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# Turning Points in International Negotiation

## A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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A turning-points analysis of 34 cases of international negotiation is performed in three parts: precipitants (external, substantive, or procedural), process departures (abrupt or nonabrupt), and immediate and later consequences (escalatory or de-escalatory). The cases are divided into three types according to issue area: security, political (including environmental), and trade or economic negotiations. The results are summarized in terms of paths to outcomes: security negotiations are characterized primarily by external precipitants leading to abrupt departures in process that typically turn the talks in the direction of agreements; process departures or turning points in political and trade talks are usually precipitated by either substantive or procedural decisions made by the negotiators that also lead to agreements. Implications of the findings are discussed in terms of the risk-averse and reactive orientations taken by governments in the area of security policy. They are also discussed in the context of strengths and limitations of the comparative analysis approach and in relation to analyses of 11 cases of domestic negotiations in the airlines industry.

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International negotiation is a dynamic process. Outcomes develop from patterned exchanges between negotiating parties and their constituencies. Of particular interest to analysts is the challenge of depicting these patterns. Some prefer sequential stage models (Douglas 1957; Zartman 1975; Gulliver 1979; Pruitt 1981; Druckman 1983), although they differ on just how the stages should be characterized. Others propose cyclical models in which monitoring and learning are central (Coddington 1968; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Cross 1983). For both, however, the guiding question is to explain the relationship between processes and outcomes. Central to this explanation is the idea of turning points or events that move the process on a trajectory toward or away from agreement. This article is an attempt to increase the usefulness of turning points as an empirical concept. It consists of a large-sample comparative analysis of negotiation processes.<sup>1</sup> Central to the analysis is an effort to identify factors that influence the occurrence and consequences of turning points.

1. For a small-sample analysis of negotiating responsiveness, see Druckman and Harris (1990). For comparative analyses of negotiating objectives, attributes, events, and conditions, see Chesek (1997), Druckman (1997a), and Druckman et al. (1999); for large-sample analyses of international mediation, see Bercovitch and Langley (1993) and Bercovitch and Wells (1993).

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## TURNING POINTS IN NEGOTIATION

There seems to be agreement on a broad conceptual definition of turning points. There is less agreement on how the concept should be operationalized for the analysis of negotiation processes. The concept is usually considered in conjunction with stages and defined as “events or processes that mark passage from one stage to the next, signaling progress from earlier to later phases” (Druckman 1997b, 92). It has been used to depict progress in such diverse negotiations as the base-rights talks between Spain and the United States (Druckman 1986), the North American Free Trade negotiations (Tomlin 1989), the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) talks (Druckman, Husbands, and Johnston 1991), and 11 cases of multilateral environmental negotiations that took place between 1972 and 1992 (Chesek 1997). Turning points are indicated in these studies by such key events as resolving an impasse, signing a framework agreement, developing formulas and then bargaining over details, and absorbing events outside the talks by changing evaluations of the terms on the table or resolving the decision dilemma in the endgame. Each of these events is viewed as instrumental in moving the negotiation from one stage to the next. They can be procedural events in which the format changes (for example, from a plenary to a working committee structure), the venue is changed from a public to a private location, or deadlines are imposed. They can be substantive, as when new concepts are introduced that lead to a framework agreement or different ways of packaging proposals are invented. Or, they can be external to the talks, as when a leadership succession occurs in the country of one or more of the parties, public opinion about the issues changes, or a third party is sought to provide assistance. Many of these events were used as indicators of turning points in the four earlier studies.

Although they agree on the conceptual definition of turning points stated above, these investigators present considerable variety in the kinds of events chosen to indicate them. None has offered a typology that distinguishes among the various events—as, for example, procedural, substantive, or external. None has clarified whether these types of events are precipitants of departures in the process (such as a new conceptualization of the issues) or are the departures themselves (such as moving from a stage of debating the issues to bargaining exchanges). This study seeks more precision in definition and analysis. It does so by distinguishing among three elements of the negotiat-

2. This conception of turning points is similar in some ways but differs in others from the concept of ripeness. Both refer to changes in the course of a process or relationship. Both occur often as a result of an impasse, referred to also as a hurting stalemate (Zartman 2000). And both are known better in retrospect through analysis than in prospect during an ongoing process. Unlike ripeness, however, turning points are (a) part of a negotiation (or prenegotiation) process rather than a condition for negotiation, (b) indicated by changes that occur during the process rather than by the conditions that lead to the change, (c) less dependent on perceiving or seizing the opportunity when it presents itself, and (d) indicative of downturns or escalations as well as upturns or de-escalations in the process. In the three-part framework presented above, ripeness refers to the precipitants (or antecedent conditions), whereas turning points are indicated by departures in the process, which have consequences for the way the process unfolds toward or away from agreements.

ing process: precipitants, process departures, and consequences.<sup>2</sup> Process departures are considered to be turning points precipitated by certain events with consequences for progress toward or away from agreement.

The previous studies do, however, suggest hypotheses about a relationship between types of negotiation and factors that precipitate the occurrence of turning points. In the negotiations that dealt with security issues, turning points were driven primarily by external events. The resolution of the base-rights issues between Spain and the United States was facilitated by high-level diplomatic activity and leadership succession crises (Druckman 1986). Progress in the INF talks between the Soviet Union and the United States occurred as a result of decisions made in consultation with France and Great Britain, a delinking of the issues from the START agenda, and summit politics between the national leaders (Druckman, Husbands, and Johnston 1991).

In contrast, progress in the negotiations that dealt with trade or environmental issues was due more to procedural and substantive influences than external events. Tomlin's (1989) analysis of the prenegotiation rounds of the North American Free Trade talks called attention to the role of new ideas about what will be negotiated and how to negotiate those issues to bring about turning points. More recently, Cameron and Tomlin (2000) showed how procedural innovations contributed to progress in the NAFTA talks involving Mexico, Canada, and the United States. Similarly, Chesek's (1997, 455) analysis of environmental negotiation cases led her to conclude that "the negotiations are guided from phase to phase through turning points that are often motivated by procedural events." The convening of specialized working groups, the use of time pressures, and consensus-building procedures (including postponement of a decision on some difficult issues) were instrumental in bringing about turning points. So too were such substantive breakthroughs as a realization by all parties of the importance of addressing the issues and separating peripheral from core concerns. A distinction among these cases is between the *external events* that precipitated turning points in the security negotiations and the *internal processes* that influenced progress in the trade and environmental cases.

