The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context

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The prime claim of the theory of securitization is that the articulation of security produces a specific threatening state of affairs. Within this theory, power is derived from the use of ‘appropriate’ words in conformity with established rules governing speech acts. I argue, however, that a speech act view of security does not provide adequate grounding upon which to examine security practices in ‘real situations’. For instance, many security utterances counter the ‘rule of sincerity’ and, the intrinsic power attributed to ‘security’ overlooks the objective context in which security agents are situated. As a corrective, I put forward three basic assumptions — (i) that an effective securitization is audience-centered; (ii) that securitization is context-dependent; (iii) that an effective securitization is power-laden. The insights gleaned from the investigation of these assumptions are progressively integrated into the pragmatic act of security, the value of which is to provide researchers in the field with a tractable number of variables to investigate in order to gain a better understanding of the linguistic manufacture of threats.

KEY WORDS ◆ agency ◆ audience ◆ context ◆ discourse ◆ pragmatic act ◆ securitization

Introduction

The power of discourse has become an important aspect of security analysis. Among the many methods developed to scrutinize the tenets and implications of security discourse, the theory of securitization, grounded upon speech act philosophy, has aroused the most interest. For the Copenhagen School (CS), securitization is premised on one main assumption: the enunciation of security itself creates a new social order wherein ‘normal politics’ is bracketed. Two constitutive rules, both pertaining in fact to the
linguistic competence of the actors involved, are required for a successful securitization —‘(1) the internal, linguistic-grammatical — to follow the rule of the act . . .; and (2) the external, contextual and social — to hold a position from which the act can be made (“The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked”)’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 32). Unless the players follow these rules, the linguistic construction of a security problem — securitization — is not possible.

I challenge this position here. The basic problem is that, within the CS framework, the discursive action of security holds a high degree of formality. As a consequence, the concept of security as a speech act ‘lends itself too much to a distorted sense of [securitization] as having a fixed, permanent, unchanging [code of practice]’ (Gusfield, 1981: 9). To be more explicit, the assumption of a speech act approach ultimately reduces security to a conventional procedure such as marriage or betting in which the ‘felicity circumstances’ (conditions of success) must fully prevail for the act to go through. I argue, on the contrary, that securitization is better understood as a strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction. The strategic or pragmatic action of discourse differs from a speech act on at least one essential count — if the strategic action of discourse operates at the level of persuasion and uses various artifacts (metaphors, emotions, stereotypes, gestures, silence, and even lies) to reach its goals, the speech act seeks to establish universal principles of communication, the value of which is to be functional whatever the context, culture and whatever the relative power of the actors. In fact, this contrast between the strategic and speech act view of security parallels the difference between ‘pragmatics’ and ‘universal pragmatics’. The first deals with language usage, including a colorful use of language to attain a goal. Universal pragmatics is primarily concerned with fundamental principles (or rules) underlying communicative action. If the rules are not followed, the communicative action is distorted, and thus not successful or ‘felicitous’, to use Austin’s vocabulary. To this degree the speech act concept of security, a kind of universal pragmatics, is consequently inadequate for students of International Relations to deal with the ‘discursive politics of security’, the goal of which is to persuade a target audience, drawing on contextual clues, to issue a mandate for action to defeat or reduce the identified threat.

It is useful, I argue, to think of security pronouncements not as speech acts that are successful to the extent that rules are followed by the agents but as discursive techniques allowing the securitizing actor to ‘induce or increase the [public] mind’s adherence to the thesis presented to its assent’
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tytecka, 1969: 4). The speech act model is, therefore, born out of an attempt to propose the idea that securitization is a sustained strategic practice aimed at convincing a target audience to accept, based on what it knows about the world, the claim that a specific development (oral threat or event) is threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to alleviate it. In this regard, the revision I propose here is to recast the speech act model of security. By integrating strategic purposes into the equation, my approach elevates securitization above its normative setting and, in so doing, ensconces it in the social context, a field of power struggles in which securitizing actors align on a security issue to swing the audience’s support toward a policy or course of action.

The thrust of this article stems from three assumptions — one, although the CS points out that a ‘significant audience’ must concur with the securitizing actor (who speaks ‘security’) for a referent subject, i.e. the threatening event to be securitized—the nature and status of that audience—remains unaccounted for. Two, like the CS, I assume that the very use of the concept ‘security’ modifies the context, but unlike the CS I argue that such a use must be aligned with an external context — independent from the use of language — to yield the desired effect. Three, in one view, I retain the broad focus on linguistic competence, according to which the power of security utterances derives from the social position of the speaker; but I add that language has an intrinsic force that rests with the audience’s scrutiny of truth claims, with regard to a threat, being made by the speaker. In this paper, then, I defend the idea that the audience, political agency and context are crucial, if overlooked, aspects of securitization that should guide the analysis of the linguistic manufacture of threats in world politics.

A caveat. Theoretically, securitization is a socio-philosophical approach. Thus, differences in the articulation of its theoretical premises affect the way empirical work is done. Moreover, because this is so, to mark off securitization from speech act theory requires investigating whether the pragmatic approach provides a sustainable framework by which to gauge the strategic use of language. To address this point would involve, primarily, a discussion of the poststructuralist link to the speech act in order to capture how the symbol security is managed, understood and put into reality, through rhetoric. This, however, constitutes the purpose of another paper (Balzacq, 2004). In a paper like this one, on the contrary, we need to provide, first, the theoretical foundations of the pragmatic act, and, second, to elaborate on these bases in order to say what the important elements of the pragmatic act are and to state how they affect securitization.

This article is organized as follows — first, I introduce the reader to relevant aspects of the speech act theory, and delineate the scope of this paper within the broad problem of securitization. I think that many
problems associated with securitization arise from unspecified yet deeply held philosophical views. It appears, therefore, that without such a clarification, we cannot ascertain the implications of a speech act approach to security. Second, I use the insights gleaned from the previous section in order to follow the line of reasoning of the CS account of security to its logical conclusion — that security as a speech act is highly problematic because it overlooks the external context, the psycho-cultural orientation of the audience, and neglects the differential power between the speaker and the listener. In this section I argue that there is a need to consider securitization as a strategic practice. This position, in fact, is supported by the following argument — as a form of discursive pragmatics, the analysis of security utterances is also ‘concerned with the information over and above the linguistic meaning and it consists of inferences based on *non-linguistic world knowledge*’ (Stevenson, 1993: 4–5; emphasis added). Third, I posit that, as situated speeches, strategic acts of security operate at the intersection of many-faceted ‘circumstances of the individual utterances [and] the general conditions which allow, and afford, a particular act of speaking’ (Mey, 2001: 94). The benefit of this formulation is threefold. One, the strategic act of security raises the question of inequality of access to discursive resources in security interactions (the question of power); two, the pragmatic view of security accounts for how actors can bring about something by saying ‘security’ (the question of the audience); three, as a consequence, the pragmatic act of security deals adequately with the complexity of actual security circumstances without fitting within the normatively ordered interactions of the speech act framework (the question of the context). I conclude by arguing that the outcome of securitization is contingent upon how congruent these factors are.

