challenged and altered” [p. 30]).

In “Feminism and Islam in Iran,” Parvin Paidar (who began her U.S. academic career writing under the pseudonym, Nahid Yehaneh) traverses early nationalist and statist feminism in an era of cultural nationalism, arguing that “Iranian feminism was essentially secular until the rise of Shi’i modernism in the 1970s” (p. 57). She ends with a discussion of contemporary Islamist feminism, that odd bird that perplexes so many Western feminists, concluding that the opportunities of women are limited.

Annelies Moors’s essay “Gender Relations and Inheritance: Person, Power, and Property in Palestine” puts in practice a method to which most feminist scholars can only aspire: she demonstrates with ethnographic data how focusing on gender challenges materialist assumptions about the necessary connections between property and power in the Mid-
dle East, the heart of much of the historical and anthropological literature on the region. She shifts our focus from the nature of property to the position of the women involved, stressing women’s elaborate inheritance strategies and the dynamic character of the process in Palestine. It is an exciting and important piece of work that appropriately centers gender and women.

Sheila Hannah Katz’s chapter on early Jewish and Palestinian nationalisms is an historical tour de force. Using pre-1950s Palestinian and Jewish texts, she demonstrates how changing nationalist constructions of masculinities and femininities and the eroticization of “the land” have shaped contemporary power relations between Jews and Arabs. Another powerful explicator of contemporary Jewish/Arab relations in Israel/Palestine, Simona Sharoni effectively engages in feminist intervention strategies to elucidate the masculinist and militaristic underpinnings of the peace accord, but also to suggest strategies for unsettling the conventional conceptions of the “center” and “margins” of political life.

Hoda El Sadda, in “Women’s Writing in Egypt: Reflections on Salwa Bakr,” exemplifies the general strategy of the other essays: remaining close to one’s primary data (or positionality), observing the subject for unexplored interpretations, and engaging in her own feminist interventions (simultaneously analyzing Salwa Bakr’s). El Sadda explores Bakr’s analysis of language embedded in her fiction and the gendered nature of all literature, arguing that Bakr subverted dualities.

Rosemary Sayigh, longtime resident of Lebanon and observer of Palestinian camps, offers a complicated analysis. Locating herself, a feminist anthropologist, amidst the sprawling Shateela camp of the 1980s, she tries to work out the varied agendas of researcher, camp residents, and the national resistance struggle. With great power Sayigh explores issues of positionality, accountability, and ethics and how these affected her research methods and priorities.

Kandiyoti sees these essays linked through their feminist agenda and through foregrounding gender “as a means of understanding, decoding, and ultimately challenging . . . social and cultural phenomena” (p. xii). This statement is too modest. However, as to “feminist intervention,” I would caution that intervention is not a substitute for social action (and since most of the essayists are activists, I assume they would agree).

In many ways the essays are refreshing, for example, in not foregrounding Islam or the veil, now considered trite in the progressive literature on the Middle East. With the exception of one essay, Islam is just one of many social phenomena. Further, unlike other edited collections, these essays are unabashedly feminist, with no apologies offered. The authors do not feel compelled to classify their subjects’ activism on behalf of themselves, as women, as either “feminist” or “not feminist.”

Another important departure from other such collections within Middle Eastern women’s studies is that the essays are epistemological, evidence of a growing sophistication. The grand narratives have been at least partially abandoned and the need for analyses of “power relations
and political processes through which gender hierarchies are both created and contested is understood (p. 17), yet there is still a paucity of studies that actually accomplish that task.

The authors of these essays can certainly be said to have contextualized and historicized their subject matter. This is a collection that still falls within the modernist framework but in which the researchers use postmodernist strategies to subvert the old questions. However, of the modernist questions that might have lingered, my personal wish is that class had been among them.


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As historians of education have observed, school reform basically recycles two agendas: excellence and equity. Over the course of the last century reforms to promote excellence, typically achieved through increased centralization and standardization, have alternated with reforms to promote equity, typically achieved through decentralization and other changes intended to make schools more responsive to student needs. In The Social Construction of Virtue, Noblit and Dempsey critique both sides of the equity versus excellence debate and argue that the best hope for meaningful reform is to realize that “people in everyday life offer new possibilities for understanding the moral nature of education” (p. 12). When the authors speak of the “moral nature of education,” they are referring not to the idea that schools should teach values but to the argument that the “essential nature” of schools as institutions is to “express our [society’s] values.”

The book begins with an overview of the debate between advocates of excellence and standards (here represented by Mortimer Adler, Allan Bloom, and E. D. Hirsch) and advocates of equity (represented by Dewey). The recycling of reform, Noblit and Dempsey argue, reflects a long-standing conflict in Western society. Contemporary ideas about excellence come out of an oratorical tradition emphasizing the mastery of standards and the importance of received wisdom. Current notions of equity have developed out of a philosophical tradition emphasizing the search for truth and knowledge by means of individual experience. The major problem, as Noblit and Dempsey see it, is less the content of this debate than the way in which it dominates our thinking, crowding out other ideas about education. Unfortunately, the authors’ discussion of this claim is much too brief. If the ideas of the oratorical and philosophical traditions are guilty as charged of “silencing” other perspectives it
would be helpful to understand how and why these ideas have come to play such an important role in the arenas of educational theory and policy.

According to Noblit and Dempsey, one crucial idea that Adler, Bloom, Hirsch, and Dewey fail to grasp is that the “moral construction” of virtue, rather than the transmission of knowledge, is the most important function of schools. The everyday moral narratives that people construct about the purpose of their communities’ schools contain the blueprint for reform. To demonstrate this point the authors turn to an “ethnography” of elementary schools in two inner-city communities. The first school, located in a largely white neighborhood, is highly ranked and has a student body that is 70% African-American. The second school, located in a neighboring African-American community, was closed in 1975, and many of its students were redistricted to the school in the white community. The research for the book grew out of an invitation from the recently hired principal to write a school history intended to unify staff, parents, and students.