These observations may reflect a difference in the way that governments approach security issues as compared with the way they deal with trade, environmental, or other political issues. Security issues have been negotiated in the context of adversarial relationships between nations. Referred to by Strauss (1978) as antagonistic negotiations, security talks (including arms control) are often protracted, difficult, increasingly antagonistic, marked by mutual distrust, and seem to contain elements of false rather than genuine bargaining. Acting strategically, security negotiators are cognizant of the connection between a shifting balance of power among their nations and the shifting balance that obtains within the negotiations (Druckman 1980). A cautious approach is reflected in slow progress toward outcomes that often takes the form of small incremental adjustments. (See Hopmann [1996] for examples of cases.) Governments are risk averse when dealing with their own security and reluctant to alter the status quo or take bold initiatives; the exception to this pattern of course was Gorbachev's nuclear and troop reduction initiatives during the latter part of the 1980s.

Writing about security regimes, Jervis (1983, 190) noted that

the superpowers do not take account of each other's security requirements, look to the long run, or develop rules and expectations of restraint . . . (it is unlikely that they would develop) the sorts of cooperative understandings that help ameliorate political conflicts across a broad range of issues.

The lack of such understandings renders the idea of a security regime implausible. As a result, security negotiators have little control over the process and few opportunities to create the conditions for turning points that move the talks forward. Progress may depend more on the influence of external events or interventions.

Unlike security issues, trade and environmental negotiations have benefited from the kind of expectations of cooperation and restraint provided by international regimes. The regime provides an institutional context for resolving disputes through reciprocal exchanges that occur in formal bargaining or in international interactions (Keohane 1986). Shared expectations, even in changing institutional contexts, facilitate coordination as the negotiators proceed from early conceptual discussions to later bargaining and decision making. Negotiating stages have been shown to be useful for depicting complex trade negotiations (Cameron and Tomlin 2000) and multilateral environmental talks (Druckman 1993). They also give negotiators more control over the process that includes creating the conditions for turning points that move the process from one stage to another.

This discussion distinguishes between external or exogenous and internal or endogenous influences on turning points. Progress in security talks depends more on the influence of factors *outside* or more distant from the negotiation process. The progression of trade and environmental or political talks depends more on the influence of factors *inside* or closer to the process, such as procedures orchestrated and ideas put forth by the negotiators. This distinction can be stated as hypotheses: (a) turning points are precipitated by external events or interventions in negotiations over security issues, and (b) turning points are precipitated by such internal processes as procedural changes or new substantive concepts in negotiations over trade or political issues. An attempt is made to evaluate these hypotheses in a comparative context. In this study, a larger sampling of cases was analyzed than in any of the previous studies of turning points.

The remainder of the article is organized into several sections. The next section describes the methods used for analysis. It is divided into several parts. The first part consists of a discussion of the case-based, process-tracing methodology used to identify turning points. This is followed by a description of the sample of cases used in the analysis and the comparative-analysis framework, including the coding procedures. The results are presented next and followed by a discussion of implications for the hypotheses and the analysis framework as well as some next steps. The article concludes with an extension of the framework to an analysis of 11 cases of domestic negotiations in the airlines industry.

## METHOD

### CASE CHRONOLOGIES: PROCESS TRACING

Turning points are understood in relation to a chronology of events through the course of a negotiation. The case chronology contains most of the information needed to analyze turning points. First, a departure must be observed and coded. It is identified in relation to earlier trends and may be more or less abrupt. Second, precipitants must be identified either within or outside of the process. These can be procedural or substantive decisions that occur in a proximate relation to the observed departure. They can also be external events to which the negotiating parties respond. They are identified through "backward tracing" from the departure. Third, the consequences of the departure are recorded in terms of movement toward or away from agreement. Progress toward an agreement, indicated also by stage transitions, is regarded as being de-escalatory, especially if it resolves an impasse. Movement away from agreement, which may consist of an impasse or crisis, is coded as an escalation of the conflict. By distinguishing between immediate (proximal) and longer term (distal) consequences, it is possible to project the path through future turning points leading toward or away from agreement.

When viewed in terms of the complete chronology of a negotiation, a turning-points analysis can be construed as a form of process tracing. Following Bennett and George (forthcoming), process tracing is an attempt to identify the causal chain that proceeds from precipitating (independent variables) to consequent events or outcomes. The emphasis placed on causation renders process tracing as more than a historical description of a sequence of events. It attempts to infer causation within cases and, as such, is similar to time-series analysis. It differs from the experimental logic of inferring cause from similar between-case (group) comparisons, referred to as the method of controlled comparison (Faure 1994). The path being traced proceeds from precipitating events to process departures to immediate and then later consequences that lead to an outcome. This within-case analysis can, however, be extended to comparisons between cases. By categorizing diverse cases in terms of issue area (security, trade, or political negotiations), paths from different cases can be compared. The cases used for the analysis are described in the next section. The mechanics for process tracing are described below in the section on comparative analysis.

### THE CASES

The data set consists of 34 cases drawn mostly from the February 1999 compendium of Pew Case Studies in International Affairs (30 of the 34 cases). The Pew cases were selected according to a stratified random sampling frame with replacement. The strata were region and type of negotiation. An attempt was made to represent the regions of the world in rough proportion to the distribution of regions in the universe of

cases: the sample distribution is Africa (3 cases), Asia (7), North America (3), Latin America (3), Europe (10), Middle East (2), and global (2). An attempt was also made to represent the types of negotiations in nearly equal numbers: security (10 cases), trade (9), and political (11). A constraint on the sampling procedure was the requirement that each case provides sufficient chronological detail about the process for analysis. When a randomly chosen case provided insufficient detail, it was replaced by another randomly chosen case within the same strata, or, in two instances, other sources were used to provide sufficient information (cases 8 and 29). By also including in the sample the previous case studies of turning points, the number of security cases increased to 12 (10 Pew cases plus base-rights and INF cases). The North American Free Trade case appears as a Pew case study but was coded from the information provided by Tomlin (1989).<sup>3</sup>

Two additional cases were included in the sample. The trade agreement between the United States, United Kingdom, and Switzerland and the U.S.-Portugal negotiation on the use of airfields were coded from the Library of Congress declassified archive of historical negotiations (U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1942, 1946). The decision to include these cases was based on the volume of relevant process information provided for coding turning points. The detail provided in this archive was comparable to that provided by the Pew cases in the sample. Including these cases in the sample brought the number of trade cases to 10 and the number of security cases to 13. (See Table 1 for a list of the cases organized by type of negotiation.)