**The Vocabulary of Speech Act Theory**

The CS technique of security analysis builds upon the ‘theory of speech act’ as spelled out by John L. Austin, with oblique references to John R. Searle. Hence, any attempt at revising, regrounding and expanding its methodological procedure requires a clarification of the central premises of the philosophy of speech acts. Such an undertaking risks disparagement, however — ‘It is rather to insist’, warns Quentin Skinner (2002: 106), ‘that we shall miss the relevance of speech act analysis if we think of it as just another piece of philosophical jargon that we can brush aside if we happen not to like the sound of it’. Therefore, heeding this caveat, this section provides the reader with the conceptual instruments needed to proceed, I hope, smoothly through the remainder of the article. It seeks to shed light on how I re-evaluate the CS study of security, the manner in which I try to
remedy its weaknesses and how, in practical terms, the position adopted here leads us to a concept of security as a pragmatic act.

In essence, the basic idea of the speech act theory is simply expressed — certain statements, according to Austin, do more than merely describe a given reality and, as such, cannot be judged as false or true. Instead these utterances realize a specific action; they ‘do’ things — they are ‘performatives’ as opposed to ‘constatives’ that simply report states of affairs and are thus subject to truth and falsity tests. From Austin’s perspective, each sentence can convey three types of acts, the combination of which constitutes the total speech act situation — (i) locutionary — the utterance of an expression that contains a given sense and reference; (ii) illocutionary — the act performed in articulating a locution. In a way, this category captures the explicit performative class of utterances, and as a matter of fact, the concept ‘speech act’ is literally predicated on that sort of agency; and (iii) perlocutionary, which is the ‘consequential effects’ or ‘sequels’ that are aimed at evoking the feelings, beliefs, thoughts or actions of the target audience. This triadic characterization of kind of acts is summed up by Jürgen Habermas in the following — ‘to say something, to act in saying something, to bring about something through acting in saying something’ (emphasis in original).

It is important to note that illocutionary and perlocutionary acts diverge in the direction and the nature of consequences they initiate. The first, by convention, is bound up with effects that occur if and only if all four of the ‘felicity conditions’ are met — (i) a preparatory condition determined by the existence of a ‘conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances’; (ii) an executive condition to determine whether the procedure has been fully executed by all participants; (iii) a sincerity condition that posits that participants in this ‘conventional procedure’ must have certain thoughts or feelings, and ‘must intend so to conduct themselves’; (iv) a fulfillment condition determined by whether participants ‘actually so conduct themselves subsequently’ (Austin, 1962: 14–15). The second, perlocution, is ‘specific to the circumstances of issuance, and is therefore not conventionally achieved just by uttering particular utterances, and includes all those effects, intended or unintended, often indeterminate, that some particular utterances in a particular situation may cause’ (Austin, 1962: 14–15). Thus, if perlocution does not adhere to rules conditioning the realization of an illocutionary act, which the CS paraphrases for its definition of security and securitization, it becomes plain that viewing security as a speech act is a restrictive theoretical position. Equally, in any intersubjective process such as securitization, the purpose is to prompt a significant response from the other (perlocutionary effect); unless this
happens there is no securitization. Necessarily, then, perlocution is central rather than tangential to understanding how a particular public issue can change into a security problem.

Two related implications, one empirical and another theoretical, follow from this. To begin with, on the empirical side, a speech act conception of security poses a problem in that it is disconnected from the actual dynamics of world politics wherein the meaning of actions is not always determined by the conventional rules governing illocutionary acts. Indeed, viewing security as a speech act amounts to reducing it to an institutional procedure such as marriage or betting in which all the ‘felicity circumstances’ must prevail for the act to be effective. Second, from a theoretical standpoint, to interpret security as a speech act is to assume that a part — the illocutionary act — represents the whole — the total speech act situation — that includes locution, illocution and perlocution. Moreover, with very few exceptions, political elites use discourse to win a target audience without necessarily attending to one of the basic rules of a successful speech act — sincerity. In this respect, the speech act view of security does not account for the relation between the persuasive power of an agent and a concomitant swing in the attitude of the target audience; however, the pragmatic act of security does. Indeed, the method I promote studies contextual language use by combining the analysis of what security utterances do and what they mean.

By building upon that endeavor, the next section examines the assumptions underlying the CS view of security. I take seriously the CS claim that the politics of security is discursively composed and that linguistic variables have concrete effects on the dynamics of world politics, but I disagree with the canonical view of security as a speech act which ‘becomes effective ex opere operato’ or ‘from the act being done’ (Mey, 2001: 215). In addition, the CS strives to promote discourse analysis as a new technique of devising reproducible findings in security research, but does so by overlooking the power of context as an explanatory variable in the efficacious use of language. I grapple with these issues here. The overall aim, however, is to bring out and reject, based on the arguments of the previous section, the CS position that securitization is a speech act. This section therefore traverses the bridge from the speech act to a pragmatic model of security.

**The Speech Act and the Politics of Security**

The project of widening the ambit of security studies requires a conceptual rearticulation of security within the confines not only of methodology, but also of suitable political practices. It can be summarized with the following question — ‘What really makes something a security problem?’ (Wæver, 1995: 54). For the CS, the answer is quite simple yet decisive — something
‘shows itself’ (from the Greek *phainestai*) as a security problem through the discursive politics of security (Dillon, 1996: 47). Thus, inasmuch as security is a *logos*, that is, a linguistically manifested agency, no issue is essentially a security problem. (In)security is not an objective condition, a state of affairs that predates discourse. Ole Wæver (1995: 55) posits it in the following way — ‘With the help of language theory, we can regard “security” as a *speech act*. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance *itself* is the act. By saying it something is done (as in betting, a promise, naming a ship). . . . [T]he word ‘security’ is the *act* . . . (emphasis added)’. In this instance, security is an illocutionary act, a ‘self-referential’ practice; its conditions of possibility are constitutive of the speech act of saying ‘security’. But this posture has a negative effect on the theoretical model of the CS, notably when its proponents stress that, for securitization to be felicitous (successful), a ‘significant audience’ must concur with the securitizing actor on the threatening nature of the ‘referent subject’ (the thing that threatens).9 Ironically, then, an issue acquires the status of security through intersubjective practices in which its saliency is dramatically increased. However, this position conflates illocutionary — what is done in saying the locution — and perlocutionary — what is done by saying something — acts.