The ethnographic chapters whet the reader’s appetite for more information. The labored theoretical discussions interspersed throughout make for an arid picture of life at these schools and of the ways communities come to their decisions about what constitutes virtue vis-a-vis their local schools. Moreover, the ethnographic portraits of these two communities are hardly alternative examples of moral narratives about education. The data presented indicates that both communities tend to define virtue in terms of excellence, although the African-American community also valued collective responsibility and expressed a faith in redemption. The most engaging examples of the “construction of virtue” come at those points in the book that deal with the racial politics of the decision to close the school in the African-American community, the effect this decision continues to have on the current attitudes of the community and the school staff, and the interaction between the staff and the field-workers.

The authors’ emphasis on the moral dimension of schooling leads, not surprisingly, to prescriptions that do not address many of the problems that most “excellence” or “equity” critics are worried about. It leads instead to a renewed concern for the problem of constructing values: “Law and regulation should be geared so that schools are encouraged to examine their own narratives, traditions, beliefs, and what they want for the future” (p. 205). Readers worried about school achievement or the gap between the rich and poor are not likely to find this satisfying. But readers who share the premise about the function of schools as an expression of community morals may find this refreshing.
A sensitive and complex research issue in sociology is the substantial gap in school performance across racial and ethnic groups. There are many indications, for example, that differences remain in the school performance of Asians, whites, African-Americans, and Hispanics, even after one controls for family background. George Farkas has waded into the heart of this debate with a pragmatic and empirically focused work. He adopted a “holistic” strategy: the book describes his empirical results and the implementation of his Reading One-One tutoring program, which is aimed at correcting the academic difficulties he uncovered in his quantitative research. This combination of intensive data analysis and intervention is unusual. Farkas acknowledges the structural components of stratification. Still his work is marked by a determination to break the elements of the stratification process into component parts and to create effective interventions.

The book focuses on cognitive skill, particularly in the area of reading, as well as the “habits” and “styles” children bring to school. For example, he begins by using Woodcock-John Psycho-Educational Battery-Revised data (a national data set where children are tested individually) to argue that family linguist backgrounds influence cognitive development. He makes the interesting point that, in his results, young black children’s processing speed (a dimension which he suggests might be “hard wired”) is not different from that of whites. There are, however, differences in important cognitive skills (i.e., auditory processing), which he links to cultural exposure. He insists these differences in cognitive skills are extremely influential. Using the National Longitudinal Survey, he presents evidence that differences in cognitive skill help explain wage gaps by race.

A key part of the thesis, however, is that individuals use their agency to create school careers. Using a Dallas School District Study of 486 middle school students, he convincingly demonstrates that teachers’ judgments of students’ school habits (i.e., homework, effort, organization, and class participation) influence course mastery and, especially, course grades. Levels of unexcused absenteeism and teachers’ assessments of students’ appearance and dress also play a role, as do cognitive skills. Thus, knowledge of “skills, habits, and styles,” dramatically narrows the substantial gap in educational outcomes between Asians, whites, Hispanics, and African-Americans. For example, after taking into consideration teachers’ judgments of students’ school habits, the difference in course mastery (of a social studies curriculum) between Asians and whites is cut in half. He asserts that there are real differences in skill by race and
ethnic group; indeed he sees variations in reading skill as the “smoking gun” that impedes school performance. Although presented in a labored fashion, there are numerous interesting tidbits: black students who have black teachers are absent less often. He shows boys doing less homework, being more disorganized, and showing less effort than girls but still talking more in class.

Having sought to understand the sources of school difficulty, Farkas designed an intensive tutoring program for the early grades. Similar to that of Robert Slavin, the program stresses the critical importance of reading skills in fostering school development. The program, Reading One-One, uses (paid) college students to meet regularly with children in a “pull-out” program to tutor them in reading skills. Farkas shows positive changes in participants’ reading scores as a result of the amount of exposure students had to the program, but the program encountered resistance from district officials. The demise of Reading One-One is described in the last chapter of the book.

The flaws in the book are, in many respects, linked to its ambitious character. The manuscript discusses detailed analyses from four different data sets (two national, one districtwide, and one program based). The breadth and scope of the book is a unique strength; still, the various components of the book are not woven together in a tight fashion. The theoretical issues (notwithstanding the title) are also underdeveloped. The author, impressed by the educational benefits of the program, scarcely conceals his tone of disbelief and dismay in his description of “sabotage” by district administrators. Yet, the literature on organizations as well as on the politics of education amply demonstrates other cases of difficulty in the implementation of educational reform. The integration of this literature into the end of the book would have been helpful. In addition, while asserting that he uses “qualitative methods” to provide this portrait of bureaucratic resistance, this section lacks a pattern of reflexivity or a presentation of the taken-for-granted perspective of the educators in the program. Still, the author builds a credible tale.

Overall, this book is an important and unusual contribution to the literature. The seriousness of the data analysis makes the book more appropriate for graduate rather than undergraduate courses, but the discussion of the tutoring program and its demise would be useful for a discussion of school reform at any level. In sum, Farkas moves to the center of a complex issue in a thorough, illuminating, and interesting fashion. Human Capital or Cultural Capital is an important contribution to the debate about the role of racial and ethnic membership on school experience and one effort to improve the performance of urban, poor children.
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Work-Place: The Social Regulation of Labor Markets. By Jamie Peck. New York: Guilford, 1996. Pp. xvi+320. $42.50 (cloth); $19.95 (paper).

Andrew Sayer
Lancaster University

Most sociologists would agree that the study of labor markets cannot be safely left to economists, with their disregard of institutional embeddedness and their treatment of labor as a straightforward commodity bought and sold in self-regulating markets. In Work-Place, Jamie Peck develops an analysis of the social regulation and spatial embeddedness of labor markets as integral to their functioning. He argues that while institutionalist and radical analysis of segmented labor market theories are vastly superior to the neoclassical model, they need a much greater historical and geographical sensitivity. Most people are restricted to local labor markets; unlike national labor markets, these are not mere statistical artifacts but represent the space of operative constraints and feasible opportunities in which people live, hence, the space at which labor is mobilized and reproduced.