The Pew cases are presented in a common format. Ranging in length from 10 to 15 printed pages, each case consists of (a) a decision-forcing or retrospective structure; (b) a compelling introduction; (c) a background section sufficient to introduce the reader to the subject; (d) the body of the case that fleshes out the subject, identifies the issues, and presents the major *decision points*; (e) consecutively numbered endnotes; and (f) *chronologies* and other relevant appendices. All cases are peer-reviewed by faculty who have participated in the Pew Faculty Fellowship in International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. In addition, criteria are stated as standards for what makes a good case study.<sup>4</sup>

These cases were chosen for analysis for several reasons. First, they are coherently and cogently organized. Second, many of them use such primary sources as interviews with participants as the bases for description and analysis. A third reason is that the

3. Of the 11 environmental cases analyzed by Chesek (1997), only the Montreal Protocol was included in the sample used for this study. This was the only case in her sample that was written as a Pew case study (case 447). The case of a Minerals Regime for Antarctica (case 134), included in this sample, follows from the 1980 Convention included in her sample. Each of the earlier cases was reanalyzed for this study in terms of the framework's variables described in this section. The hypotheses were examined on an extended sample of cases that adds to the earlier turning-points cases. However, results were compared for analyses performed on samples that included and excluded the 3 cases and are reported below.

4. My own use of the cases has led to the judgment that most authors have followed the guidelines, making them suitable for the kinds of comparative process analyses performed in this study. (For earlier comparative analyses of Pew cases, see Druckman [1997a] and Druckman et al. [1999].)

TABLE 1  
Cases Categorized by Type of Negotiation

<i>Case</i>	<i>Source<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Turning Points<sup>b</sup></i>
<b>Security negotiation cases</b>		
1. Angolan Civil War	Pew # 460	4
2. Beagle Channel, 1977-79	Pew # 401	1
3. French withdrawal from NATO	Pew # 301	3
4. Troop withdrawals from Lebanon	Pew # 310	5
5. United States-Portugal airfields use	Foreign relations of the United States	1
6. Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF)	Druckman, Husbands, and Johnston (1991)	5
7. Base rights, United States and Spain	Druckman (1986)	4
8. Korea, 1951-53	Pew # 359; Bacchus (1973)	3
9. Making peace with Germany	Pew # 435	2
10. NATO on INF, 1977-79	Pew # 305	2
11. SALT I	Pew # 303	3
12. Ending the Vietnam War	Pew # 337	5
13. Withdrawing Russian forces from the Baltic States, 1990-94	Pew # 371	6
<b>Political negotiation cases</b>		
14. Negotiating neutrality, Austria and the European Union	Pew # 233	2
15. Camp David Accords	Pew # 445	4
16. Austrian State Treaty	Pew # 432	2
17. Mining the deep seabed	Pew # 423	4
18. United States-Nicaragua regime change	Pew # 327	1
19. Montreal Protocol, 1987	Pew # 447	5
20. Falklands/Malvinas dispute	Pew # 406	5
21. Future of Hong Kong	Pew # 411	3
22. Minerals regime for Antarctica	Pew # 134	3
23. Panama Canal	Pew # 407	4
24. Normalizing United States-Chinese relations	Pew # 426	3
<b>Trade negotiation cases</b>		
25. Switzerland and Allied forces	Foreign relations of the United States	1
26. Philippine debt, 1983-86	Pew # 133	4
27. United States-Japan air service	Pew # 104	3
28. Nigeria-International Monetary Fund 1983-85	Pew # 205	2
29. North American Free Trade	Pew # 143; Tomlin (1989)	5
30. Renegotiating international debt	Pew # 208	2
31. Japan's construction markets	Pew #145	5
32. Algerian gas	Pew # 103	5
33. United States-European Community accession, Spain and Portugal	Pew # 147	3
34. United States-Canada soft lumber	Pew # 141	1

a. The Pew cases can be found in Pew Case Studies in International Affairs (1999).

b. This column refers to the number of turning points coded for each case.

series is the largest pool of case studies in international negotiations available, showing considerable diversity in topic and geographical region. A fourth reason is that they are more descriptive than analytic, although not the kind of raw material that would be presented by transcripts of discussions.<sup>5</sup>

### COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The framework for analyzing turning points consists of three variables: precipitants, departures in the process, and consequences. These variables are features of negotiation as it occurs in a wide variety of cases. They are intended for comparative analysis. One goal is to discover patterns that transcend specific cases. Another is to evaluate the relationship between the framework's variables, including the hypothesized relationship between types of negotiation and precipitants. Both analyses contribute to theory development. Of course, generality is achieved at the cost of a less detailed analysis of individual cases. By moving from the case-specific language used by authors of case studies to a general conceptual language used by theorists, it is possible to discern similarities and dissimilarities between the cases. By doing individual case and comparative analyses, we can strike a balance between the kinds of historical analyses that emphasize uniqueness and those that seek general patterns. Because the individual case analyses are the data set for the comparative work, we retain an archive of case-by-case chronological analyses.<sup>6</sup> (See Stern and Druckman [2000] for a discussion of comparative case methodologies.)

This analysis contributes to the state of the art. The four previous studies of turning points concentrated on one type of negotiation, either trade (Tomlin 1989), security (Druckman 1986; Druckman, Husbands, and Johnston 1991), or environmental negotiations (Chesek 1997). This study expands the sampling in each of these categories. Only Chesek's (1997) study was a comparative analysis of several cases. This study extended the range and diversity of types of negotiations included in the comparative analysis. Furthermore, by developing analytical categories for each aspect of the turning-points framework—precipitants, departures, consequences—we reduce the vagueness in definition often attributed to the concept (for example, see Tomlin 1989).

Each case was coded in terms of the framework's variables as follows.

*Type of negotiation.* Based on the Pew Case Studies in International Affairs (1999, 66-70) compendium subject index, the cases were categorized by issue area as security, political/environmental, or trade/economic. These categories were used as strata in the sampling frame. Security negotiations included cases on defense, strategic policy making, arms control, and war termination. Political negotiations included international (bilateral or multilateral) relationships, conflict management and resolution, global resources, energy, the environment, and international law and organizations.

5. The two cases from U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (1942, 1946) are closer to transcripts of the discussions. The four cases described in articles or chapters are presented in at least as much detail as that provided by the Pew case authors.

6. The case chronologies are available from the author (ddruckma@gmu.edu).

Trade or economic negotiations included issues concerning economic development, money and finance, trade and investment, and science and technology development.