The basic idea is as follows. The focus on rules of securitization, which enables the CS to hold that security is a *self-referential* practice (or an illocutionary act, the validity of which is subject to conditions set forth above), poses a great challenge to its model of securitization as an *intersubjective* process. As a result, the CS destroys its view of security as a ‘self-referential practice’, the utterance of which achieves something by virtue of its illocutionary force in conformity with formal conditions of explicit performatives. The source of this confusion rests on the assumption that the speech act encompasses both the illocutionary act and the perlocutionary effect.10 To express my concern in this way is to treat the conception of ‘security as a speech act’ with some qualifications. Indeed, to claim that security is a speech act, as I have suggested, is to reduce security to an illocutionary act, i.e. a conventional procedure: ‘an act . . . conforming to a convention’ (Austin, 1962: 105). In a nutshell, either we argue that security is a self-referential practice, in which case we forsake perlocution with the related acquiescence of the audience (and thereafter the idea that security is a ‘speech act’), or we hold fast to the creed that using the concept of security also produces a perlocutionary effect, in which case we abandon self-referentiality. I suspect instead that the CS leans towards the first option. One basic reason supports my position — although the CS appeals to an audience, its framework ignores that audience, which suggests that the CS opts for an illocutionary view of security yielding a ‘magical efficiency’ rather
than a full-fledged model encompassing perlocution as well (Buzan et al., 1998: 46, note 5). In fact the CS singles out three units of analysis — (i) the referent object — what is the object of securitization? (ii) The securitizing actor — who speaks ‘security’? (iii) Functional actors — i.e. those whose activities have significant effects on security making. They are not securitizing actors; nor are they referent objects (Buzan et al., 1998: 36). True, these units draw attention to most of the factors that students of security must be concerned with. The failure to properly incorporate audience and context, however, makes it difficult to address the practically important question of what the proportionate causal weight of audience and contextual factors are in securitization theory.

For the reasons put forth here, and consistent with the vocabulary of the speech act theory spelled out earlier, one must ask — can a scheme that ought to include locution, illocution and perlocutionary acts in security analysis be dubbed a ‘speech act’? There is little ground for a positive answer. Maintaining the elegant concept of securitization, drawn from the banking system, but rejecting the label of ‘security as a speech act’ because of its philosophical flaws, I propose therefore to knit the three acts into an integrated scheme, called a ‘pragmatic act’.11

I see at least two advantages to this — on the one hand, it stresses the (symbolic) interactionist act of achieving security with words — securitization;12 and, on the other hand, it allows us to emphasize the contextual and non-linguistic clues such as physical gestures, social-time continuum or common scene of action for social agents. We thus can illustrate the principles I have suggested as basic to a pragmatic approach to security — securitization is a meaningful procedure, in a field of forces, carried out through linguistic impulses, that strives to establish an unraveling course of events as a shared concern aimed at recommending an immediate political action. In conceiving security as a pragmatic act, then, discourse is not self-referential. This has important methodological implications. A scheme that seeks to promote an understanding of security discourses as actions must be committed to recover not only ‘discourse itself’, but also other factors — agents’ capabilities, the ontology of their interactions — and the social field in which rhetorical games take place. Arguably, this position prevents the discursive analysis of security from being ‘diverted into a prolix and self-indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world’ (Walt, 1991: 223).

The concept of security as a pragmatic act can be broken down into two overlapping levels, that of the agent and that of the act, each in turn having interwoven facets (Mey, 2001: 214). The agent level includes three aspects — (i) the power position and the personal identity of who ‘does’ security, which is ‘a set of attributes, beliefs, desires, or principles of action’; (ii) the...
social identity, which operates to both constrain and enable the behavior of the securitizing actor; (iii) the nature and the capacity of the target audience, and the main opponents or alternative voices within the relevant social field — either individual or corporate, ad hoc or institutionalized (see Fearon, 1999; Suganami, 1999). The level of the act has two sides: the ‘action-type’ side that refers to the appropriate language to use in order to perform a given act — the grammatical and syntactical rules of the language. The other facet is contextual — which heuristic artifacts shall a securitizing actor use to create (or effectively resonate with) the circumstances that will facilitate the mobilization of the audience — analogies, metaphors, metonymies, emotions, stereotypes? What is the target audience, the main opponents or alternative voices within the relevant social field — individual or corporate, ad hoc or institutionalized? Which media are favored — electronic or print? The overarching outcome is to open up the politics and methods of creating security, since discourse involves practice and refers to variables that are extra-linguistic. Given this, there are three key assumptions through which the pragmatic act of securitization serves to improve on a speech act framework. First, an effective securitization is highly context-dependent. Second, an effective securitization is audience-centered. Third, securitization dynamics are power-laden.

Securitization as a Situated Interactive Activity

The last section elucidated the benefits of adopting a strategic (pragmatic) approach to securitization, rather than conceiving of it as a speech act. The driving question, regardless of details, was — what are the crucial underlying principles of securitization? The answer was that, according to the CS, securitization is a rule-governed practice, the success of which does not necessarily depend on the existence of a real threat, but on the discursive ability to effectively endow a development with such a specific complexion. We have also shed light on the pervasive ambiguity that lies at the heart of the theory of securitization, namely, that security is at one and the same time a self-referential activity as it is an intersubjective process. By examining the units of analysis of the CS, which negate the audience, I have argued that the CS leans towards self-referentiality, rather than intersubjectivity. Finally, I have substituted this view with a pragmatic approach on the grounds that it more effectively integrates not only the audience, but also the context and the agency. However, this revision should not be seen as a rejection of the remarkable program of security studies opened by the CS, but as an attempt at strengthening it by accounting for other crucial variables, the neglect of which clouds our understanding of securitization as a linguistic practice. The
problem we now face is — what importance do these factors have in understanding securitization? I address this question below.

