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What is This?
The Autonomy Dilemma of Track Two Diplomacy in Southeast Asia

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Introduction

TRACK TWO DIPLOMACY has been a key aspect of regional cooperation in Asia Pacific and particularly in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Operating through its own networks, this diplomacy has contributed towards the success of such key initiatives on regional security as the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). This article examines the prospects for track two networks in Southeast Asia, particularly the ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS). It also looks into the initiatives collectively known as track three activities and their impact on the expansion of security dialogue in the region. The success of track two processes was made possible largely because of their linkages with governments in the region. In a security environment in flux, these linkages have raised questions about the autonomy of these processes from state influence. The dilemma of greater efficiency versus lower autonomy has opened to debate the continuing relevance of track two diplomacy.

Unofficial Diplomacy: The Role of ASEAN-ISIS

Unofficial diplomacy in Asia Pacific has been instrumental in the expansion of multilateral channels for regional exchanges on security cooperation. Its role has been important in a region where security is officially defined to be
comprehensive and includes economic, military, political, and social facets.\textsuperscript{1} This approach ensures 'that all issues receive due attention in appropriate forums, and that disputes and problem areas can be solved for the general benefit using the collective wisdom of all the participants.'\textsuperscript{2}

A key feature of this diplomacy has been multilateralism, which John Ruggie defined as an institutional form coordinating the action and policies of three or more states based on general principles of conduct.\textsuperscript{3} It involves the collective promotion of and commitment to a standard of behavior. After the Cold War, increased economic interdependence in the Asia Pacific region paved the way for the development of institutionalized multilateral processes that promoted cooperation and peace. Multilateralism facilitated the emergence of pluralism in discussions and agenda setting on regional security through the involvement of expert networks and nongovernmental organizations.\textsuperscript{4} NGOs have organized informal, non-official meetings on regional security with government officials as participants. From 1993 to early 1995, at least 112 multilateral fora were convened to discuss specific security issues or the general condition of Asia Pacific security.\textsuperscript{5} At least 93 of these meetings were non-official in nature.

Unofficial meetings, also referred to as dialogue mechanisms,\textsuperscript{6} have been generically called track two diplomacy. The term is attributed to Joseph Montville, a US Foreign Service officer, who defined it as:

unofficial, non-structured interaction. It is always open minded, often altruistic, and ... strategically optimistic, based on best case analysis. Its underlying assumption is that actual or potential conflict can be resolved or eased by appealing to common human capabilities to respond to good will and reasonableness.\textsuperscript{7}

This definition implies a willingness on the part of the participants to go beyond the usual state-interest basis of official diplomatic negotiations. Realists tend to find limited use for track two activities precisely because of this overly optimistic, if not naïve, approach to international negotiations. The designation 'track two' is meant to distinguish nongovernmental or non-official meetings from official and formal diplomatic channels referred to as 'track one' activities. Government officials participate in 'track two' activities in their private capacity; however, the nature of this participation is generally considered to be a 'polite fiction' as the line demarcating what is official and non-official in such meetings is unclear.\textsuperscript{8}

This distinction is even more blurred in meetings referred to as 'track one and a half diplomacy'. The term itself was introduced by Paul Dibb to describe a workshop on regional confidence building organized for the ARF and held in Canberra in November 1994. The meeting was unofficial but was attended mostly by military or government people. Track one and half has also referred to unofficial meetings with an agenda set by government officials. Such was perhaps the case with a meeting held in Manila in May 1994 that discussed an initiative towards the establishment of a regional entity that would encompass
the ten countries of Southeast Asia. While the distinction employed is in
essence subjective, track two and track one and a half meetings are supposed
to be differentiable through their relative independence of the interests of par-
ticipating states.9

The literature on security dialogues in Asia Pacific gives little attention to
these distinctions and considers track two diplomacy as almost synonymous
with the entire spectrum of non-official diplomatic activities. Yet, these dis-
tinctions and their implications for foreign policy processes show the
increasing complexity of the world of non-official diplomatic activities. The
dichotomy between tracks one and two no longer suffices to cover the extent
of these activities.10 More importantly, obfuscating these distinctions raises
questions about the extent to which these activities are independent of govern-
ments and their interests.