*Precipitants.* Distinguishing between factors inside and outside the negotiations, precipitants were categorized as procedural (inside), substantive (inside), or external (outside). Procedural factors are defined as decisions made to change the structure or format of the talks, including formality, working committees, venue, and exposure to the media. Substantive factors consist primarily of new ideas or concepts introduced by one or more of the negotiating parties, including the way proposals are packaged for discussion, frameworks for discussing the issues, and new ways of thinking about or conceptualizing the issues. The emphasis is on the issues and proposals rather than the structure or format of the talks. External factors are events that occur outside of the negotiations, including both policy or leadership changes within one or more of the countries represented (proximal events) and third-party interventions by non-negotiating parties or events that occur elsewhere with possible global implications (distal events). The external precipitants refer often to the larger policy and relational contexts within which the negotiation process is embedded.

*Process departures (turning points).* The distinction made here is between more or less abrupt changes in the ongoing negotiating process, both of which are considered turning points. Abrupt changes or turning points are sudden departures from a pattern of give-and-take and include interim or final agreements or deadlocks as well as unexpected transitions from one stage to another, notably from proposal exchanges to a willingness to settle that marks an endgame process. Less abrupt changes or turning points include new proposals (as precipitants) that alter the discussions somewhat or adjust the terms of trade and somewhat predictable stage transitions. These kinds of process departures follow the precipitants and are distinguished from them. The difference is that precipitants are the procedural suggestions made, statements of new ideas, or events that occur, whereas the departures are the decisions made by a party or parties to agree or reject a proposed change or idea as well as the transitions that occur from one stage to another.

*Consequences.* Some departures lead to positive consequences, others to negative results. Positive consequences refer primarily to progress toward or the achievement of agreements that are the outcome of the negotiation. Negative consequences refer to movement away from agreements toward impasses. The former are depicted as de-escalatory consequences ("upturns" in a trend); the latter are escalations in the process ("downturns" in a trend). As part of the three-part framework, consequences follow immediately from the departures ( $t$ ) and are distinguished from them. The departure is the reaction to the precipitant, whereas the consequence is the direction of the talks toward or away from positive outcomes. Extending the consequences further in time, we also analyze the events that follow in the next turning-point sequence ( $t + 1$ ). By doing so, we can evaluate the extent to which escalation precedes or follows de-escalation.

Coding procedures and the mechanics of cross-tabulation and process-tracing analyses are described in the sections to follow.

*Coding judgments.* The definitions of the framework's variables guided the decisions to categorize the parts of the turning-points framework in each case as shown in the appendix. (Two cases in each of the three issue areas are shown—a case with only one and a case with three or five turning points.) Student analysts trained to code the material in terms of the categories first made these case-specific decisions. Each analyst coded two randomly assigned cases. They based their decisions on case chronologies constructed for each case based on the information provided by the case-study authors. (Authors of a number of Pew cases provided chronologies.) The author and his graduate assistant reviewed each coding decision. The review consisted of examining the chronologies and judging the plausibility of decisions made for each sequence of precipitants (suggestion, event), departures (decision), and consequences (impact of the departure on the unfolding process). The review confirmed the initial decisions or revised them in favor of fewer turning-point sequences. These judgments were then presented to the student coders for discussion that led to a consensus decision in the manner of Delphi paneling techniques. (See Frei and Ruloff [1989] for a discussion of the procedures.)

The categorical distinctions made for the departure and consequences variables are based on the kind of material available for coding. They have advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, they increase the ease of coding and intercoder reliabilities. On the other hand, they may obfuscate the extent to which these events vary by degree. Although it is difficult to capture these variables in terms of gradations—as amount of escalation—an attempt to do so would provide an opportunity to perform parametric statistical analyses of relationships.

An example of coding decisions is provided from a recent account of the NAFTA talks by Cameron and Tomlin (2001, 168-171). Each coding decision follows the appropriate text.

The Americans raised the question of whether Mexico could guarantee that a panel decision would be enforced in Mexico. To deal with this problem, the Americans proposed the addition of a special review panel mechanism (SRM) to Chapter Nineteen, along with criteria that would govern its application. [*procedural precipitant*]

As American officials began to place on the table for consideration specific language on criteria that would trigger the application of the SRM, Canadian fears grew . . . as the negotiations moved to their second week . . . Canada insisted that it was not prepared to pay the price the US was asking for on Chapter Nineteen in order to get NAFTA . . . and the Canadians would break off negotiations over the issue if they had to. In fact, negotiations were suspended, informally, but it was Mexico that brought about the suspension . . . Mexico's action brought the negotiation to a standstill, freezing the process across the entire set of working groups. This was a major blow. [*abrupt process departure/turning point*]

It took two days for the Americans to finally realize that Canada was in earnest about its objections. In the end, Americans would get their SRM in NAFTA Article 1905, but its

operation would be circumscribed according to Canadian specifications. [*de-escalatory consequence*]

The sequence for this example can be depicted as follows: trade negotiation → procedural precipitant → abrupt departure → de-escalatory consequence. This sequence is a tracing of the causes and consequences of a turning point in these negotiations.

*Cross-tabulations.* The analyses were designed to uncover relationships among the parts of the framework. These relationships contribute to the development of paths from the type of negotiation to consequences of the departures. One issue, however, is the unit of analysis. There are more turning points than there are cases. To the extent that the turning points that occur within a case are not independent—later turning points are influenced by earlier ones—they cannot be counted as separate instances. Thus, the case, not the turning point, is the unit of analysis. Each analysis is based on an  $n$  of 34 cases.<sup>7</sup> This is done by calculating percentages on a case-by-case basis: for example, the number of external (procedural, substantive) precipitants divided by the total number of precipitants in that case or the number of abrupt departures (or escalatory consequences) relative to all departures (or consequences) in that case. For some analyses, the frequencies (number of external or internal precipitants), rather than percentages, were used to facilitate statistical analysis.

The analyses consisted of assessing relationships among the parts of the analytical framework: type of negotiation (trade, political, security), precipitant (substantive, procedural, external), process departure (abrupt, nonabrupt), and consequence (escalatory or de-escalatory). Relationships are represented by cross-tabulations between pairs of variables. The cross-tabulation of type of negotiation by precipitant consists of the average percentage of the total in each precipitant category by case (how many substantive, procedural, and external precipitants for trade, political, and security cases, respectively). This analysis provides an evaluation of the hypotheses stated above. Other cross-tabulations included precipitants by departure, precipitants by consequences, and departure by consequences. Each of these cross-tabulations sums to 1.00 for percentages or to 34 for frequencies. In addition, the sequence of consequences from one turning point (at time  $t$ ) to another (at time  $t + 1$ ) was analyzed. The question of interest is whether a previous escalation is followed by another escalation or a de-escalation. These analyses provided the basis for the process tracing. Paths from the type of negotiation to consequences at  $t$  and, for a number of cases, at  $t + 1$  were developed for each of the three types of negotiation cases.