**Context: Internalist vs Externalist View**

Let us restate the baseline assumptions for our treatment of securitization. The CS endorses the postulate that language is performative; in other words, by uttering the term security the previous state of affairs changes. This highlights what the speech act approach to security consists of — modifying the context through the enunciation of utterances, the success of which hangs upon ‘felicity conditions’ (necessary and sufficient rules that must prevail for linguistic acts to produce their effects), and for communication to be practicable. It implies that if the speech act is achieved under prescribed rules, the context alters accordingly; hence, a formerly secure place will become insecure. On this internalist approach, the context is shaped by the use of the concept of security. Thus, security, or at least its illocutionary force, remolds the context in which it occurs. What is key here is the ‘abductive power’ of words; indeed, as an abductive tool, the concept of security permits the activation of a new context, or converts the existing one into something different. In this sense, security utterances operate as ‘instructions for the construction and interpretation of the situation. The power of these tools is such that appropriate conditions can be created when they are not textually or contextually erased’ (Violi, 2001: 187). I would like to follow Patrizia Violi’s ideas on this to their logical conclusion. I interpret Violi to mean that words create their own conditions of receptiveness by modifying, or building a fitting context. To illustrate something of what is at stake, consider the story of the Popish Plot that involved Catholics in England in 1678. Eugene E. White (1992: 108) recounts it in remarkable terms:

[A] perjurer, Titus Oates, projected a complex, fabricated story that Catholics were conspiring to murder [King] Charles [II], substitute his Catholic brother, and restore England to Catholics by rebellion. This tale led much of Protestant society to believe that a provoking crisis of gravest immediacy actually existed. It was widely thought that in coordinated strikes the Catholics were going to massacre thousands of Protestants and that the queen was in league with assassination attempts on her husband’s life. Largely on the basis of invented evidence supplied by Oates and testimony given by a known conspirator and confidence man, William Bedloe, seven men were executed for treason and [consequently] a Disabling Act was passed excluding Roman Catholics from both houses of Parliament. Although there was no ‘real’ substance to the conspiracy, it constituted a very ‘real’ urgency to the alarmed Protestants, and through the rhetoric of their Parliament and their Courts they modified the alleged exigency to their satisfaction.
This segment reveals how linguistic content can modify a context by investing an individual group with a specific ominous tone. For members of the CS, this is a clear articulation of the Janus-faced nature of security — a practice and a discourse, or, indeed, a ‘discursive politics of security’. Highlighted in this context, the word ‘security’ does not point towards an objective reality; it is an agency in itself to the extent that it conveys a self-referential practice instantiated by discourses on existential threats that empower political elites to take extraordinary measures to alleviate ‘insecurity’. Furthermore, this approach reinforces the CS view that ‘real rhetorical urgency’ does not always equal the existence of a ‘real threat’. The radical approach to the relation between language and the facts surrounding it can be described like this — what is decisive for security is what language constructs and, as a consequence, what is ‘out there’ is thus irrelevant (compare Campbell, 1992: 1–2; Knudsen, 2001). However, despite important insights, this position remains highly disputable. The reason behind this qualification is not hard to understand. With great trepidation my contention is that one of the main distinctions we need to take into account while examining securitization is that between ‘institutional’ and ‘brute’ threats. In its attempts to follow a more radical approach to security problems wherein threats are institutional, that is, mere products of communicative relations between agents, the CS has neglected the importance of ‘external or brute threats’, that is, threats that do not depend on language mediation to be what they are — hazards for human life. In methodological terms, however, any framework over-emphasizing either institutional or brute threat risks losing sight of important aspects of a multifaceted phenomenon. Indeed, securitization, as suggested earlier, is successful when the securitizing agent and the audience reach a common structured perception of an ominous development. In this scheme, there is no security problem except through the language game. Therefore, how problems are ‘out there’ is exclusively contingent upon how we linguistically depict them. This is not always true. For one, language does not construct reality; at best, it shapes our perception of it. Moreover, it is not theoretically useful nor is it empirically credible to hold that what we say about a problem would determine its essence. For instance, what I say about a typhoon would not change its essence. The consequence of this position, which would require a deeper articulation, is that some security problems are the attribute of the development itself. In short, threats are not only institutional; some of them can actually wreck entire political communities regardless of the use of language. Analyzing security problems then becomes a matter of understanding how external contexts, including external objective developments, affect securitization. Thus, far from being a departure from constructivist approaches to security, external developments are central to it.
Specifically, a large part of what is going on in securitization is overlooked by an internalist view of the context, the logic of which overstates the intrinsic power of a rule-governed use of concepts. The fact is, to move an audience’s attention toward an event or a development construed as dangerous, the words of the securitizing actor need to resonate with the context within which his/her actions are collocated. With this awareness of the limits of an internalist position, I would like to advance a second, externalist approach to connecting security utterances to a context.

While the CS insists that the concept of security modifies the context by virtue of a successful application of the constitutive rules of a speech act (illocutionary act), I suggest, on the contrary, that to win an audience, security statements must, usually, be related to an external reality (see Grace, 1987: 48–9). Hence success, that is, the possibility of marshalling the assent of an audience (perlocutionary effect), rests with whether the historical conjuncture renders the audience more sensitive to its vulnerability. If so, the alarming discourse put on the ‘marketplace of ideas’ by the elites would elicit the required conduct from the masses (Snyder and Ballentine, 1996; Kaufman, 1996). This means that the success of securitization is contingent upon a perceptive environment. Therefore, the positive outcome of securitization, whether it be strong or weak, lies with the securitizing actor’s choice of determining the appropriate times within which the recognition, including the integration of the ‘imprinting’ object — a threat — by the masses is facilitated.15 This tends to subscribe, moreover, to the view that the public would accept the description of threats deployed by elites, and securitization will successfully take place, if the times are critical enough.

A simple idea underlies this, though the details might be arcane. We agree that when the concept ‘security’ is used, it forces the audience to ‘look around’ in order to identify the conditions (the presumed threats) that justify its articulation. In other words, the context ‘selects’ or activates certain properties of the concept, while others are concealed. This sensitivity to the modeling function of the context is to a large extent that which activates some properties of the concept while at the same time maintains other properties, naturalized parts of the semantic repertoire of security (Williams, 1976: 21–2). In this respect, the conditions for success of the Popish Plot can be seen under a fresh light. Of course, the internalist interpretation given above possessed elements of cogency — rhetoric, in short, catalyzed the sense of urgency. Yet, while there may be little harm in relying on the intrinsic properties of words to explain how Titus Oates maneuvered England toward his position, overlooking the broader context of 17th-century England would be shortsighted. Indeed, research in the success of securitization should also examine the facilitating conditions that predisposed Britons to agree with Oates’s ideas. In this respect, two
important contextual factors are noteworthy. First, at the domestic level, England was still very traumatized by London’s 1666 fire, for which Catholics were thought to be responsible. In addition, many Protestants scorned the prospect of having James, who was a Catholic, succeed his brother upon death. Second, at the European level, England felt economically threatened by France’s King Louis XIV, a Catholic, who had just invaded the Netherlands and had tightened his hold on Spain. Taken together, these circumstances made the masses ripe for persuasion; indeed, the context could have served to cause this directly. Oates used the context purposefully by stressing the dangers that were allegedly lurking for Britons, and, as a result, he convinced England to espouse his concerns and take action against the Catholics.