Track two networks have always been active in promoting Asia Pacific eco-
nomic cooperation. However, it is in relation to regional peace and security
that unofficial diplomatic activities have grown dramatically. In Southeast
Asia, organizations and individuals engaged in track two activities have
especially been involved in policy advocacy and formulation through the
provision of policy frameworks for officials too busy to put together proposals
themselves. Their efforts have helped establish ‘building blocks’ for support-
ing cooperative arrangements at the official level.11 Among the most import-
of these is the series of informal workshops and meetings on ‘Managing Pot-
tential Conflicts in the South China Sea’ organized by Ambassador Hasjim
Djalal in 1990 with support from the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and the
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). These meetings pro-
vided a forum for claimants to discuss the issues involved without having to
deal with the question of jurisdiction. Beyond the political aspect of the issue,
the meetings have expanded the range of discussions to include technical
scientific concerns as well.

Research institutes like the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in
Singapore have also made strong contributions to security dialogue in the
region. ISEAS has organized seminars and conferences that discuss a range of
regional security issues from an academic point of view rather than a policy-
oriented one. Nonetheless, government officials have found the discussions in
these meetings useful as a means of exploring possible initiatives.

Largely, however, track two in Southeast Asia is largely synonymous with
ASEAN-ISIS. Founded in Bali in September 1984, this is currently made up of
the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP), the Centre for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, Indonesia), the Institute of Foreign
Affairs of Laos (IFA), the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS,
Malaysia), the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS,
Philippines), the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Institute
for Security and International Studies (ISIS, Thailand), and the Institute of
International Relations (IIR, Vietnam). Since 1993, representatives of these institutes have consulted annually with the ASEAN foreign ministers. Their recommendation was a factor in the establishment of the ARF in 1993. ASEAN-ISIS has become a key component of the networking efforts and organized a large number of security dialogue activities. The Asia Pacific Roundtable is the largest and among the most important of them, with over 250 scholars, diplomats, military officers, and journalists participating every year. Together with five research institutes from Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, and the United States, ASEAN-ISIS was involved in the formation of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), a key institution in confidence building and security cooperation in the Asia Pacific region.

The unofficial nature of these activities gives ASEAN-ISIS and other track two channels an inherent advantage over official diplomatic processes. Track two has been able to provide governments with the cover under which extensive low-profile exchanges and negotiations take place without risk of undue embarrassment. In this way, it opens doors for official channels in areas where they would otherwise be completely blocked. Second, track two activities arrange for the socialization of regional cooperation and behavior. Third, unofficial diplomatic channels are the venue where personal relationships between participants develop. This is of great importance in a region where personal bonds underlie positive relations between governments as well as provide the basis for intellectual and policy exchanges. Track two mechanisms have made key contributions towards the enhancement of official interaction and mutual confidence and towards the development of relevant discourse; they have become essential to the way ASEAN conducts business.

The Problems of Track Two Diplomacy

Despite the achievements of track two diplomacy in general, and ASEAN-ISIS in particular, a number of issues have emerged which have implications for the future of unofficial diplomacy in the region. These cluster around questions regarding autonomy, the focus of the security discourse, and who participates in the channels.

Track two channels are too intertwined with governments in the region. The linkage between tracks one and two provides track two diplomacy with access to privileged information and a position from which it could directly influence official policy. At the same time, it affects track two’s potential for critical thinking and, consequently, the quality of analysis and discussion. This problem is becoming more evident as the distinction between tracks becomes increasingly blurred.
The partnership between ASEAN and ASEAN-ISIS approximates the ideal complementarity between tracks one and two. The fact, however, that some of the new member-institutions of ASEAN-ISIS are government agencies, and therefore tend to behave like government representatives, creates the impression that track two processes largely represent the views of foreign policy bureaucrats. A statement drafted by some members of ASEAN-ISIS and critical of the coup led by Hun Sen in Cambodia just prior to that country’s scheduled entry into ASEAN in 1997 was never released. Some members of ASEAN-ISIS opposed its dissemination, arguing that it violated the principle of non-interference. While the document made its way onto the desks of some ASEAN foreign ministers, it was never formally issued as an ASEAN-ISIS statement.