*Process tracing.* Paths were traced for each case. This was done by ascertaining the primary type of precipitant (occurring in at least 50% of the turning points for that case), the primary type of departure (whether abrupt or nonabrupt departures occurred in at least 50% of the turning points), immediate consequence (as escalatory or de-escalatory in at least 50% of the turning points), and later consequence if more than

7. As noted above, some analyses were calculated without the three cases used in previous analyses. The  $n$  for these analyses was 31.

one turning point occurred (as escalatory or de-escalatory in at least 50% of the following turning points). The paths are shown for each of the cases in the Results section. These case paths were then aggregated for each type of negotiation: security, political, and trade. The aggregation procedure consisted simply of a count of the number of types of precipitants (or departures, consequences) relative to the total number for all those types of cases. For example, if 7 of 10 departures for the trade cases are abrupt, then this would be the designated type of departure in a typical trade path. For some paths, an equal number of procedural and substantive (or external) precipitants result in a shared designation. This analysis provides another basis for comparing the types of negotiations.

## RESULTS

This section is divided into three parts. First, the results of the cross-tabulations are reported along with the frequency of cases in which mediation was used. Second, the findings from the analysis of sequences of consequences are shown. And third, the case-by-case process tracings are displayed.

### CROSS-TABULATIONS

*Type of negotiation by precipitant.* As shown in Table 2, most of the precipitants in the security negotiation cases were external (78%). The fewest external precipitants occurred in political negotiations (19%). Somewhat less than half (44%) of the precipitants for political talks and somewhat more than a third (39%) for trade talks were substantive. Fewer procedural precipitants occurred in those negotiations (30% and 37% in trade and political cases). Trade and political negotiations were characterized primarily by precipitants that occurred inside the talks (substantive + procedural: 69% and 81%, respectively), whereas security talks were characterized by outside precipitants (78%). Frequencies of cases in each category where the precipitant was primarily (more than 50% of the turning points within the case) inside (substantive or procedural) or outside (external) the negotiation are shown in Table 3.<sup>8</sup> The statistical relationship between type of negotiation and type of precipitant is highly significant ( $\chi^2 = 15.36$ ,  $df = 2$ ,  $p < .001$ , Cramer coefficient [ $C$ ] = .67). Particularly notable is the observation that the primary precipitant in 12 of the 13 security cases was external. This finding provides strong support for the hypotheses stated above, namely, that the type of negotiation can be distinguished in terms of the kinds of precipitants that produce turning points. Support for the hypotheses is obtained also when the 3 earlier turning-point cases are excluded from the samples of security (cases 6 and 7) and trade (case 29) cases, reducing the total number of cases to 31. The relationship between type of negotiation and type of precipitant is highly significant ( $\chi^2 = 12.91$ ,  $df = 2$ ,  $p < .01$ ,  $C = .65$ ).

8. Two trade cases had an equal number of inside and outside precipitants. A decision was made to assign one case to the inside category (case 25) and the other to the outside category (case 27).

TABLE 2  
Type of Negotiation by Precipitant

<i>Precipitant</i>	<i>Type of Negotiation</i>		
	<i>Trade</i>	<i>Political</i>	<i>Security</i>
Substantive	.39	.44	.05
Procedural	.30	.37	.17
External	.31	.19	.78

TABLE 3  
Type of Negotiation by Precipitant

<i>Precipitant</i>	<i>Type of Negotiation</i>		
	<i>Trade</i>	<i>Political</i>	<i>Security</i>
Inside	7	9	1
Outside	3	2	12

NOTE: Based on 34 cases.  $\chi^2 = 15.36$ ,  $df = 2$ ,  $p < .001$ , Cramer coefficient ( $C$ ) = .67.

*Type of negotiation by precipitant by departure.* As shown in Table 4, the external precipitants that occurred in security negotiations led to the most abrupt departures in the process. Fifty percent of the precipitants in the security cases were external followed by abrupt departures. None of the other precipitants within types of cases approached this number: the closest were the 27% of substantive precipitants in the trade cases that were followed by abrupt departures, the 26% of substantive precipitants in the political cases, and the 24% of external precipitants in security cases that were followed by nonabrupt departures. Furthermore, the largest discrepancy between abrupt and nonabrupt departures occurred for the external precipitants in the security cases (differences of 26% for external vs. 3% for substantive and 2% for procedural). The discrepancies between abrupt and nonabrupt departures that followed external precipitants for trade and political talks were 14% and 9%, respectively. For all types of cases, the external precipitants were followed roughly twice as often by abrupt than by nonabrupt departures. More abrupt departures occurred also following substantive precipitants in the trade cases (a difference of 18%), whereas more nonabrupt departures occurred following substantive precipitants in the political cases (a difference of 8%).

*Precipitant and departure by consequence.* Although 75% of the consequences showed progress toward agreement (75% were de-escalatory), more than half of the escalations occurred in response to external precipitants (see Table 5). Two thirds of these escalations followed abrupt departures (67% were abrupt, 33% nonabrupt), as shown in Table 6. Although there were also more de-escalations following abrupt

TABLE 4  
Precipitant by Departure

	<i>Precipitant</i>		
	<i>Substantive</i>	<i>Procedural</i>	<i>External</i>
Trade negotiations			
Abrupt departure	.27	.16	.25
Nonabrupt departure	.09	.12	.11
Political negotiations			
Abrupt departure	.18	.18	.14
Nonabrupt departure	.26	.19	.05
Security negotiations			
Abrupt departure	.03	.11	.50
Nonabrupt departure	0	.13	.24

TABLE 5  
Precipitant by Consequence

<i>Consequence</i>	<i>Precipitant</i>		
	<i>Substantive</i>	<i>Procedural</i>	<i>External</i>
De-escalatory	.19	.25	.31
Escalatory	.08	.03	.14

departures, the ratio of abrupt to nonabrupt departures is larger for the escalations (2:1 [abrupt:nonabrupt] for escalations vs. 4:3 [abrupt:nonabrupt] for de-escalations).

Another analysis provides further insight into the relationship between external precipitants and escalations. External precipitants can be divided into those that involve the negotiating parties (e.g., policy changes or a leadership succession) and those that involve parties or events that are not part of the negotiation (e.g., decisions made by international organizations or agreements reached in other negotiating venues). Of interest is whether the escalations occur primarily after events closer to or more distant from the process. Twenty-eight percent of the escalations occurred following a departure in response to an external precipitant involving one or more of the parties; about 40% occurred when the precipitant was further removed from the process. A ratio of about 3:1 (de-escalations:escalations) for negotiating parties compares to a ratio of 3:2 (de-escalations:escalations) for parties or events further removed. Thus, escalations are somewhat more likely to occur in response to departures that follow more distant events.