Thus, the semantic repertoire of security rests with overarchig consequences for a given community, for instance, the possibility for a people’s slaughter. The semantic repertoire of security is a combination of textual meaning — knowledge of the concept acquired through language (written and spoken) — and cultural meaning — knowledge historically gained through previous interactions and situations. Taken together, these two kinds of meanings form a frame of reference through which security utterances can be understood. The role of a frame is to structure various properties of an entity or development under the same label — ‘threat’ — by virtue of the conventions governing the use of the concept and the conditions under which its invocation is justified. More pragmatically, the basic idea is this — the performative dimension of security rests between semantic regularity and contextual circumstances. Indeed, security utterances are complex strings of creative and performative arguments pointing toward an external threatening referent subject. It is not necessary, in attempting to understanding a security issue, to have recourse to an abstract definition that functions as formal ‘barbed wire’, and thus constrains its application to different agents’ domains of experience. I posit that security utterances are linguistic ‘marks intended to recall or direct the attention [of the audience] to some person, object, idea, event or projected activity . . .’ (Sapir, 1934: 492). This enables us to say that security is a symbol. What is involved in the mediation of the symbolic aspect of security is an elucidation that points to specific features of natural or social development which, in turn, influences the action of the other, or of the assembly, as the case applies.

The symbol of security is isomorphic, that is, although it is a naturalized frame, it is also shaped by current information about the context, and the influence of the speaker’s discourse (see Balzacq, 2004). In fact, the mobilization of security arguments requires a judgment of best fit between the state of affairs or a development and a voiced utterance. To use Philip N.
Johnson-Laird’s (1983: 471) words, the manifest content of security discourse ‘is usually a blueprint for a state of affairs: it relies on the [audience] to flesh out the missing details’. It is important to note, however, that security utterances can only have a meaning ‘for those who know how to interpret them in terms of that which they refer’ (Sapir, 1934: 492). Therefore the meaning of security derives from the mutual recognition of the content of the threatening object that is symbolically referred to. The configuration of securitization evolves within a symbolic context of forces that define what a conceptual event (security) is for an audience, and when the use of that concept resonates with the context in order to increase or win the support for the enunciator’s policy. To the extent that this interpretation makes sense, it would seem to follow that the challenge of a securitizing agent would be to convince the audience (e.g. a nation) to recognize the nature of a symbolic referent subject. Hence, we arrive at the assumption that securitization is audience-centered.

**Audience or the Drive for Instrumental Identification**

Despite pervasive ambiguities surrounding agents’ perception of a threatening external development or a state of affairs, it can be argued that the success of securitization is highly contingent upon the securitizing actor’s ability to identify with the audience’s feelings, needs and interests (see Edelman, 1988). To persuade the audience (e.g. the public), that is, to achieve a perlocutionary effect, the speaker has to tune his/her language to the audience’s experience. In fact, identification is the perspective through which the cognitive and behavioral change induced by security utterances can perhaps be accounted for most explicitly. This is demonstrated by the work of Kenneth Burke (1955: 55) for whom an effective persuasion requires that a speaker’s argument employ terms that resonate with the hearer’s language by ‘speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying [her/his] ways with [her/his]’. Indeed, securitizing actors ‘develop maps of target populations based on both the stereotypes [of the referent subject] they themselves hold and those they believe to prevail among that segment of the public likely to become important to them’ (Schneider and Ingram, 1993: 336).

The securitizing actor is sensitive to two kinds of support, formal and moral. These can be congruent or not; nonetheless, the more congruent they are, the more likely the public issue will be successfully securitized. Be that as it may, although moral support conditions formal backing, the two should not be conflated; they are of a different status and are unequally distributed depending on whether the target audience is a formal institution. For example, to wage a war against a country to rid the state of a threat —
real or perceived — political officials will appeal for moral support from both
the public and the institutional body whose attitude has a *direct causal
connection* with the desired goals. But while moral support is generally
necessary, alone, it is not enough. It is the formal decision by an institution
(for instance in the form of a vote by a Parliament, Security Council or
Congress) that mandates the government to adopt a specific policy. This
support is, generally, necessary and sufficient. The requirement of a ‘direct
causal connection with desired goals’ (Kasper, 1990: 205) is important
because audiences do not have the same ‘power over’ a given securitizing
actor. As we know, states can do without the UN Security Council, but need
the support of their legislative branch to launch a military action. Be that as
it may, securitizing agents always strive to convince as broad an audience as
possible because they need to maintain a social relationship with the target
individual group. In common with the desire to transmit information,
political officials are responsive to the fact that winning formal support while
breaking social bonds with constituencies can wreck their credibility. That
explains why, while seeking formal acquiescence, political officials also cloak
security arguments in the semantic repertoire of the national audience in
order to win support. The following text, articulated by the Greek orator
Demosthenes, is particularly useful in understanding the impact of this
technique.

Had my opponents urged the right policy in the past, this discussion would be
superfluous.

First, then, we must not be downhearted at the present situation, however
regrettable it seems . . . . The fact that it is plain dereliction of duty on our part
which has brought us to this position . . . . Why mention this? To set this fact
firmly before your minds, gentlemen, that if you are awake, you have nothing
to fear, if you close your eyes, nothing to hope for. To prove this I point to two
things, the past power of Sparta, which we defeated by sheer attention to
business, and the present aggression of Macedon, which alarms us because our
attitude is wrong. If the belief is held that Philip is an enemy hard to face in
view of the extent of his present strength and the loss to Athens of strategic
points, it is a correct belief. But it must be remembered that at one time we
had Pydna, Potidaea, Methone and the whole surrounding district on friendly
terms, and that a number of communities now on his side . . . . would have
preferred our friendship to his . . . . Consider the facts, consider the outrageous
lengths to which Philip has gone. He does not offer us the choice between
action and inaction. He utters threats . . . . When are we to act? What is the
signal? When compulsion drives, I suppose. Then what are we to say of the
present? In my view the greatest compulsion that can be laid upon free men is
their shame at the circumstances in which they find themselves . . . .

First, then, gentlemen, I declare the need to provide fifty triremes, and
secondly to arouse a spirit in the men of this country which will recognize that

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. . . they must serve in them in person. Further, transports and sufficient smaller craft for half the cavalry must be provided. This I maintain should be a standing force to use for immediate moves away from home. . . . The idea must be implanted in Philip’s mind that Athens has abandoned inaction, and may make a sudden move. . . .