As “institutionalized, codetermined, conjunctural phenomena that vary over time and space” (p. 77), labor markets are a particularly challenging problem for explanation. Chapter 2 analyzes how social regulation influences the very constitution of a “supply” of labor. Chapter 3 provides an excellent review and critique of three generations of segmentation theory: dualist approaches, emphasizing the needs of different production processes (P. Doeringer and M. Piore); radical approaches, emphasizing labor control (Reich, Edwards); and multicausal approaches (I. Michon, Rubery, Wilkinson), emphasizing regulation and institutional variability. Peck draws upon regulation theory to develop a “fourth-generation segmentation approach” (p. 86) challenging the implicit assumption of its predecessors that regulation operates at a purely national level and exploring how labor markets are regulated in geographically distinctive ways. Regulation—understood in the manner of the French regulation school to include regularization—operates at other levels too, including the local level. At the local level, it covers not only locally based policies and programs but local enterprise agreements, work cultures, and household structures.

Another chapter provides a critical review of the much hyped literature on “flexibility,” distinguishing the many different phenomena included under that banner and arguing that deregulated, flexible labor markets are unlikely to be sustainable over the long term without eroding skills. There then follow two more empirical chapters relating to the author’s research on homeworkers in Australia and on local training enterprise councils in Britain. Influenced strongly by the United States’s private industry councils, the TECs have, in fact, contributed little to the development of either technical skills or enterprise and have primarily functioned to keep down unemployment statistics. Drawing critically on Rich-
Peck provides an illuminating analysis of the changing nature of regulatory regimes from state-run skill-training bodies financed by levies on firms to privately run but centrally regulated bodies funded according to performance data. The implications of this form of regulation go far beyond the limited case of industrial training to a wider critique of neoliberal governance and the inconsistencies between its rhetoric and its practice. Further, Peck attacks the assumption that we are entering a post-Fordist order, arguing that a successful new mode of regulation has yet to emerge from the decline of Fordism and that disorder is the dominant tendency. The book concludes with a discussion of competition among regulatory regimes for mobile investment at intranational and international levels and warns that a “race-to-the-bottom” threatens both economic viability and social stability. In these ways, Peck not only brings out the spatial embeddedness of labor markets but counteracts the neglect of the influence of the state in much labor market theory.

Work-Place does not quite escape the twin occupational hazards of radical writing on labor markets—exaggerating the importance to firms of labor costs and labor control and paying insufficient attention to the top-to-middle end of labor markets. It therefore repeatedly emphasizes the risk of capital flight to places with cheaper labor and, hence, the near inevitability of a “race-to-the-bottom,” which lowers the pay and security of workers’ jobs. However, the fact that rich countries continue to be the main recipients of foreign direct investment reminds us that access to product markets is usually capital’s priority and that labor quality is often more important than labor cost. Peck does note in the preface his belief that “labor inclusive” approaches “based on social protection and negotiated worker involvement” are a feasible alternative to neoliberal weakening of labor, but unfortunately, this more hopeful scenario is not followed up or illustrated in the book.

Notwithstanding this reservation, as a contribution to developing theoretical approaches to labor markets, especially with regard to space and regulatory regimes, Work-Place is an important book for researchers in this area.


Bart Landry
University of Maryland

Black Corporate Executives, by Sharon Collins, is a very welcome addition to the small but growing amount of scholarly literature on the new black middle class. In the study, based on in-depth interviews in 1986
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and 1992 with 76 high ranking black executives from the 52 largest white-owned corporations in Chicago, Collins perceptively explores a number of important issues surrounding the emergence of the new black middle class. They include questions of upward mobility, the significance of race, the role of affirmative action, the position of black executives in these major U.S. corporations, and the future of the black middle class.

The focus on black executives in major corporations makes this a study of those at the apex of the new black middle class. To select prospective interviewees, Collins first identified 52 of the largest white-owned corporations in Chicago, then went to informants familiar with these corporations to locate black executives in these corporations. Other black executives were reached through information from interviewees themselves. Of the 87 black executives located in this process, 76 were interviewed. Only 13 of the 76 executives were women, leading Collins to remark that the assumption of black females reaping greater benefits from affirmative action than black males was not supported by her survey.

The first three chapters provide background for the analysis of Collins’s own data. These chapters offer a useful and perceptive review of pre–civil rights racial conditions in the United States as well as progress made following passage of the Civil Rights Act in the mid-1960s. They also include a review of major scholarly interpretations of the gains by blacks that were achieved during the late 1960s and 1970s. While the information found in these chapters is not new, it should be especially valuable to the general reader and for students in college courses.

What is new in these chapters is the presentation of Collins’s own position and the concepts she will later effectively use in the analysis of her own data. Perhaps the two major concepts underlying Collins’s thesis are “racialized” positions and a “politically mediated opportunity structure.” These two concepts are at the heart of her analysis of black mobility into the boardrooms of corporate America.

Through her analysis of interviews and the careful use of direct quotes, Collins presents data to support her contention that the opportunity for blacks to move into executive positions in the major corporations of Chicago resulted from federal government mandates and black community pressures to desegregate. While the results were encouraging, in that corporations responded by hiring blacks for managerial positions in the 1960s and 1970s, she documents a bifurcation of these positions. Some black executives held positions whose functions were tied to the general population, “mainstream” positions. Others occupied positions tied to black constituencies either as customers or as groups that needed to be appeased in a period of urban unrest and protest, “racialized” positions. Analysis of her data reveals that the majority of black executives in her sample either held racialized jobs throughout their corporate careers or held one or more racialized jobs before eventually moving into the mainstream.

Collins’s finding that racialized jobs typically proved to be “traps” from which many were not able to escape is equally significant. In these posi-
tions, which typically included affirmative action functions or community relations, there was little opportunity to acquire the management experiences that would qualify these executives for mainstream positions. Furthermore, Collins found that most black executives in mainstream positions held support jobs rather than jobs in planning and operations, the latter being the jobs with real power. Both racialized jobs and mainstream support jobs proved to be the most vulnerable to corporate downsizing in the 1980s and 1990s.

The consequences of what Collins calls “politically mediated” upward mobility has been a “structure of achievement that preserved inequality while it carried out its role in reinstating social order” (p. 161) in the 1960s and 1970s. Because these developments left corporate structures intact, Collins argues, the cessation of government pressure during the Reagan years and after and the absence of black community pressures similar to the 1960s and 1970s make the future of black mobility into corporations uncertain.

