

Le libéralisme politique

Le **libéralisme** est, dans la matière des relations internationales, un courant subséquent au [réalisme](#). Il se caractérise par l'importance qu'il accorde aux acteurs non étatiques, du rôle des [entreprises multinationales](#), d'[ONG](#) et d'organisations humanitaires (comme le [CICR](#) par exemple) ou de coopération entre [États](#) (telle que l'[ONU](#)), de [lobbies](#), etc. Le libéralisme est étroitement lié à l'[idéalisme](#) courant de [Kant](#) à [Woodrow Wilson](#)

Spinoza, Locke, Descartes, Milton : la liste des pères fondateurs du libéralisme politique est assurément plus longue. Bien que leur inspiration philosophique diffère, tous s'accordent sur les traits caractéristiques de la société libérale. Le premier concerne l'étendue des pouvoirs qui assurent le fonctionnement de la société. L'**État n'a pas le droit de tout faire, et il ne doit jamais faire ce que d'autres que lui pourraient faire à sa place**. Ainsi le libéralisme politique se définit d'abord négativement : il n'est ni un étatsisme ni un anarchisme ; il refuse pareillement le dépérissement de l'État et sa déification. C'est ce que Benoît appelle la « **subsidiarité de la puissance publique** ».

Le deuxième trait caractéristique du libéralisme politique, c'est son **acceptation de la diversité sociale**, et même les encouragements qu'il lui apporte. Alors que l'objectif de tout système totalitaire est de réaliser l'unité sociale, de vaincre les particularismes des milieux sociaux, le libéralisme se donne au contraire la diversité sociale sous tous ses aspects à la fois comme point de départ et comme point d'aboutissement. Cette diversité est respectable en ce qu'elle constitue le résultat nécessaire des libertés individuelles. Elle est, en outre, éminemment souhaitable : c'est elle, et elle seule, qui donne à la société une fluidité suffisante pour que les passages d'une condition sociale à une autre soient aisés et fréquents. Ainsi, la diversité sociale est-elle pour le libéralisme politique à la fois une fin et un moyen : son acceptation se confond avec celle d'une organisation spontanée de la société.

Enfin, troisième trait caractéristique du libéralisme politique : son affinité d'inspiration avec l'**idéal démocratique**. De celui-ci, Montesquieu donne l'interprétation la plus largement répandue aujourd'hui : « Lorsque, dans la république, le peuple en corps a la souveraine puissance, c'est une démocratie. » La puissance entre les mains du peuple : cela implique, en même temps que la fixité et la généralité de la loi, la dévolution de la souveraineté au peuple et à lui seul. Dans le sens où les sociétés n'ont jamais cessé de l'entendre, depuis ses origines grecques, **la démocratie exprime le mode de désignation des gouvernants, le fondement de la légitimité de leur pouvoir, et non l'étendue et moins encore les buts de celui-ci**. À la différence du libéralisme, la démocratie n'a pas pour préoccupation ultime de protéger la liberté, ou mieux, les libertés. Il reste que l'un et l'autre, bien que leur objet soit fondamentalement différent, convergent nécessairement aujourd'hui parce qu'ils trouvent leur source d'inspiration dans une même tradition qui va de la philosophie grecque à l'esprit des Lumières en passant par la pensée judéo-chrétienne. Comme le souligne Raymond [Aron](#) dans son *Essai sur les libertés* : « **La logique du libéralisme conduit à la démocratie par l'intermédiaire du principe de l'égalité devant la loi**. Mais la démocratie exige, pour être réelle, le respect des libertés personnelles, liberté d'expression et de discussion, liberté d'association et de groupement. »

Avec ses *Recherches sur la nature et les causes de la richesse des nations* (1776), Adam [Smith](#) achève la conceptualisation de la doctrine du libéralisme économique. Conceptualisation qui, du reste, est contemporaine de la naissance de l'industrie en Angleterre. Selon lui, toute la richesse vient du travail de l'homme. Et c'est la perception de son intérêt personnel qui pousse l'homme à l'épargne et au travail. D'où cette conclusion décisive : l'intérêt privé est le moteur de l'économie. Conclusion à laquelle Adam Smith ajoute la thèse de l'**harmonie fondamentale entre l'intérêt particulier et l'intérêt général**. De cet ensemble de constatations, l'économiste déduit que **la société politique se doit de garantir la libre concurrence des intérêts privés**, s'exerçant dans le cadre du marché, seule capable d'assurer l'adéquation automatique entre l'offre et la demande.