When you vote . . . you will be giving your vote for action against Philip, and action not confined to the words of manifestos and dispatches. (as quoted in Saunders, 1970: 188, 189, 190–1, 193–4)

To contextualize, threatened by Philip of Macedon, Demosthenes tries to move his audience to vote for action and provide necessary means — financing an expeditionary force against Philip — to alleviate the danger he represents to the good life of Athenians. Demosthenes’ choice of language to sway the audience’s attitude and arouse action is characterized by a high sense of urgency — ‘This I maintain should be a standing force to use for immediate moves away from home’ (emphasis added). To convince them to stand by his side, Demosthenes connects to his audience by using inclusive plural pronouns like ‘our’, ‘us’ and ‘we’. Two modalities affect the semantic repertoire upon which Demosthenes, as any securitizing actor, draws, in order to fuse his/her perspective with his audience’s — collective memories, products of social experiences — ‘it must be remembered that’ — and the Zeitgeist (spirit of the times) reflected in words that convey the general feeling prevalent among Athenians — ‘We must not be downhearted at the present situation’ and ‘If the belief is held that Philip is an enemy hard to face in view of the extent of his present strength and the loss to Athens of strategic points, it is a correct belief’. Further, although the Zeitgeist can be rooted in collective memory, it is mostly constituted by the predominant social views, trends, ideological and political attitudes that pervade the context in which participants are nested — ‘Consider the facts, consider the outrageous lengths to which Philip has gone. He does not offer us the choice between action and inaction.’ In turn, as it appears in the excerpt, collective memory and the Zeitgeist condition how a given community perceives and symbolizes urgency, the kind of language likely to induce an audience to change its ideas on a subject and convey political immediacy (Bar-Tal, 2000: 87–90; White, 1992: 146). The essence of this point of view is the assumption that speaking is an action, and that the question of expedient agency underlies any attempt to securitize a public issue by eliciting a suitable attitude.

Agency: The Practical Force of Discourse

We may begin with the stipulation that when talking of performatives, we assume that they are actions, i.e. a specific ‘bringing about that $p’$, where the value of ‘$p$’ indicates the new end-state to be achieved as a result of the discursive action. Communication is successful, from this point of view at
least, to the extent that the speaker and the hearer attain a mutual knowledge that prompts the receiver to do something. The main implication is that the hearer and speaker are engaged in responsive activity within a dynamic situation. Thus, the power involved in communication is relational, rather than being merely substantial or ‘self-actional’ (Emirbayer, 1997). Indeed, to study securitization is to unravel the process by which a securitizing actor induces an audience to agree with a given interpretation of an event or a set of events. Thus, a study of securitization blends questions of persuasion and linguistic competence to place the issue of agency at the center of discourse analysis. However, understanding agency in securitization is a complicated process. Therefore, we have to work it out carefully (i.e. schematically).

**Causality and Habitus.** The essence of a discursive action is its compelling power to cause a receiver or an audience to perform a deed. Thus, discourse and action are linked in two distinct ways. First, discourse is part of agency in that it instantiates a sphere of action wherein agents dealing with defined questions operate ‘agonistically’.20 This is the constitutive side of discursive action, which is another way of saying that through mutual knowledge, discourse shapes social relations and builds their form and content. Second, on the causative side, as vehicle of ideas, discourse targets and creates the instantiation of a particular communicative action.21

Yet to preface words’ agency, for utterances to lead to specific actions, the hearer must deliberate first between the sentence’s meaning and the speaker’s meaning. The former refers to the semantic meaning associated with words syntactically aggregated, whereas the latter is predicated on some aspects of language use that include metaphors, indirect implications, images and metonymies (pragmatics). When this task of decoding is completed, and after a common knowledge is established, normally, a reaction ensues. This gives consistency to Paul Ricœur’s (1981: 206) claim that discourse ‘leaves “a trace”, makes its “marks” when it contributes to the [intersubjective] emergence of such patterns which become the document of human action’. A vivid example of discourse’s capacity to leave a trace and cause an action can be seen in the consequences provoked by the statement released by Song Kyung-hee, the former spokeswoman of the then South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun. In a press conference held in mid-May 2003, she declared that South Korean military preparedness was stepped up to Wathcon II — a military move that ensues when North Korea makes a threatening gesture — immediately after the US coalition started the war on Iraq. Although both South Korea’s defense and unification ministries were quick to offset this announcement by recalling that the current Wathcon II had been in effect since the naval clash between the two Koreas in the West Sea in 1997, North
Korean officials decided to cancel both the 10th inter-Korean ministerial talks and the 5th economic cooperation forum scheduled for June 2003. The constitutive and causative forces are not the only relevant sides of discursive action; there is indeed another face upon which discursive action is critically salient, which is the teleological approach. There, we start off with the idea that both causal and teleological explorations answer the question ‘why.’ They differ, however, on the object of reference. Put simply, causal explanations have the following logic — “Y” occurred because “X” happened or “X” is what produced “Y”; teleological explanations, on the other hand, proceed thus — “X” occurred in order that “Y” should happen or “Y” is what “X” was for. In discourse analysis, the distinction is nonetheless tenuous. As the Korean case shows, the meetings were cancelled because the spokeswoman issued a statement that was construed as an act of threat.

Now, taken from the standpoint of actions and intentions, the North Korean elites reacted as they did because they thought that the articulation of the symbol ‘Wathcon II’ was intended to persuade them to ‘see’ a warning signal. To explain South Korea’s statements, North Korean elites used a backward analysis of the inferential link between the spokeswoman’s intentions and South Korea’s planned actions. In grammatical terms, their aim was to find an answer to a decisive question — ‘What was the statement of the spokeswomen for?’ If, therefore, my analysis of discourse as action is correct, if ‘X’ happens, for instance, because ‘Y’ was uttered, then, in the total speech act, the resulting matrix articulates action-type (the how-question), the problem a securitizing claim intends to solve (the what-question), the communication purpose (the why-question) it serves and the domain of relevance it pertains to (see Table 1 which follows).

Two propositions follow from this map. First, when we study securitization, we elucidate how action-types are mobilized in discourse to comprehend and communicate the stakes raised by a threatening development. Second, communicative purposes mediate between the ‘problem’ and the ‘domain of relevance’ as laid out on the ‘map’ (see Table 1); they direct our attention to the results and consequences of actions. It can, therefore, be agreed in these cases that an utterance is a distinct action insofar as we can attribute a communication purpose, that is, a real or a potential consequence to it. Our analysis points towards the idea that if we want to consider what is done in saying (illocutionary act), we need to give credit to the effects of that specific action — perlocutionary effects (what is done by saying). However, when I insist that an illocutionary act must be complemented by perlocation, I do not want to commit myself to Searle’s view that because communicative purposes are not grounded upon the rules of speech act, we cannot guarantee that they will be effectuated. It is true, of course, that
constitutive rules of speech acts are central to the power of words. But it is misleading to hold that because conventional rules do not guarantee that the results will be attained by producing an utterance, our description of performatives must dismiss communicative or extra-linguistic elements. This is why the insistence on rule-guided security actions fails to capture some factors that may affect the outcome of discursive games. The weakness of a speech act approach considered in the first section gives us some reason to believe that any approach to securitization called properly pragmatic must at least try to account for ‘the constitution of the political field and the relation between this field and the broader space of social positions and processes’ (Thompson, 1991: 28). In this way, performatives are situated actions intentionally mediated by agents’ ‘habitus’; that is, a set of dispositions that informs their perceptions and behaviors (Bourdieu, 1990, 1991). Performatives are thus analyzed as nodal loci of practice, results of power games within the social field or context on the one hand, and between the latter
and the habitus on the other. In this instance, the discourse of securitization manifests a distinct kind of agency, i.e. a ‘temporally constructed engagement by actors of different structural environment — the temporal relational contexts of action — which, through the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgment, both reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive response to the problems posed by changing historical situation’ (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: 970).