The blurring of what is official and non-official has also bedeviled CSCAP. One of the principal reasons behind its establishment had been to open a venue for engaging China multilaterally on issues of regional security concern. In particular, a track two forum was thought to be a safe way to handle the issue of Taiwan and cross-Strait relations. China, however, made it a condition for its participation in CSCAP that these issues would never be discussed. China also insisted that there should be no member-committee from Taiwan. In the end, CSCAP member-committees bowed before the demands of pragmatism and accepted China on the latter’s specified terms.

A further issue arises from the way that track one mechanisms such as the ARF have taken to organizing their own track two activities. Such activities, including the publication of newsletters and books, have been extended financial and even political support by governments in the region as long as they reinforce government policies. Political exigencies can cause this support to be withdrawn. 16

The trends in the Asia Pacific, including Southeast Asia, indicate that track two is moving towards greater alignment with governments and their agenda. In this context, how far can track two maintain its autonomy and provide effective support to track one? If these trends continue, track two’s role as a source of policy ideas will eventually diminish. 17 As official processes and officially sponsored processes become more institutionalized, track two activities will have a more passive and less important role ‘as information providers and analysts’. 18

The security discourse in Southeast Asia is too narrow. Track two activities have been instrumental in the emergence of common understandings of security in the region (a shared discourse). The unofficial nature of track two makes it the channel of choice for discussing sensitive security issues which normally would never be brought up in official meetings. It is the forum where non-traditional perspectives in security can be introduced. Indeed, track two has been credited with effecting changes in official perspectives on broad issues of security.
Yet in 1997, track two processes dealing with security issues (especially ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP) showed that they were not equipped to deal with the security concerns created by the financial crisis. That crisis exposed the vulnerability of people’s lives to the effects of globalization, and traditional approaches to security do not adequately provide answers to such concerns. Despite avowed adherence to a comprehensive understanding of security, Southeast Asian governments have used a security discourse that is largely state-centric, and track two networks have helped propagate this discourse. Consequently, track two has not lived up to its potential for conveying new understandings of security.

ASEAN-ISIS has pushed the envelope of security in the region. The ASEAN-ISIS Colloquium on Human Rights held annually since 1994 is partially based on a broad framework of security. Also, in 1994 the Asia Pacific Roundtable had a panel on non-traditional security issues and a plenary session on human rights. Since 1996 ASEAN-ISIS (with special Canadian support) has included a session on gender and international security.

These non-traditional security issues, however, remain on the margins of security discourse in the region. The great majority of track two activities are about mainstream security issues, with their focus on state security. The meetings on non-traditional security issues focus mostly on the relationship between economics and security (even prior to the financial crisis). Even there, little attention is given to how regional economic relations affect people’s lives.\(^{39}\)

ASEAN has to go beyond a state-centric security frame if it is to address the objectives stipulated in its ‘Vision 2020’.\(^{20}\) Track two institutions like ASEAN-ISIS need to work on the substance behind the idea of equitable and just societies. These issues go to the heart of maintaining the credibility and legitimacy of track two processes in the region.\(^{21}\)

*Track two is an exclusive club.* Pluralism and consequent hypotheses about an incipient regional civil society\(^{22}\) assume that track two activities are open to various groups participating and articulating their security concerns. In reality, track two involves a select number of groups and individuals discussing security issues that concern governing elites.\(^{23}\) Inclusivity is not based on incorporating the concerns of marginalized groups. It is more about involving nongovernmental actors in debates on issues defined by governments with little consideration for alternative perspectives.\(^{24}\)

Track two processes have been accused of promoting a form of ‘group-think’ when they gather individuals with similar professional or academic backgrounds (with their own specialized jargon) as part of consensus building apart from the rest of civil society. In fact, despite efforts to make public the ideas presented and discussed in track two fora (such as the publication of proceedings), these have not had much influence on public opinion in the region.\(^{25}\) This situation is exacerbated when participation is subject to gate-
keeping. Track two activities are noted for the great regularity with which certain people are invited to different meetings while others are excluded. On the other hand, many NGOs are hesitant about involving themselves in track two processes even when invited to participate. They question whether these activities (particularly those organized by ASEAN-ISIS) have substantive agendas for change, or whether their own participation will only help legitimize the status quo.