Une singularité du libéralisme réside dans la manière dont il pose le problème des conflits et dont il envisage leur résolution. À cet égard, la difficulté résulte du fait que **le libéralisme reconnaît les divergences entre les opinions, les intérêts ou les profits, qu'il considère même que ces divergences constituent une richesse et une chance de salut pour les sociétés**. La question, du même coup, se pose de savoir comment concilier la stabilité de l'ordre collectif et la protection de la diversité sociale. Dans l'univers de rareté qui est celui où se prennent les décisions économiques, **le marché est la seule procédure pacifique permettant d'arbitrer les conflits**. Le marché est la seule procédure sociale qui permette à des consommateurs et à des producteurs de s'entendre sur un prix et sur un volume de transaction. **C'est la loi de l'offre et de la demande : vendeurs et acheteurs se font réciproquement des concessions, qui permettent de s'arrêter à un prix qui ne satisfait personne mais que tous acceptent**. Au débat entre des intérêts divergents il n'y a pas d'autre issue, hormis la procédure du marché, que la loi du plus fort, c'est-à-dire le plus souvent celle du pouvoir politique. Encore faut-il, pour que le marché soit « bon » et juste, assujettir les opérateurs à des règles impératives.

- The [democratic peace theory](#), and, more broadly, the effect of domestic political [regime types](#) and domestic politics on international relations;^{[1][2]}
- The [commercial peace theory](#), arguing that free trade has pacifying effects on international relations. Current explorations of [globalization](#) and [interdependence](#) are a broader continuation of this line of inquiry;
- [Institutional peace theory](#), which attempts to demonstrate how cooperation can be sustained in [anarchy](#), how long-term interests can be pursued over short-term interests, and how actors may realize absolute gains instead of seeking [relative gains](#);
- Related, the effect of [international organizations](#) on international politics, both in their role as forums for states to pursue their interests, and in their role as actors in their own right;
- The role of [international law](#) in moderating or constraining state behavior;
- The effects of liberal [norms](#) on international politics, especially relations between liberal states;
- The role of various types of unions in international politics (relations), such as highly institutionalized [alliances](#) (e.g. [NATO](#)), [confederations](#), [leagues](#), [federations](#), and evolving entities like the [European Union](#); and,

- The role, or potential role, of [cosmopolitanism](#) in transcending the [state](#) and affecting international relations.

Kant

A cosmopolitan community might be based on an inclusive morality, a shared economic relationship, or a political structure that encompasses different nations. In a cosmopolitan community individuals from different places (e.g. nation-states) form relationships of mutual respect.

Vers la paix perpétuelle est un [texte](#) d'[Emmanuel Kant](#) publié en [1795](#), Kant y formule un certain nombre de principes destinés à créer les conditions d'une « [paix perpétuelle](#) » (par opposition à une simple « cessation des hostilités » provisoire) qui est la seule forme de paix possible tant que « [l'état de nature](#) » continue de régner entre les États.

On rappelle la métaphore des arbres : les arbres poussent haut et droit quand leur proximité les met en concurrence pour chercher l'air et la lumière, mais un arbre seul s'étend rabougri dans sa solitude. Cette métaphore suggère qu'il faut retenir de la guerre le conflit qui fait que l'on peut grandir en s'opposant ou en rivalisant, mais non la violence directe.

➔ Etats Unis d'Europe

Article pour obtenir la paix perpetuelle

First article: 'The civil constitution of every state is to be republican.'

The first classification is properly called a classification of forms of sovereignty, and there are only three of these:

- **autocracy**, in which only one person, the monarch, has sovereign power;
- **aristocracy**, in which an associated group, the nobility, has sovereign power;
- **democracy**, in which all those who constitute society, the people, have sovereign power.

Republicanism is the political principle of the separation of the executive from the legislative power; despotism is the principle of the state's making the laws and administering them.

Second Article: 'The law of nations is to be founded on a federation of free states.'