*The role of third parties.* Third-party intervention or mediation is one type of external precipitant. It occurred in 9 of the 34 cases, 7 of which were negotiations over

TABLE 6  
Departure by Consequence

<i>Consequence</i>	<i>Departure</i>	
	<i>Abrupt</i>	<i>Nonabrupt</i>
De-escalatory	.44	.31
Escalatory	.16	.08


security issues. In 8 of the 9 cases, the intervenors represented a superpower nation—the United States, the USSR, or China. The one exception was the Beagle Channel talks (case 2), where the negotiating parties sought help from the pope. Of the 9 cases that involved mediation, 6 reached agreements: the cases that failed to reach agreement were the talks over troop withdrawals from Lebanon (case 4), regime change in Nicaragua (case 18), and the Falklands/Malvinas talks (case 20). Thus, roughly one quarter of the cases in this sample sought outside help. Most were negotiations over security issues. Of interest is whether, in a larger universe of cases, a similar ratio of mediated to nonmediated cases would occur between security and other types of negotiations.

#### SEQUENCE OF CONSEQUENCES

The sequence from a consequence at time  $t$  to the next consequence at  $t + 1$  is shown for the cases with more than one turning point in Figure 1. The focus of this analysis is whether an escalatory consequence is followed (in the next turning point) by another escalation or by a de-escalation. This question is relevant to earlier findings showing a relationship between crises (escalations) and positive turning points (de-escalations) (Druckman 1986). The results are clear. Twenty of the 25 sequences in which an escalation occurred in the 17 relevant cases—where an escalatory consequence occurred among the two or more turning points—show that a de-escalation follows a previous escalation in the negotiation process. This is a ratio of 4 positive (de-escalations) to 1 negative (escalation) consequence of a previous escalation. It provides strong support for the earlier finding obtained from an analysis of the Spain–United States base-rights talks (case 7 in Table 1).

#### TRACING PATHS TO OUTCOMES

Paths are traced for each case within types of negotiation cases in Figures 2 (security cases), 3 (political cases), and 4 (trade cases). The 13 security cases are shown in Figure 2. For each case, the primary precipitant (occurring in more than 50% of the turning points), primary type of departure (more than 50% abrupt or nonabrupt), immediate consequence, and later consequence (if more than one turning point occurred) are shown. In all cases, precipitants were primarily external (ranging from



**Figure 1: Consequence of a Previous Escalation ( $t \rightarrow t + 1$ ) across Cases**

- Case 1: external precipitant (1.0) → abrupt departure (.75) → de-escalatory consequence (.75) → de-escalatory consequence ( $t + 1$ )
- Case 2: external precipitant (1.0) → abrupt stage change (1.0) → de-escalatory consequence (1.0)
- Case 3: external precipitant (1.0) → abrupt departure (.67) → escalatory consequence (1.0) → escalatory consequence ( $t + 1$ )
- Case 4: external precipitant (.80) → abrupt departure (.60) → escalatory consequence (.60) → de-escalatory consequence ( $t + 1$ )
- Case 5: procedural precipitant (1.0) → nonabrupt departure (1.0) → de-escalatory consequence (1.0)
- Case 6: external precipitant (.80) → abrupt departure (.60) → de-escalatory consequence (1.0)
- Case 7: external precipitant (.75) → abrupt departure (.75) → de-escalatory consequence (1.0)
- Case 8: external precipitant (1.0) → abrupt departure (.67) → de-escalatory consequence (.67) → de-escalatory consequence ( $t + 1$ ) (also follows the escalation)
- Case 9: external precipitant (1.0) → abrupt departure (.50) → de-escalatory consequence (1.0)
- Case 10: external precipitant (1.0) → abrupt departure (.50) → escalatory consequence (.50) → de-escalatory consequence ( $t + 1$ )
- Case 11: external precipitant (1.0) → abrupt departure (.67) → de-escalatory consequence (.67) → de-escalatory consequence ( $t + 1$ ) (also follows the escalation)
- Case 12: external precipitant (.60) → abrupt departure (.60) → de-escalatory consequence (.60) → de-escalatory consequence ( $t + 1$ ) (also follows the escalations)
- Case 13: external precipitant (1.0) → abrupt departure (.50) → escalatory consequence (.50) → de-escalatory consequence ( $t + 1$ )

**Figure 2: Paths for Security Cases**

NOTE: See Table 1 for names of cases.

.60 to 1) and departures were abrupt (ranging from .50 to 1). Although most consequences of the abrupt (or nonabrupt) departures are de-escalatory, when an escalation occurs (more than .50 in 4 of the cases) at  $t$  (immediate), it is followed in most cases by

- 
- Case 14: substantive-procedural precipitant (.50)<sup>a</sup> → abrupt departure (.50)  
→ de-escalatory consequence (1.0)
- Case 15: substantive precipitant (.75) → nonabrupt departure (.75) → de-escalatory consequence (1.0)
- Case 16: substantive/procedural precipitant (.50) → nonabrupt departure (1.0)  
→ de-escalatory consequence (1.0)
- Case 17: substantive/procedural precipitant (.50) → nonabrupt departure (.75)  
→ de-escalatory consequence (.75) → de-escalatory consequence ( $t + 1$ )
- Case 18: substantive precipitant (1.0) → abrupt departure (1.0) → escalatory consequence (1.0)
- Case 19: substantive-procedural precipitant (.50) → abrupt departure (.75)  
→ de-escalatory consequence (.75) → de-escalatory consequence ( $t + 1$ )
- Case 20: external precipitant (.80) → abrupt departure (.80) → de-escalatory consequence (.60)  
→ de-escalatory consequence ( $t + 1$ )
- Case 21: substantive precipitant (.67) → abrupt departure (.67) → de-escalatory consequence (.67)  
→ de-escalatory consequence ( $t + 1$ )
- Case 22: procedural precipitant (1.0) → abrupt departure (.67) → de-escalatory consequence (1.0)
- Case 23: external precipitant (.75) → abrupt departure (.50) → de-escalatory consequence (1.0)
- Case 24: procedural precipitant (.67) → nonabrupt departure (.67) → de-escalatory consequence (.75)  
→ de-escalatory consequence ( $t + 1$ )
- 

### Figure 3: Paths for Political Cases

NOTE: See Table 1 for names of cases.

a. Refers to two precipitants of equal frequency; half the precipitants are substantive and half are procedural

a de-escalation at  $t + 1$  (later). A typical path, aggregated across the 13 security cases, is as follows:

security negotiation → external precipitant → abrupt departure in process  
→ de-escalation at time  $t$  → de-escalation at time  $t + 1$ .