*Black Corporate Executives* is very well written in a style that makes it easily accessible to the educated public. Because it is grounded in carefully collected data that is skillfully analyzed, the study is also important to the sociological community. It makes a solid contribution to the literature and should be a welcome addition to a wide variety of academic courses in business and in the social sciences.


Les Back
*University of London*

K. Anthony Appiah’s and Amy Gutmann’s new book, *Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race,* asks searching questions about the meaning of race as we approach the millennium. It seems fitting that the introduction to the book, written by David B. Wilkins, returns us to W. E. B. Du Bois’s famous pronouncement that “the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line.” *Color Conscious* asks its readers to think critically and with equanimity about the politics of race as we move into the next century.

These are big questions that resonate with no less importance than those posed by Du Bois himself close to a hundred years ago. Indeed the figure of Du Bois seems to linger at the side of these writers. It seems fitting in this context to also mention that Du Bois was, among many other things, a sociologist and a personal friend of Max Weber. He published the first substantial study of African-American community (*The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study* [University of Pennsylvania Press, 1899]). While the scope of *Color Conscious* covers philosophy, cultural
theory, social policy, and politics, this is an important book for sociologists to read and engage with critically. It attempts to ask searching questions about the integrity of race as a social category within America.

The book takes the form of two long essays. First, Appiah provides an exhaustive and impressive treatise on the connections and disjunctions between race, culture, and identity within American and European thought. The scope of this piece ranges from the detailed deconstruction of the racial underpinning of the ideas of Thomas Jefferson, Matthew Arnold, and Johann Gottfried Herder to a discussion of African-American formations of racial identity. Appiah argues persuasively that race is no more than an effect of racial discourse and that social distinctions cannot be understood in terms of the concept of race. His argument is nuanced, and he understands that it has been strategically necessary for black Americans to recode the meaning of race in a positive and self-affirming way in order to assert for themselves a dignity that racism has historically denied. But here he cautions the reader that the profusion of racial essentialisms within African-American communities and elsewhere may lead to replacing one kind of tyranny with another.

Appiah is arguing for identities that are, in his phrase “not too tightly scripted” by the expectations of others and by racial authenticity. This is something close to what Stuart Hall has referred to as “identity though difference.” He invites us to live with fractured identities, to find solidarity and yet to recognize the contingency within all categories of personhood. More critically Appiah and Gutmann are very much bound within a dyadic model of black-white relations, and references to other minority groupings are made only in passing. One might question the viability of their approach to the political morality of race given the complex mosaic of cultural groupings found within the United States. The reader is left to wonder, as David B. Wilkins mentions in his introduction, how their analysis would be complicated by a serious discussion of the position of Hispanics or Asians within the landscape of racial ideas.

Amy Gutmann’s essay shifts the focus to the practical imperatives of responding to racial injustice. It is one of the great strengths of this book that it attempts to combine both a philosophical discussion of race and cultural theory with a commitment to trying to demonstrate the relevance of these ideas to issues of public policy and institutional politics. Here she deconstructs many of the contemporary arguments against affirmative action, from the color-blind perspective to the pursuit of “class, not race” policies, and offers a moral justification for the use of color-conscious (which she distinguishes from racial essentialism) initiatives that are morally justified through a notion of fairness. Black and white citizens have different obligations to counter racial discrimination, but Gutmann appeals to a shared responsibility for achieving a just society.

This is a very important and much-needed book. Appiah and Gutmann argue rightly that much of American “race talk” is dishonest, confused, ill-informed, and unhelpful. They end with a call for common ground, which involves a return to some of the tenets of modern liberalism, such
as the sovereignty of the individual and the importance of reasoned debate. However, the lesson of the 20th century is that the appeal to liberty and opportunity alone will not dismantle the color line. The great contribution of this book is that Appiah and Gutmann challenge us to rethink how racial disadvantage and inequality might be tackled in way that is morally defensible.


Neil Fligstein
*University of California*

*The Ownership of Enterprise* is a difficult book to review for someone who shares none of its assumptions. However, I feel strongly that sociologists need to confront books like this one because they do tell us something about what people who are inventing theory that is being applied to the corporate world are thinking. The current conception of the firm that dominates discussion in law schools, some business schools, and departments of financial economics is based on “agency” theory. This view argues that the firm is a fiction and the best way to understand it is to see it as a “nexus of contracts.” The purpose of the firm is to produce residual cash flow, what Marxists call “surplus value,” or profit. Ownership is a claim to this cash flow. The problem is to produce contracts that bind various actors, whether they be managers, workers, or suppliers, who act as agents for the owners (the principals) in ways that help maximize the production of residual cashflow.

The ideological development of this theory in universities has gone hand in hand with the way financial analysts, lawyers, judges, and executives have come to manage and understand the corporation in the past 20 years. The job of many people working in the corporate world is to frame what corporations do in these terms (i.e., maximizing shareholder value) and then make decisions, be they investments, writing contracts, or deciding case law, on this basis. A trip through a book like Hansmann’s shows how those who are concerned with making firms more efficient by altering the organization of property rights are thinking about the problem.

Hansmann wants to transcend the normative debate about who should have claims on residual cash flow (stockholders or stakeholders—i.e., workers, suppliers, customers, and communities) by asking a provocative empirical question: What determines the most efficient form of ownership in a given context? To put it another way, Why would anyone want to control residual cash flow, which is uncertain, when they could have a contract that specifies remuneration? Hansmann’s answer, which is an original and interesting twist on agency theory, is that ownership relations maximize efficiency when there exists no arrangement by which one

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class of patrons (Hansmann’s term for suppliers, managers, workers, and customers) can gain without another losing.

Hansmann argues that the owners of firms in a given situation will be those for whom the cost of market imperfections might have the greatest negative outcome (i.e., those who could suffer the highest transaction costs in the case of market failure). For instance, if a firm is a natural monopoly vis-a-vis its customers but its capital, labor, and other factors of production come from competitive markets, then it makes sense for the customers to own the firm so they will not be exploited by managers (a potential case is rural electric utilities). The way Hansmann understands which group bears the highest cost of market imperfections is to study who owns firms in an industry. If customer-, worker-, or investor-owned firms dominate in a given industry, then the game is to figure out why that group has the highest potential transaction costs.