**Intention and Linguistic Competence.** There are various interpretations of words’ agency; but I argue that the expression of the power of words, in the sense relevant here, depends on — (i) the context and the power position of the agent that utters them; (ii) the relative validity of statements for which the acquiescence of the audience is requested; and (iii) the manner in which the securitizing actor makes the case for an issue, that is, the discursive strategy displayed. The first conception derives from a notable expression by R.S. Perinbanayagam (1991: 22) — ‘the force of an utterance,’ he states, ‘signifies the force of the self being presented discursively in the interaction. . . . [The] signifying force is presented in an organized and creative force embodying the intentions of the [securitizing actor].’ Intentions, despite their central status in discourse analysis, are notoriously hard to pin down; they remain problematic because it is very difficult to know whether actors must mean what they say (see Brand, 1984; Cavell, 2002). Cut to the bone, intentions refer to what the securitizing actor wants to achieve in articulating a specific utterance within a societal context (Austin, 1962: Lecture VIII).

In the political field, as in many others, the ability of bringing about transformations with words largely depends on the authority that actually articulates sequences of utterances. This is also known in pragmatics as the question of ‘linguistic competence’ — who is allowed to speak about a subject matter or who can partake in the debate. On security issues though, with very few exceptions, a very sharp line cannot be drawn between those who can and those who cannot (see Bigo, 2000; Doty, 1998/99). Nonetheless, in empirical ways, it can be argued that many discourses can readily marshal the assent of a target audience as a result of the audience’s asymmetric access to information. Since the audience is not fully informed, for instance, on the temporal proximity of threats, it usually relies on state officials’ discourses because it thinks that the latter, who are the site of constitutional legitimacy, must have ‘good reasons’ to assert, in this case, that ‘X’ represents a threat to a state’s survival. Of course, by virtue of ‘good reasons’ (i.e. the claim that they know more than they can say or the argument of secrecy) public officials would find it easier, compared to any other securitizing actor, to securitize an issue, primarily, because they hold
influential positions in the security field based on their political capital, and have privileged access to mass media (see Bourdieu, 1990; Foucault, 1980; Herman and Chomski, 1989). Moreover, the concept of linguistic competence is also important because it implies that certain issues ‘are the legitimate province of specific persons, roles, and offices that can command public attention, trust, and confidence’ (Gusfield, 1981: 10).

In both cases of linguistic competence, the power to persuade rests with the assumption that a given securitizing actor knows what is going on, and works for common interests. Here, knowledge (a kind of cultural capital), trust and the power position (political or symbolic capital) are linked (Bourdieu, 1979; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998: 43–60). This connection suggests something about the ‘dispositional concept’ of power, which is the ability to induce effects either directly or indirectly — by performing actions or having them done by others. The ‘power to’ secure the compliance of the audience helps the securitizing actor ‘fuse his/her horizon’ with the audience’s, which, in turn, has the ‘power to’ acknowledge or ratify the claims put forward by the speaker (White, 1992). The case remains, nonetheless, that the claims of public officials would, generally, be ascertained against clues coming from the ‘real world’. This attends to the second position that places a word’s agency in the logical structure of the securitizing actor’s statements. In other words, the determination of evidence for truth claims does not only derive from the authority of the speaker, but emerges also out of the claim itself. If it does, the third position, the discursive strategy displayed by the enunciator, conditions how effectively a professed argument will affect the salience of the point at issue. Like any other aspects of words’ agency, the manner in which the securitizing actor makes the case for the point at stake follows at least two basic principles — emotional intensity and logical rigor (proving how critical a problem is, how it matters to the audience(s), and point to the consequences). The practical force of discourse falls, therefore, between logical consistency and the dynamics of social power (Weldes et al., 1999: 17–9).

**Conclusion**

The important point that stands out from this article is that the speech act model of security conceals more than it reveals about the linguistic construction of security problems. The lesson to be drawn is that perlocutionary effect is not literally part of the speech act (see Fotion, 2000). There are crucial differences, which the CS has overlooked. Thus, to palliate this shortcoming and, as a result, strengthen the theory of securitization, I have developed the view that securitization should be understood as a strategic (or a pragmatic) practice, as opposed to one of universal pragmatics (speech...
act), the aim of which is to determine the universal principles of an effective communicative action of security. Furthermore, if from the standpoint of the CS, an effective securitization is derivable from the constitutive rules of the speech act, the strategic approach embeds it in a configuration of circumstances, the congruence of which facilitates the realization of securitization. Of course, the circumstances leading to securitization vary in form and content; it would therefore be presumptuous to think that they can be grasped comprehensively. However, in order to make the analysis of securitization more tractable, I have narrowed down their number by arguing, in substance, that the conditions underlying the effectuation of securitization fall into at least three sets of factors — audience, context and securitizing agent. In short, the first of these has three components — (i) audience’s frame of reference; (ii) its readiness to be convinced, which depends on whether it perceives the securitizing actor as knowing the issue and as trustworthy; and (iii) its ability to grant or deny a formal mandate to public officials. The second set of factors concerns contextual effects on the audience’s responsiveness to the securitizing actor’s arguments — relevant aspects of the Zeitgeist that influence the listener, and the impact of the immediate situation on the way the securitizing author’s sentences are interpreted by the listener. The third set involves the capacity of the securitizing actor to use appropriate words and cogent frames of reference in a given context, in order to win the support of the target audience for political purposes (see Bakhtin, 1986; Ferguson and Mansbach, 1996).