In the 4 cases in which an escalation followed an abrupt departure, the sequence is as follows:

security negotiation → external precipitant → abrupt departure → escalation at time  $t$   
→ de-escalation at time  $t + 1$ .

The 11 political cases are shown in Figure 3. In contrast to the security cases, only 2 of the precipitants were external. Nine were inside precipitants, either substantive, procedural, or a combination of these types of precipitants: 3 were substantive, 2 procedural, and 4 a combination of substantive and procedural. Only 4 of the departures were nonabrupt, and most of the consequences at  $t$  and at  $t + 1$  were de-escalatory. These patterns suggest the following typical path for the cases of political negotiations:

political negotiation → substantive/procedural precipitant → abrupt departure  
→ de-escalation at time  $t$  → de-escalation at time  $t + 1$ .

The 10 trade cases are shown in Figure 4. Interestingly, each of the types of precipitants occurs with roughly equal frequency. Four are external, 4 are procedural,



tabulations and the case-by-case process tracings make evident that the null hypothesis of no difference between types of negotiation is rejected. This supports the findings obtained in the earlier analyses of turning points in which the two security cases were driven by external events, whereas the turning points in the trade and environmental cases were precipitated by internal factors. The comparative analyses presented in this article increase the generality of these findings beyond a small number of cases. (Significant findings were obtained both when the earlier cases were included and when they were excluded from the sample.) They also suggest that negotiations are likely to be influenced by the larger contexts in which they occur. One feature of the larger context is the extent to which professional negotiators have shared expectations for the way a process moves toward an outcome. One indicator of shared expectations is the frequency of escalations during the process: more than half of the total number of escalations (14 of 25) occurred in the security cases.

Security negotiators made few concessions and offered few proposals for agreements. One possible explanation for this behavior is that, unlike their counterparts in the trade and political areas, security decision makers are sensitive to possible losses rather than potential gains, making them less likely to take risks. Progress in these talks was shown to depend less on their own initiatives than on such external interventions as mediation (7 of the 13 security cases) or outside events (5 of the 13 cases). This pattern is likely to play a role in hindering the development of the sorts of cooperative regimes that are prevalent in the trade and political domains. Indeed, the difficulties involved in establishing security regimes are evident (see, e.g., Jervis 1983). And, then, the lack of a cooperative regime serves to reinforce the very behaviors that prevent the emergence of such institutions. In contrast, trade and environmental regimes facilitate coordination in negotiations, which, in turn, bolster the strength of these cooperative regimes. This circular relationship between negotiating behavior and international regime formation or sustenance has implications for the way that microlevel processes interact with macrolevel structures. (See Druckman [1990] for more on this relationship.)

Most of the consequences of the process departures (75%) were de-escalatory in the sense of showing progress toward reaching agreements. This finding is consistent with the idea that turning points in negotiation are benchmarks of progress. This was evident in each of the earlier case studies: for example, Gorbachev's and Reagan's decisions in INF galvanized the process toward agreement; high-level interim activities in the Spain–United States base-rights talks led to a framework agreement; and the various substantive and political decisions in the North American Free Trade pre-negotiation discussions led to formal negotiations. To the extent that the cases used in this analysis are representative of a larger universe of cases, we can conclude that most precipitants, whether internal or external to the process, serve to move a negotiation in the direction of agreements. To the extent that parties create these precipitants, they have control over the velocity of the process leading toward or away from agreement. Yet to be explored is the relationship between types of agreements reached and the kinds of precipitants that produce departures in the process.

The analyses suggest that the negotiating parties have a role in bringing about turning points. Our distinction between external and internal precipitants is relevant. In the

political and trade cases, process departures were precipitated by either substantive or procedural activities that are largely controlled by the parties. In fact, it can be argued that these are attempts made by the parties to control the process to avoid the intrusion of outside influences. Format changes (procedures) and new ideas (substantive) are intended to move the process toward agreement when this is the goal of the negotiation. But they can also be used to subvert a negotiation process to avoid an undesirable agreement or prolong the process in the interest of obtaining side effects (Iklé 1964). Attempts made to prolong a process for its own sake have been more characteristic of security negotiations than either the political or trade cases. The uncertainty concerning the consequences of any new agreement in this area makes the parties reluctant to bring about departures that either escalate or de-escalate the process. Thus, the process is more vulnerable to outside influences as we have documented in this analysis. Further analyses should illuminate how parties attempt to control the process by precipitating certain types of departures.

Of particular interest are the later consequences of escalatory reactions to departures that occurred in 25% of the turning points. Similar to Druckman's (1986) earlier finding, the negotiating parties—although not necessarily the negotiators themselves—confronted a crisis or setback and reversed it to produce progress in the upcoming rounds. Most of the reversals (7 of 9) were produced by such external interventions as third-party actions in the security cases. In contrast, few external interventions were sought to reverse an escalation in the political and trade cases: 8 of 10 were engineered from inside the talks as either substantive or procedural decisions. By separating precipitants from consequences and tracing the path between them, we can distinguish between various actions taken in different types of negotiations (as precipitants) to reverse course (as consequences of departures).

More generally, these analyses reveal research opportunities and expose some limitations. With regard to opportunities, the study provides a framework for analysis of change in negotiation. By construing turning points in terms of a causal sequence, the framework disentangles driving factors (precipitants) from process and consequences. By defining each of these parts as variables, it guides coding decisions and provides reproducible procedures. Going beyond the single case, the framework is shown to facilitate comparative research. One next step would be to perform controlled comparisons on a smaller, more homogeneous set of cases. Expanding the sampling frame, the framework can be used to analyze other types of cases, including negotiations that occur within countries, as described in the next section, and those that are non-governmental or unofficial.

Another opportunity is to consider the larger context of conflict between the parties. That context includes the types of conflicts, structures, and experiences with the negotiation process or issues. With regard to conflict, it would be interesting to ask whether the negotiation process and framework discussed in this article apply also to the sorts of identity issues that have arisen during the past decade. Do they apply to conflicts, the source of which is less interest- or value-based and more cognitive in the sense of differences over the means to achieving shared goals? With regard to structures, we might ask whether the process is different for the more institutionalized negotiations that take

place in the context of the United Nations than for those conducted outside of this kind of organizational setting. With regard to experience, we might ascertain whether changes have occurred in the professionalization or efficiency of the process. Such changes may have implications for control over the velocity of the process and, thus, the way that precipitating events are introduced.