The misgivings of NGOs indicate that track two falls short of its potential as a forum for broad participation. The security discourse in the region is pre-set, with the locus still on traditional concerns regarding state interests and security. With little incentive to rock the status quo, the implementation of the principle of inclusivity merely preserves the established order.

Track two is nothing more than a talk shop. The tendency of track two activities to focus on dialogue as an end in itself has been frustrating for those concerned with policy making. The importance of the slow, deliberate, and consensus-seeking approaches utilized by ASEAN and ASEAN-ISIS is lost to most of their critics. Others concede the need for it but think that it should be taken to the next level of more substantive dialogue. The lack of appreciation or patience for the process again goes back to the need to further open up participation.

At the same time, the lack of appreciation for dialogue as an end of track two is itself indicative of the lack of understanding of what track two is all about. It is mistakenly assumed that the most difficult issues confronting states should be left to unofficial diplomatic mechanisms. Track two is not a substitute for track one activities; otherwise it loses the advantage of its non-official status.

Nonetheless, there is a clear need to see more of the discussions in track two activities turn into meaningful proposals for policy coordination and cooperation.

The infrastructure of track two in the region is fragile. The financial crisis brought into the open the financial concerns of many of the institutes involved in track two mechanisms. By 1998 the support for these activities coming from foundations and governments had been reduced. This was in part due to the crisis pushing the member-states of ASEAN to be more inward-looking.

Human resource issues constitute another element in the maintenance of track two networks in the region. A new generation of scholars committed to the continuity of ASEAN-ISIS and track two processes is needed. The ASEAN-ISIS institutes have had varying degrees of success at recruiting new blood. Some have been able to attract young scholars who have blended into their activities. Others, however, have either lost personnel or been unable to attract new ones. This disparity in the success experienced by its different member-institutes does not bode well for the future of ASEAN-ISIS. While financial and human resource constraints do not pose an immediate threat, they do have medium- and long-term implications for the network.
Track Three Processes and Alternative Security Perspectives

Problems notwithstanding, the impact of ASEAN-ISIS and other track two dialogue channels in the region has put into question traditional definitions of diplomacy that emphasize only activities involving government representatives. The global system has become too complex to be seen only in terms of a system of states. Any study of diplomacy, particularly as it pertains to multilateral institutions, would have to look at the different levels at which outcomes on global and regional issues are influenced.

Non-state actor participation in diplomatic processes also contributes to the building of an incipient regional civil society in the Asia Pacific. Then Foreign Minister of South Korea Han Sung-Joo noted that unofficial diplomacy is essentially ‘people to people diplomacy undertaken by both individuals and private organizations’.\(^{30}\) Collaboration between nongovernmental actors has contributed to the emergence of track three dialogue channels. These channels include meetings and conferences that draw their participants mainly from nongovernmental circles. Discussions are more academic and very informal, and the agendas generally tend to be critical of governments and their policies.

A number of NGOs and institutes, as well as independent scholars around the region, have been studying and addressing non-traditional security issues. Their use of new communications technology, and their increasing savvy in winning public sympathy for their causes have gained them international influence out of proportion to the material resources they control.

In 1994, a network known as Peace, Disarmament and Symbiosis in the Asia Pacific (PDSAP) convened a conference in Manila with the theme ‘From the Cold War to the 21st Century: Towards a New Era in the Asia Pacific’. The group built upon initial meetings held in Tokyo in 1992 and upon bilateral Philippines–Japan inter-parliamentary dialogues. The conference itself was intended to expand the PDSAP network to include academics, NGOs and ‘concerned parliamentarians’ from around the Asia Pacific region. It opened up questions of peace, security, and living standards in the context of a development discourse critical of unfettered globalization.

In 1997 these issues were taken up in a conference organized by Focus on Global South, a group attached to the Social Research Institute of Thailand’s Chulalongkorn University, in association with Forum-Asia, the Peace Research Institute of Tokyo’s International Christian University, and Berkeley’s Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development. The conference was entitled ‘Alternative Security Systems in the Asia-Pacific’ and took place on 27–30 March in Bangkok. Among its objectives was ‘to move the understanding of security from a traditional concept to a more comprehensive
and pro-active view that addresses the causes of conflict, including socio-economic and gender inequalities, environmental degradation, and lack of political participation. A second conference held in Manila on 22–24 July 1998 examined how to conceptualize an alternative security perspective that would incorporate these concerns.