The rest of The Ownership of Enterprise is an attempt to consider some industries where different ownership forms appear successful and then to reason why those forms are particularly advantaged in that situation. For instance, Hansmann argues that worker-controlled firms make the most sense where workers have similar skill levels and share similar interests, like professional partnerships. When workers are more heterogeneous, their interests diverge and firms have more politics and, thus, higher costs than investor-owned firms. These transaction costs have a huge effect on competitive advantage and explain why one form of ownership dominates.

What can we learn by this exercise? The Ownership of Enterprise provides a nontechnical approach to agency theory and discusses much of that literature in lucid language. It also proposes an elaborate set of novel mechanisms to understand ownership from the perspective of agency theory. The book might provide hypotheses for scholars interested in using a very broad view of agency theory to account for diverse patterns of ownership.

There are many downsides to the book. The industry cases are selected mostly by availability, and, in most cases, Hansmann does not even have the crucial data to tell if one ownership type predominates. Moreover, he assumes that the market processes he theorizes exist and actually are determinative for what ownership types survive. This assumption works for lawyers and agency theorists but is much more problematic for social scientists. Hansmann also has such an ad hoc view of the many different ways in which agency or transaction costs can come into play that it would be difficult to systematically test his hypotheses. Finally, he dismisses challengers to his perspective. Theories that emphasize the role of history, accident, or preexisting political and legal institutions are never given adequate consideration either as theories or in the evidence in any systematic way.

Vicki Smith
University of California, Davis

Anyone desiring to understand the profound changes reshaping U.S. corporate practices and employment relations in recent years should read this book. Adding to a long-standing debate about the historical transformation of and complex interconnections between corporate ownership and corporate control, Michael Useem looks at the rise of large, powerful institutional investors—public and private pension fund managers, investment and insurance companies, and nonprofit organizations—who have become agents of corporate control in the 1980s and the 1990s. He takes the reader on two journeys. The first journey is a grand survey of the entire terrain of the American economy; the second is an up close tour of specific corporate headquarters and boardrooms to observe institutions’ effects behind the scenes.

Investor Capitalism draws on multiple sources to build a case for the formidable power of institutional investors. Useem uses data from interviews with chief executive officers, chief operating officers, chief financial officers, pension fund managers, and directors of investor relations from 20 large corporations as well as from interviews with 58 senior officers for large institutional investors. To interview data he adds survey research data, participant observation data from meetings and conferences, archival data, and numerous additional quantitative research findings. Together they yield a rich and often disturbing picture of the ways institutional investors are transforming corporate strategies and structures. By looking at this new form of financial power from both sides of the divide—from the point of view of both private corporations and investors—Useem is able to document the varied ways in which investors have extended their reach into top management decision making as well as the obstacles facing investors in their quest for power. He furthermore makes a persuasive argument for a qualitative change in the course of investor-management relations over the last decade from a period of acrimonious investor activism to the current period of comparatively stabilized and closely-managed network relations between corporate top management and investors.

As Useem points out, the rule of Wall Street has changed. Historically, investors who are unhappy with the performance of any given company would walk away, selling their stocks and moving on to invest in the next firm. Shareholders with significant holdings can no longer register their dissatisfaction so simply. Instead, major investors, anchored to companies by huge blocks of shares, more routinely challenge corporate managers. Investors have become activists for improved company performance, exerting pressure on top level company management directly and
energetically to improve their bottom lines. They have lobbied, often successfully, for new forms of company governance, for executive dismissal, for changes in product strategies, and for changes in boards of directors.

Useem argues that top level managers have not passively accepted investor intervention and, to demonstrate the pitched battle between the two groups, meticulously tracks several cases in which thousands of managerial hours and millions of company dollars were devoted to thwarting institutional investors' buyout and reorganization attempts. His recreations of these investor-management skirmishes are gripping. Corporate top managers have developed a "cultural resistance to shareholder insistence," as well as organizational and legal mechanisms for circumventing institutional power. Top managers criticize investors for stubbornly and often counterproductively holding to a short-term horizon for judging company performance, for lacking the qualifications for effective decision making about what companies should do, and for not legitimately representing the interests of those whose money they are investing.

With 57% of shares of the 1,000 largest companies held by large institutional investors, however, corporate management has had no choice but to change some of its practices. So, while Useem found that corporate managers have resisted some forms of investor intervention, they have yielded on others, a response culminating in a general pattern of corporate restructuring. Some of the indexes of restructuring are familiar—widespread layoffs, redesigned and reengineered business organizations, homogenization, the forced resignations of CEOs—while others—institutionalizing investor voice, developing routines for communicating with and registering the demands of investors—are less familiar. All combined, however, these innovations add up to a new institutional framework in our largest companies in which investors have taken a key role in directing the performance of the economy, the management of investors has become critical to effective business leadership, and far-flung networks have emerged for transmitting information in two directions, from company management to investors about business performance and from investors to company management about investors' concerns.

These networks, the "optical fibers of investor capitalism" (p. 206), represent the institutionalization of investor power. Although one may wonder how thoroughly investors have supplanted the power of professional managers, there is no minimizing how deeply institutional investors have reconfigured American corporations and, in turn, American society itself. *Investor Capitalism* makes very plain that the equation of corporate power has shifted considerably, with institutional investors emerging as an implacable factor in that equation.
This is a book aimed at “advanced students.” Readers who have a more than passing familiarity with the history of American sociology, who are aficionados of the Chicago school, and/or who cut their sociological baby teeth reading and gossiping about the likes of Albion Small, W. I. Thomas, Ernest Burgess, and, of course, Robert Park, will find it richly satisfying. Less knowledgeable readers, on the other hand, are more likely to be mystified than satisfied and would be well advised to acquaint themselves with one or more of the basic primers (e.g., Martin Bulmer, *The Chicago School of Sociology* [University of Chicago Press, 1984]; Robert E. L. Faris, *Chicago Sociology 1920–1932* [University of Chicago Press, 1967]; Fred H. Matthews, *Quest for an American Sociology: Robert E. Park and the Chicago School* [McGill-Queens University Press, 1977]) before tackling a graduate level text like this one. My advice here is based on the fact that Rolf Lindner’s goal is not to describe a particular time and place and cast of characters, but to advance a thesis about that time and place and those characters; the information that is proffered is determined by its relevance to the thesis.