Some may contend that this cannot tell us what causes securitization. To this I will answer, the problem of a strict causality in securitization dynamics is probably an inaccurate frame. Indeed, rather than looking for a one-directional relationship between some or all of the three factors highlighted, it could be profitable to focus on the degree of congruence between them. This does not mean that I am writing off causality from the analysis of securitization; instead, what I would like to propose is to inquire into causal adequacy rather than causal determinacy. It seems to me that one of the best ways to do this is through an examination of the degree of congruence between different circumstances driving and/or constraining securitization. The advantage is noteworthy — an investigation of degrees of congruity enables us to determine the relative status of one of the forces within the network of causality. Since it is tricky to identify a precise causal link as the exclusive source of a securitized issue, investigating congruence between, for instance, the strategies of the securitizing actor, the frame of reference of the audience and the immediate context may yield more credible results. In other words, rather than clinging to a set of a priori universal principles, the analysis of the degree of congruence among relevant concurrent forces should better guide attempts at understanding securitization, because how
these various factors blend tells us a great deal about the likely outcome of the process. Thus, with configuration and congruence one does not need to rely on the normative conditions of securitization; one grasps key concepts that highlight at once causal networks and products of securitization. Obviously, the emphasis on any of these factors (audience, political agency or context) may differ according to the research program, or intrinsic patterns of security interactions. For instance, the common frame of reference and the perceived speaker’s knowledge of the security problem would bear more weight in securitizing an issue absent of a sensitive external context. By contrast, if the external context provides potent clues for the existence of a security hazard, the importance of the speaker’s knowledge and the influence of the common frame of reference would decrease. In other words, in securitization, the common frame of reference and the perceived speaker’s knowledge can be substitutes for external forces (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998: 55).

If, as suggested in this paper, securitization is a nexus of congruent forces, then securitization is not a self-contained process. Why should this be? Actually, every securitization is a historical process that occurs between an antecedent influential set of events and their impact on interactions; this involves concurrent acts carrying reinforcing or aversive consequences for securitization. Because securitization is the product of such a complex repertoire of causes, an investigation focused on a unique factor (e.g. rules of speech acts) may fail if other elements exert a significant influence on the process. To analyze the construction of a security problem, then, we ought to take note of the fact that any securitization ‘encompasses not only the particular piece(s) of persuasion that we are interested in but also all other successful and abortive attempts at modification that are relevant to experiencing that rhetoric’ (White, 1992: 13).29 And yet, as it appears, this process is more challenging than the study of a rule-governed practice; but it remains potentially rewarding.

Notes

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1. A sample of an impressive literature includes Alker and Sylvan (1994); Debrix (2003); Milliken (1999); Hopf (2002); Larsen (1997); Neumann (1999); Ringmar (1996); Walker (1986); Weldes (1999).

2. The primary formulation of this ‘theory’ owes much to Wæver (1989). Additional versions were undertaken within the ‘Copenhagen School’ project. See Buzan et al. (1990); Wæver et al. (1993); Wæver (1995: 46–86); Buzan et al. (1998); Buzan and Wæver (2003). The distinctive features of the Copenhagen School (CS) have been aptly sketched by Huysmans (1998a). On the label ‘CS’, see McSweeney (1996). For a comprehensive bibliography on the CS, see Guzzini and Jung (2004). See also Buzan and Wæver (1997).

3. This is extrapolated from Habermas (1984). See also Thompson (1991).

4. Different portrayals of the ‘speech act theory’ can be found in: Austin (1962, 1970: 233–52; 1971: 13–22). Searle (1969, 1977: 59–82; 1991: 254–64). There are several aspects and branches of speech act theory. However, in fairness to the CS and in order to limit the scope of my investigation, I will privilege Austin’s and Searle’s treatment of the speech act, authors from whom the CS examination of speech act draws.


9. As far as I know, the concept ‘referent subject’ is not used by the CS. I coin it to establish a balance with the ‘referent object’, that is, the thing that has to be secured.

10. This might be grounded upon a more profound confusion between the term ‘speech act’, which is the illocutionary act, and the total situation of speech act, viz. ‘the total situation in which the utterance is issued . . . (and which allows us) to see parallel between statements and performatives (also referred to as speech acts, explicit performative, or illocutionary act)’ Austin (1962: 52). This confusion is also perceptible in Schiffrin (1994: 54).


12. The symbolic interactionist component comes up in Austin (1962: 110, note 2).


14. For a treatment of the double hermeneutic in social sciences, see Giddens (1979: 284). In International Relations, this concern is voiced by those endorsing a

15. In ethology, the science of animal behavior, ‘imprinting’ means a visual and auditory process of learning. Konrad Lorenz (1981) showed that ducklings learn to follow real or foster parents at a specific time slack, that is, at a critical stage after hatching. As used here, imprinting refers to a learning process conjured up by political discourse. This learning activity is meant to grasp the causal structure of the environment and to categorize the objects that populate it. This process is generally eased by a given state of the political field on which leaders draw to make people believe what they say. It is thus social and cognitive. The German word for imprinting (Prägen) was coined by O. Heinroth in 1911. For a recent account see Bateson (2000: 85–102).

16. This contradicts the poststructuralist analysis of security as a self-referential concept, the articulation of which ‘constitutes an (in)security condition’. In addition, practices attached to security are inherent to or emerge from its utterance. See Huysmans (1998b); Wæver (1995).

17. See also Todorov (1983).

18. In many respects, these views are close to the concept of ‘seeing as’ or ‘aspects of perceptions’. On these, see Ludwig Wittgenstein (2001: 165–78); McGinn (1997: 189–204).


20. This is another way of saying that in discourse actors do not ignore conflict, but integrate it in a consensus. That is to say that the chief aim of discursive exchanges is not to dissolve dissensus, but to create a space wherein such differences can be dealt with. However, this consensus remains a ‘conflictual consensus’, which is to say that this discourse is a ‘mixed game’ partly cooperative and partly confrontational. See Laclau and Mouffé (1985).


23. See von Wright (1971: 83ff.). For Aristotle (1992), both causal and teleological explanations are causes — the first is the efficient cause — what made the event happen — whereas the second is the final cause — why the event happened.

24. It must be pointed out that the teleological explanation in this point relies on an intentional process driven by desires and beliefs; for instance, the rational choice theory. In turn, the desires and beliefs explain the action by providing us with the agent’s reasons for behaving in the way s/he did. Davidson calls this process the ‘rationalization of action’. For the difference between intentional and non-intentional teleology, see McLaughlin (2001). On rational choice theory and teleological explanation, see Davidson (1963: 685, 690–1).

25. Several inquiries into the philosophy of action that inform my view here include Davidson (1982); Danto (1968); von Wright (1971).

27. This touches on the authoritative knowledge pertaining to the issue and/or the associated moral authority that ‘incites’ the audience to believe that the speaker’s statement is accurate and then to act accordingly. See Risse (2000: 22).

28. The power involved in securitization requires the decision of the securitizing agent to produce its effects. Peter Morris (1987: 20–9) calls this kind of power ‘ability’. The ability refers to what the securitizing agent decides to do. Morris furthermore describes the moral and the evaluative contexts. The first is the realm of individual responsibility whereas the latter pertains to the evaluation of the social system.

29. On the socio-temporal embeddedness of utterances, see Bakhtin (1986).

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