The focus on this alternative frame for security, more commonly called 'human security', allowed national and regional NGOs involved in track three to include concerns such as economic development and human rights in the security discourse in Asia Pacific. The People’s Forum (and, from 1997 onwards, the APEC People’s Assembly), an international agglomeration of NGOs, people’s organizations and individual academics opposed to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), held parallel conferences coinciding with the APEC Summits held in Osaka (1995), Manila (1996), Vancouver (1997), Kuala Lumpur (1998), and different cities in New Zealand (1999). The principal goal of these organizations is to communicate information that challenges the idea that globalization is the only path to economic progress. The media was their principal target, not government representatives and policy. Nonetheless, they influenced legislators across the region who have raised these views in parliamentary debates and discussions.

At another level, but working within the same framework articulated by the People’s Forum, are regional networks that have been organizing around specific human rights issues. They have done this even as they challenged the security framework underlying the human rights approach of many regimes in power within the region. In Southeast Asia, the participants in the Asia Pacific Conferences on East Timor (APCET) and the members of the Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (AltSEAN) have taken ASEAN and its member-states to task for their policy of non-interference on the issue of human rights in East Timor and Burma. APCET held three conferences on the issue of East Timor between 1994 and 1997; these attracted international attention because of the harassment that conference organizers experienced at the hands of the governments of the host countries or organizations associated with the governments. A fourth conference which will look into the transition process towards full independence of East Timor will be held in Dili in September 2000.

By pursuing objectives that are clearly critical of mainstream security and development frameworks, the efforts of PDSAP, Focus on Global South, People’s Forum, APCET and AltSEAN show the fundamental aspects of track three channels. These have a clearly activist nature. Track three mechanisms are more adversarial in their approach than track two and track one and a half. Track three is intent on instituting change from the margins of national and regional politics. The conferences and meetings held in track three propose not only policy recommendations for governments but also a program of action for the participants themselves.
A second aspect is the focus on non-traditional and alternative approaches to security. The NGOs and people's organizations involved in these mechanisms argue that existing multilateral security systems are inadequate for the needs of the post-Cold War era. A more lasting framework for peace and stability can only be attained through 'people-centered security systems' rather than the predominant framework based on state-centric structures. International collaboration and networking among NGOs have been important in advocating issues and approaches that would otherwise have remained outside the public sphere.

The emergence of track three activities – the very fact that these meetings are tolerated despite their anti-government stance – emphasizes the effects of increasing democratization in the region. Track three involves groups that are largely marginalized by the dominant discourse on security in the region. It seeks to 'build constituencies for peace which can question conventional practices and beliefs and present alternatives to official government positions.' Track three activities are symptomatic of the post–Cold War spread of democracy that was given further impetus by the 1997–98 financial crisis.

At the same time, it points to the limitations of track two in providing critical fora for regional security and political affairs. Key personalities in ASEAN-ISIS such as Mohamed Jawhar Hassan of ISIS, Malaysia, and Carolina Hernandez of ISDS in the Philippines have pointed to the potential contribution of track three to security in the region. Hernandez believes that a meeting between track two and track three adherents in Southeast Asia would generate new ideas and the impetus for furthering participation in the political–security discourse of the region. ASEAN-ISIS has taken up this idea and is looking into the possibility of a meeting in November 2000. Marzuki Darusman, the Attorney-General of Indonesia and a regular at the ASEAN Colloquium on Human Rights, also recommended a 'third track human rights mechanism for the region that would involve civil society'.

In spite of their advantages, there are clear issues regarding the longer term feasibility of track three channels. Their deliberately critical view of government policies and their insistence on structural change in the existing order limit their capacity to influence government behavior. The advantage of track three participants in 'being able to speak their mind' is offset by the lack of an audience that is able and willing to do something about what they talk about.