The bare bones version of the thesis Lindner advances can be stated simply and briefly: “the orientation of urban research represented by Park ultimately owes its origins to the reporting tradition” (p. 3). This is not, let me hasten to add, simply one more rendition of the old (and tiresome) “ethnography is mere journalism” critique—very much to the contrary. The author is a professor of European ethnology at the Humboldt-Universitat in Berlin, coeditor of the journal, *Historische Anthropologie,* a supporter and defender of fieldwork, and (judging from the content of this book) a strong admirer of Robert Park. Rather than functioning as critique, Lindner’s thesis is intended to deepen his readers’ appreciation for what Park brought to the Chicago school and what the Chicago school bequeathed to American sociology. In its more elaborated version, the argument goes something like this. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the occupational subculture of American reporters stood in opposition to—was in rebellion against—the “narrowness and sterility, the nice pretence and vain self-satisfaction of what George Santayana ... termed the ‘genteel tradition’” (p. 198). Central mind-set components of that rebellious subculture included both a strong preference for learning about the social world via direct experience (as distinct from a reliance on “book learning”) and an attitude of disinterested appreciation for the variation of human types and territories to be found in the social world (as distinct from “do-gooderism,” which aimed to bring the variants in
line with conventional morality). Critical organizational components of the subculture included both the role of city editor, who assigned reporters to “beats,” and the practice of training and testing cubs reporters by sending them out to do observational exercises. Park’s personal characteristics that attracted him to the rebellious world of journalism in the first place, combined with his years of employment as a reporter (1887–98), meant that, by 1913 when he joined the University of Chicago faculty at the age of 50, he possessed both the mind-set (a skeptical streetwise interest in what people actually do) and the organizational know-how (an ability to get students to explore the city’s diverse areas and peoples) necessary to transform sociology from “social gospel reformism” to empirical science.

There is much more to Lindner’s thesis than this necessarily capsule summary can convey. There is also much more to the book than the simple development of a thesis. That task probably could have been accomplished in a longish article. The bulk of the volumes’ 250 pages is actually taken up with intellectual by-ways or “miniessays”—developed trains of thought touched off by his argument but not really essential to it. Inessential or not, for aficionados of the Chicago school, these miniessays are not to be missed, as a small sampling of topics will show: the concepts “stranger” (both Simmel’s and Schutz’s) and “marginal man” and their relationship to the practice of fieldwork, Park as theorist, Simmel’s contributions to sociology and his similarities to and differences from Park, the origins and development of ecological thought among members of the Chicago school, and the work of W. I. Thomas. I have one minor quibble: the book contains a few (not very serious) confusions and errors, which aficionados are likely to find jarring (the systematic and unfailing transformation of Herbert Blumer into Herbert Bulmer is the most bothersome of these). This quibbling aside, if you have ever advised your students to begin their research by “nosing around,” if you have ever suggested that a paper was not interesting because it did not contain any “sociological news,” if you have ever been inclined to “damn the moralists” because the sociological “stories” they tell are so conventional and predictable, this is definitely the book for you.


Daniel J. Monti, Jr.
*Boston University*

Meredith Ramsay’s first book—*Community, Culture, and Economic Development: The Social Roots of Local Action*—is a welcome addition to the literature that deals with the three subjects featured in its title. In 1990, Princess Anne and Crisfield, Maryland, had populations of 1,666
and 2,880, respectively. The former had an agricultural economy, while the latter’s economy was based on fishing. Both had experienced population losses, and both had residents who were anxious to promote economic development activities that might lead to a resurgence in their community’s well-being. In neither case, however, did substantial economic development take place. Ramsay tells the story of how groups operating through established institutions and civic cultural routines successfully fought back attempts to mount aggressive development programs.

The white, land-based elite of Princess Anne pushed through the construction of a prison but literally and figuratively ran afoul of poor black and newer white, middle-class residents when they opened a processing plant in the town. The ruling white elite began to lose control of the reigns of the five-person town commission with the successful election of a woman, a black, a retired chemist from New Jersey, and a music teacher from New York City.

Crisfield’s story is a little different. The loss of seven businesses to fire in October, 1987, prompted the state of Maryland to allocate $5 million in community development block grant funds to rebuild the core of the old business district. The expected increase in tourism that would come with a refurbished downtown area did not materialize. In large part this was because the $5 million had produced little more than a parking lot and a public toilet, known locally as the “park and pee.” A populist mayor, sensitive to the needs of his poor white and black constituents, did not support the introduction of new businesses that would bring in new jobs and stricter housing codes. Largely content with their way of life, these persons were not at all sure that the new jobs would go to them. They were quite certain that new housing and zoning codes would leave their dilapidated homes in jeopardy. Even the Chamber of Commerce was ambivalent about the big economic development plans promoted by Maryland’s governor. Crisfield’s residents controlled growth in order to protect their fragile seafood industry.

In both cases the citizens of these communities were more concerned about the quality of their social lives and cultural routines than they were about the prospects for new and better jobs. Elite members of both towns could not push big economic development schemes down the throats of their neighbors. Life went on pretty much as the citizens had come to know it.

Ramsay’s finely textured and literate study provides fresh evidence that human beings, working together on matters of importance, can make sense of the changes going on around them and sustain their preferred view of the world. They are driven by something more than greed and will, on occasion, choose to maintain a way of life that is far from prosperous because it is important to them. Something is going on here, and it has nothing to do with the fact that the places in question can be dismissed as backward or maybe even racist. After all, we have seen before that city residents are not always keen to have new economic ventures take place.
in their neighborhoods, and sometimes they succeed in curtailing these efforts. We also have seen, though much less often, that economic development activities can serve a broad array of persons living in cities (see my own book, *Race, Redevelopment and the New Company Town* [State University of New York Press, 1990]).