The analysis illuminates the well-known trade-off between large and small *n* studies. In our search for generality, we have forfeited a degree of depth for breadth. Focusing attention on comparison, the analysis is less revealing of the case-specific circumstances that would enrich the interpretation of the turning points. Although more of this detail is found in the earlier case studies of turning points, we do have an archive of the 34 case chronologies as well as the original Pew case studies. (See the *Pew Case Studies in International Affairs* [1999] for abstracts.)

Another trade-off for comparative research is between relatively homogeneous and heterogeneous samples. The former have the advantage of enabling an investigator to distinguish more precisely between similarities and differences among the cases. By limiting the sample to one type of negotiation, for example, the typical causal paths can be inferred with more confidence, enhancing the internal validity of the findings. (See, for example, the comparative analysis of similar cases in McDonald and Bendahmane 1990.) The latter have the advantage of robustness. Findings obtained from heterogeneous samples of cases may generalize widely but not precisely, enhancing the external validity of the findings. (See, for example, the comparative analysis of different cases in Bendahmane and McDonald 1986.) In this study, the heterogeneous-cases strategy was used. The kinds of hypotheses evaluated required that a variety of types of negotiations be represented in the sample. Although generality is an advantage of this sampling strategy, it is difficult to specify a universe of cases from which this sample (or the entire set of Pew cases) was drawn. A population of negotiation cases could be defined only from documented materials. A cataloguing of these materials would miss the many undocumented or classified cases that have occurred, referred to by meta-analysts as the "file-drawer" problem (Rosenthal 1984).

Escalation in negotiation turns on events, referred to here as precipitants, that may occur within or outside the negotiating process. They were shown in this analysis to have consequences for paths toward or away from agreements. Different kinds of paths were diagnosed for each of the three types of cases in this sample. Capturing change in the negotiation process, the paths highlight the dynamic aspects of international negotiation. Of interest, however, is the question of generality or relevance to negotiations that occur in the domestic arena. A preliminary attempt is made in the next section to apply the framework to a set of domestic cases.

#### **EXTENSION AND GENERALIZATION**

An effort was made to ascertain whether the paths obtained for the international cases are similar to paths that unfold in domestic talks. Detailed chronologies were developed from current information about each of 11 cases of negotiation between the unions representing airline mechanics, flight attendants, or pilots and the airline companies. Each chronology was coded by two analysts working independently in terms



security issues, conducted primarily to serve purposes other than reaching agreements, referred to as “side effects.” (See Iklé 1964. Only 2 of the 30 international cases coded and analyzed by Druckman et al. [1999] were examples of negotiating for side effects.) Further development of these analyses and comparisons will be forthcoming.

## APPENDIX

### Examples of Turning Points in Selected Security, Trade, and Political Cases

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Security case 1:	Beagle Channel Negotiations, 1977-79 (Pew case # 401)
External precipitant:	Crisis in relations between the parties leads them to prepare for war (talks are stalemated)
Process departure/ turning point:	Papal mediation takes the form of shuttle diplomacy by Cardinal Samore; a vague agreement, referred to as “The Act of Montevideo” is crafted
Consequence:	Both sides agree to continue the papal mediation; process is made toward agreement (+)
Security case 2:	SALT I (Pew case # 303)
External precipitant:	Soviet Union nuclear arsenal approaches parity
Process departure/ turning point 1:	U.S. domestic pressure for bilateral agreement to suspend further nuclear weapons development
Consequence:	Bilateral talks begin (+)
External precipitants:	China acquires nuclear weapons; United States–China relations improve
Process departure/ turning point 2:	Soviets propose some concessions on weapons limitations
Consequence:	United States rejects Soviet proposal, threatens to break off both front and back channel talks (–)
External precipitant:	Summit meeting occurs while pursuing back channel talks
Process departure/ turning point 3:	Soviets drop their demands on linking offensive and defensive weapons (SALT I agreement deals with offensive weapons limitations; corresponding ABM agreement deals with defensive weapons)
Consequence:	Drafting of treaty documents begin leading to a treaty signing in 1972 (+)
Trade case 1:	Switzerland and Allied Forces (from U.S. foreign policy)
Substantive precipitant:	New understanding of Swiss interests (by United Kingdom) on May 6, 1942; in time the United States endorses this new understanding, namely, Swiss unemployment

- Process departure/  
turning point: Discussion becomes focused on ways to deal with the problem of Swiss unemployment in the manufacturing sector, and actions are taken by the Swiss to solve the problem
- Consequence: Path to agreement, which was reached in December 1942 (+)
- Trade case 2: United States–European Community accession negotiations on Spain and Portugal (Pew case # 147)
- Procedural-external precipitant: Ministerial meeting
- Process departure/  
turning point 1: Sets in motion a negotiation process
- Consequence: Path to agreement (+)
- Substantive precipitant: Pressure tactics by United States to obtain Spanish concessions
- Process departure/  
turning point 2: New elements incorporated in the form of concessions to the United States
- Consequence: Interim agreement reached for United States to continue to export its grain at previous levels (+)
- Substantive precipitant: United States signals that it could accept a package deal
- Process departure/  
turning point 3: Agreement negotiated between United States and European Community
- Consequence: Relations between United States and European Community improve (+)
- Political case 1: United States–Nicaragua regime change negotiations (Pew case # 327)
- Substantive precipitant: United States convinced that Somoza would not compromise, remain intransigent
- Process departure/  
turning point: United States withdraws from the talks
- Consequence: Negotiation ends and is not reconvened (–)
- Political/environmental Montreal Protocol, 1987 (Pew case # 447) case 2:
- Substantive precipitant: Scientific research on relationship between CFCs and ozone depletion
- Process departure/  
turning point 1: Prenegotiation debate on negotiability of the issue
- Consequence: Path toward multilateral negotiations (+)
- External precipitant: Scientific discovery of an ozone hole
- Process departure/  
turning point 2: Transition to higher level negotiations

Consequence:	Path toward a major agreement on banning CFCs (+)
Procedural precipitant:	Informal workshop convened
Process departure/turning point 3:	Progress is made toward a solution
Consequence:	Path to eventual agreement (+)
Substantive precipitant:	United Kingdom leads European Community to oppose U.S. plan
Process departure/s turning point 4:	Negotiation stalemated because of division
Consequence:	No progress made until succession occurs (-)
Procedural precipitant:	Belgium succeeds United Kingdom as president of European Community (negotiating as a bloc)
Process departure/turning point 5:	Belgium leads European Community in announcing support for the U.S. plan
Consequence:	Agreement is reached on banning the production of certain types of CFCs (+)

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NOTE: (+) indicates a de-escalatory consequence of the departure in the negotiation process, (-) indicates an escalatory consequence. ABM = Anti-Ballistic Missile; CFC = chlorofluorocarbon.

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