Equally important is the inadequacy of the human infrastructure needed to sustain these mechanisms. There are few civil society institutions and NGOs outside of mainstream track two groups involved in security. A result is the lack of conceptual clarity of the human security framework advocated by track three groups. This and the deficiency of expertise on security matters limit the credibility of track three meetings in policy circles. Consequently, participants in these channels rarely manage to shape debate outside their own networks.
The most serious problem faced by track three networks is the inability of participating groups to agree on priorities. This points to the conceptual difficulties with 'human security', but even more so it is symptomatic of activities involving issue-oriented and cause-oriented groups. Well versed in their respective concerns, they have little to contribute (and little desire to do so) to anything outside of these concerns. Under the best conditions, track three meetings can introduce very interesting and original ideas. Unfortunately, in-fighting and splits within the NGO community in the region have more often than not led to short life-spans for track three networks.

These problems, however, are not unresolvable. Collaboration between tracks two and three could be a way out of these. The proposal made by Hernandez to get tracks two and three people together is intended to bring their respective strengths into the same forum. This kind of collaboration will allow track two institutes to act as a conduit between track three and track one mechanisms. In return, cooperating with track three could pave the way for more independent thinking and research within track two processes, and could serve to sustain its credibility and legitimacy.

Conclusion

The experience of ASEAN-ISIS illustrates the dilemma faced by track two diplomacy. The dilemma is largely a function of the close relationship ASEAN-ISIS has with governments in the region. These linkages provide its comparative advantage as nongovernmental track two participants are placed in a position to influence government thinking. Yet the need to maintain good relations with state institutions and officials hampers its potential for critical contributions to dialogue processes.

The growth of track three networks is one of the results of this dilemma. These networks provide the critical thinking that track two seems to shy away from, with track three acting as a forum where marginalized groups can articulate concerns that are largely ignored in the elitist structure of track two mechanisms. Theoretical and practical issues, however, limit track three's contribution to the regional security discourse.

Collaboration between tracks two and three networks can bring their respective strengths together in one forum. Given the problems associated with track two in general, it is doubtful whether these issues can be addressed from within its current structure. ASEAN-ISIS in particular is subject to limitations imposed by the inclusion of government-based institutions in its membership. Ironically, for ASEAN-ISIS to maintain its credibility, it may be necessary for some of its member-institutes to undertake more activities out-
side its ambit. This is where cooperative opportunities with track three can be explored.

Certainly, collaboration faces structural and theoretical obstacles. The inclusion of government-based institutions in ASEAN-ISIS makes it difficult to accommodate the critical perspective that track three participants bring into any forum. Secondly, tracks two and three work at cross-purposes with one another. Track two seeks to help government agencies in policymaking while track three seeks to galvanize public support against governments and their policies. Again, these issues can be negotiated between the two sets of networks.

The revitalization of track two is necessary for the reinvigoration of new thinking on security in the region. The importance of track two as an intellectual springboard for this discourse remains a vital component of the process of diplomatic activities in the region. It must be allowed to perform this function, with as little constraint from government interests as possible. It should not be too dependent on national governments, otherwise it will fall into the trap of being beholden to the interests involved in the domestic political environment of the ASEAN states.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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5 For more information on these meetings, see University of Toronto–York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, Dialogue Monitor: Inventory of Multilateral Meetings on Asia Pacific Security Studies, nos. 1–6, 1995–98. In 1998, this became Dialogue and Research Monitor and is currently published by the University of British Columbia.


10 The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy uses a framework identifying nine different tracks of diplomatic activity based on the participants involved, the form of activity, and the issue area. It is largely ignored, however, by Asia Pacific dialogue networks. See Louise Diamond & John MacDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1996), pp. 1–5.


12 ASEAN has Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam as members.


16 In 1998 Jusuf Wanandi threatened to close down CSIS when he felt that political support for the institute and its activities was diminishing in the wake of the financial
17 Harris (note 11 above), p. 151.
18 Stone (note 8 above), pp. 28–29.
19 See Project Director’s note in Dialogue Monitor: Inventory of Multilateral Meetings on Asia Pacific Security Issues, no. 5, March 1998.
26 Desmond Ball has also noted this in CSCAP. See Ball (note 15 above), p. 306.
27 Interviews conducted in Southeast Asia, January–February 1999.
30 Yamamoto (note 22 above), p. 23.