No, what Ramsay is writing about goes well beyond these points. She shows how human beings embedded in a place with a viable local culture, a place they care for, are able to articulate their interests, no matter how little hard economic sense their decisions make to the rest of us. The persons and communities that Ramsay writes about struggle to reach a common understanding of the right course of action. Then they proceed to follow it. They not only act like competent persons, they are competent persons who are immersed in a viable culture.

She shows us how making a community function well is hard and sometimes thankless work. It requires the collaboration, if not outright cooperation, of the several races, generations, and classes represented among area residents. The prospect of imminent change, however alluring, has an impact on everyone who lives and works in these places. Ramsay describes how the residents of these communities come to reject new, shiny opportunities in large part because these changes would be too disruptive to the way of life that they had come to accept. She has told their story with sensitivity and intelligence. It can be read profitably by students and serious observers of economic development alike. It is a good book.


Don Herzog
University of Michigan

Michael Rosen brings intoxicating erudition and an elegant if elusive prose style to crack—or pulverize—one of the most venerable chestnuts of social theory, the theory of ideology. For Rosen, the two central elements of that theory are (1) that societies are self-maintaining systems and (2) that they produce false consciousness in their members precisely because it helps to maintain society. And for Rosen, the theory is, well, a spectacular mess. Despite the efforts of such analytical Marxists as G. A. Cohen, he urges, no such view can be reconstructed in ways that begin to comport with our ordinary standards for reasonable scientific explanation.

Much of the book is a sort of prehistory of ideology. I say prehistory advisedly: Rosen writes as though Whig history never got a bad name or at least never deserved one. Just as Leszek Kolakowski decided to return to Plotinus to unearth the seeds that sprouted in Marxist error, so
Rosen begins a dazzling tour through intellectual history with Plato and Augustine. No teleologist, Rosen does not credit Rousseau or Hume or Smith with a covert intention of laying the ground for Marx’s views. But every time he examines an author, he is ruthlessly forward looking. He wants to know how he helped lay those grounds. A prissier historian might groan at the future-directed perspective, but my view is that for Rosen’s purposes this is just fine. What is more, and better, he is a perceptive, even gifted, reader of canonical (and less canonical) texts. Instead of rounding up the usual suspects and producing peremptory citations from them, he digs in and does great work.

Less historically minded social theorists will want to skip straight to chapter 6, where Rosen credits Marx with five (largely incompatible) models of ideology. Rosen speaks of models, not theories, because he thinks in every case Marx has evocative but only sketchy gestures that omit crucial explanatory mechanisms; Marx fails to offer fully realized arguments. Along the way, Rosen urges that Cohen’s account of functionalist explanation is too lax: the genius of evolutionary biology is to supply efficient causation to underlie functionalist stories, but social theory has no parallel account. (More generally one might note that facile gestures toward evolution in the social sciences—consider, e.g., the “evolution of norms”—remain irritating in the absence of any compelling account of selection and transmission mechanisms.) An ensuing chapter on the quasi-Kantian apparatus of critical theory, with its efforts to cast society as an agent imposing fundamental categories of perception on its members, is just as assiduously and appropriately skeptical.

Rosen is so desperately well read that sometimes the thread of his argument gets lost. (Call this the Berlin effect, after Sir Isaiah.) Or, put differently, sometimes he writes promissory notes himself instead of cashing them out with cogent arguments. Given his considerable analytic skills, this is a shame. I wonder, for instance, precisely what he has against what he calls the “rationalist tradition” of the West, with its emphasis on putting reason in charge of the self. Not that that view is unobjectionable: just that so put it is so invidiously abstract that it is hard to know what to say about it one way or the other. I wonder, too, precisely what he finds attractive in Walter Benjamin’s exceedingly obscure account of the aura. Rosen begins to work up an explication, turning partly to prior continental aesthetics, but I cannot report that I had a clear grasp of the matter when he let it drop.

Finally, alas, the book ends with a whimper instead of a bang. Rosen notices some straightforward possibilities that retain some of the core insights people have wanted from the theory of ideology while junking the two premises he finds faulty. He canvasses coordination dilemmas and prisoners’ dilemmas (I think he jumbles these two together a bit), wishful thinking, and more, so reminding us that there are plenty of other ways to see how people might come to accept forms of domination that are bad for them—quite so. But then one wonders just how many Marxists and others really do resolutely insist on society as a self-maintaining sys-
tem and on odd functionalist explanations. Rosen obviously believes there are lots of them out there. I do tend to think of social science as a living museum of curiosities better preserved in amber, but his target is a specimen I do not often encounter. Those who stumble across his specimen more often and those who wish to enjoy the company of a thoughtful and literate mind will enjoy this volume.


Philip G. Roeder
_University of California, San Diego_

Stephen Hanson traces the conception of time in Marxist thought with an intellectual history that sweeps from precursors (Immanuel Kant and Georg Hegel) to Mikhail Gorbachev. Hanson rejects Marxist and modernist approaches to this question and instead introduces his own typology that draws on Max Weber’s distinction among traditional, rational, and charismatic authority and on Ken Jowitt’s characterization of the Leninist synthesis as charismatic-rational. Hanson touches on several issues in which conceptions of time were important in the Marxist tradition, such as work discipline in the factory, but the most important recurring issue in Hanson’s analysis is the question whether the transition to communism is thoroughly constrained by the unfolding of history or individuals might transcend these constraints of history and leap forward in time. In Hanson’s view, the Marxist synthesis embraces both, so that the rational time of linear history can be punctuated by charismatic interventions.

Hanson traces Marxist thought through four cycles (the last truncated by the collapse of the Soviet Union); theoretical, political, socioeconomic, and cultural cycles correspond to the periods in which Karl Marx wrote, Vladimir Lenin built the Soviet state, Joseph Stalin constructed social and economic institutions, and Gorbachev sought to create a mass political culture supporting Soviet institutions. In each cycle the initial conceptual resolution of the tension between rational and charismatic strands in Marxist thought (by Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Gorbachev, respectively) was followed by divisions among a rightist or rational tendency (Eduard Bernstein, Nikolay Bukharin, and Georgii Malenkov), a centrist or neotraditional tendency (Karl Kautsky, Grigory Zinoviev, and Mikhail Gorbachev), and a leftist or charismatic tendency (Rosa Luxemburg, Leon Trotsky, and Nikita Khrushchev), setting the stage for a new synthesis.

Hanson’s broader purpose is to demonstrate the causal force of ideas. He asserts that these conceptions of time shaped Soviet practice: political elites enforced institutional rules about time that they felt were rooted in legitimate ideological principles. The strong claim of this book is that
“both the design of Leninism’s core institutions and the patterns of political struggle among Communists from 1848 to 1991 were rooted in the conception of time set out in the work of Karl Marx” (p. 19).

This thesis leads Hanson to some interesting revisions of common wisdom and to some original stands on one side or the other of recurring debates in sovietology. For example, Hanson joins those who see continuity in the writings of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, but he argues that this continuity is rooted in their common conceptions of time. In this vein, Hanson disputes the traditional view of Stalin as an intellectual mediocrity and, instead, argues that Stalin alone among the heirs to Lenin understood the charismatic-rational conception of time and how to apply this to the task of building economic institutions. Gorbachev emerges as the heir to this Marxist tradition, trying to move to the next stage by creating a culture based on mass internalization of the Marxist norms of revolutionary time transcendence.

Hanson does leave some pieces missing in his case for the centrality of conceptions of time in Marxist thought and practice. First, Hanson owes us a more careful explanation of how the introduction of the concept of time to our reading of Marxist texts improves on conventional interpretations. Much of Hanson’s discussion of the writings of Marx and Lenin and the debates among their respective disciples is a familiar recounting. For example, it is part of the conventional wisdom that Bernstein, Kautsky, and Luxemburg disagreed over the timing of the socialist revolution. What did we fail to understand that required the introduction of the Weberian typology? Second, Hanson needs to demonstrate that these conceptions of time actually affected Soviet practice. Although the author’s strong claim is the causal force of ideas, there is little discussion of Soviet practice and no careful analysis to show that conceptions of time better explain these practices than do more conventional, and far simpler, explanations.


Alan Agresti
University of Florida

This is a useful addition to the rapidly expanding literature on statistical models for categorical, discrete, and limited dependent variables. What distinguishes Regression Models is its emphasis on models that other books on these topics treat lightly, if at all, such as models for nominal and ordinal outcomes, models for count data, and models for dependent variables that are continuous except for a set of “censored” observations known only to fall in a certain range and often set equal to some constant such as zero. 
A strength of the book is the emphasis on model interpretation. J. Scott Long motivates most models by an underlying latent variable model and then provides various ways of interpreting parameter estimates so that one does not need to rely on effects on unfamiliar scales such as the logit. The emphasis is on application rather than theory, but the technical level would be difficult for many social scientists. The style resembles the way models are presented in the econometric literature, and readers will benefit from having a somewhat better background than the typical statistical methods courses for social scientists provide. The reader ideally should have some familiarity with calculus, matrix algebra, and probability density and distribution functions. Nonetheless, the social scientist who truly wants to understand these models will benefit from the sophistication of the presentation.

After two introductory chapters reviewing linear regression and maximum likelihood estimation, chapter 3 discusses models for binary outcomes such as logit and probit models. An appealing aspect of Long’s style in this chapter and later ones is his beginning each chapter by mentioning several published articles that have used the methodology. Chapter 4 introduces basic ideas of hypothesis testing and goodness of fit based on the likelihood function. Chapter 5 presents models for ordinal outcomes, and chapter 6 presents models for nominal outcomes. This is standard material, but social scientists who are familiar only with binary logistic regression may be surprised at the variety of extensions that exist for multicategory responses including models for which values of predictors may change according to the response category. All these chapters have a strong emphasis on interpretations, which is often novel.

The book makes its most important contribution in the following two chapters introducing two types of models that are not commonly discussed in the social statistics literature. Chapter 8 presents the tobit model that describes censored observations in which, for instance, all observations below a particular level receive the value zero. Long shows connections with event history (survival) models where censoring normally occurs for high rather than low values of the response. Chapter 9 presents models for outcomes that are counts of the number of times something has happened, such as the number of times a subject has been arrested. Simple models of this type assume a Poisson distribution for the dependent variable. In practice, this distribution usually does not permit sufficient variability (the variance is constrained to equal the mean), and Long shows ways of generalizing this model to account for extra heterogeneity. Again, the emphasis on interpretation is very good, and this chapter is perhaps the best in the text.

*Regression Models* is missing two major topics. First, the log-linear model for contingency tables has only a brief introduction in the final chapter. This is not a major problem since other books cover this model in detail and since it is more natural for describing relationships among a set of dependent variables than effects of predictors on a single dependent variable. For completeness and comparative purposes, though, a full
chapter on log-linear and association models would have been nice. In particular, it will surprise many social scientists that this book contains no mention of Leo Goodman’s work.

Second, there is no discussion of models for longitudinal or other forms of repeated measurement data. New developments have been occurring at a rapid pace in this area, and an introduction would have been useful. The choice of topics for a text like this is difficult one, however, and I commend the author for choosing some that are poorly represented in the existing literature.

How does this book compare to existing books on these topics? It has a higher technical level than, for instance, the books by Stephen Fienberg (The Analysis of Cross-Classified Categorical Data [2d ed., MIT Press, 1980]), Thomas Wickens (Multiway Contingency Table Analysis for the Social Sciences [Erlbaum, 1989]), and myself (An Introduction to Categorical Data Analysis [Wiley, 1996]). There is little overlap with Wickens or Fienberg, however, as those books concentrate on log-linear models. There is overlap with mine on topics such as logistic regression and its extensions for multicategory responses. My book also includes some traditional topics for contingency table analysis whereas Long’s has greater emphasis on models for discrete and censored responses. Unlike the other books, Long’s does not provide problems at the ends of chapters; throughout, however, Long suggests many of the unproven results as exercises, and he provides solutions at the end of the text.

In summary, this is a fine book for any social scientist who wants to develop a solid understanding of the models discussed. It is an important resource for those who use the models and want to see useful ways of interpreting them, and I commend the author for a clear exposition of some models that have received insufficient attention in other books of this type.