Third article: 'The law of world citizenship is to be united to conditions of universal hospitality.'

Morality is. . . practical: it is the totality of unconditionally commanding laws that we ought to obey.

néo-libéralisme

Le terme de néo-libéralisme désigne le renouvellement des thèses économiques libérales à partir de la fin des années 1970

Critique de l'interventionnisme étatique

Le premier effet produit par la prise en charge de l'État est un effet d'éviction. Les dépenses et investissements publics ont tendance à remplacer les dépenses et investissements privés, dont l'efficacité est supposée meilleure car elle est guidée par l'incitation sélective, inhérente à la concurrence sur les marchés.

Le deuxième effet de l'accroissement des dépenses publiques est qu'elles tendent à augmenter indéfiniment le besoin de financement de l'État et se traduisent, au final, par un alourdissement continu de la ponction fiscale.

Keohane

Globalization means the shrinkage of distance on a world scale through the emergence and thickening of networks of connections—environmental and social as well as economic. It remains far from complete. We live in a partially globalized world.

liberal vision of progress.

Why liberalism?

Thoughtful theorists of rational choice recognize that the assumption of egoism oversimplifies social reality. Norms of reciprocity and fairness often affect social behavior (Levi 1997; Ostrom 1990). The theoretical predictions derived from the assumption of egoism encounter serious predictive failure in experimental settings (Ostrom 1998). And survey research shows that citizens evaluate the legitimacy of the legal system on the basis not only of their own success in dealing with it but also of their perceptions of its procedural fairness (Tyler 1990). As Sen makes clear, rejecting the premise of egoism does not imply rejecting the assumption of rationality

That path is to pay more attention than we have to expectations of how others will behave and, therefore, to underlying values and beliefs. Expectations are critical determinants of action. They depend heavily on trust, reputation, and reciprocity, which depend in turn on networks of civic engagement, or social capital. Building such networks is an incremental process. Engagement in a just set of social relations helps create personal integrity, which is the basis for consistent principled action (Grant 1997). Networks of civic engagement are not easily divided into “international” and “domestic” but, rather, cross those lines (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Rational strategic action depends on the expectations and incentives that these networks create.

The fact that strategic action depends on expectations means that understanding historical and cultural context is critical to any analysis of how institutions operate. “At the core of a behavioral explanation,” Ostrom (1998, 12) said, “are the links between the trust that individuals have in others, the investment others make in trustworthy reputations, and the probability that participants will use reciprocity norms.” That is, principled values, “congealed” in institutions, provide the basis for meaningful rational actions and direct such actions in ways that we can describe and explain

Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work* exemplifies a productive analysis of the connections among

values, social norms, and rational behavior. Putnam argues that “networks of civic engagement” produce better government. Why does he think so? Not because engaged people necessarily work altruistically for the common good but because these networks increase costs of defection, facilitate communication, and create favorable expectations of others’ likely actions (Putnam 1993, 173–4). Even those who do not subscribe to these principles would have to calculate the costs of acting counter to them.

Increased interdependence among human beings produces discord, since self-regarding actions affect the welfare of others. Globalization creates potential gains from cooperation. Institutions can foster exploitation or even oppression. Although institutions are essential for human life, they are also dangerous.

liberalism need not be optimistic about human nature. Indeed, at the global scale the supply of rogues may be expected to expand with the extent of the market. Institutional protection from the arbitrary exercise of coercion, or authoritative exploitation, will be as important at the global level as at the level of the national state.

	Realism	Complex Interdependence
Goals of actors	Military security will be the dominant goal	Goals of states will vary by issue area.
Instruments of state	Military force will be most effective, although economic and other instruments will also be used.	Power resources specific to issue areas will be most relevant. Manipulation of ID, IO, and TN actors will be major instruments.
Agenda formation	Potential shifts in the b of p and security threats will set the agenda in high politics and will strongly influence other agendas	Agenda will be affected by changes in the distr. of power resources within issue areas; the status of int’l regimes; change in importance of TN actors; linkages from other issues and politicization as a result of rising sensitivity ID
Linkages of issues	Linkages will reduce differences in outcomes among issue areas and reinforce international hierarchy.	Linkages by strong states will be more difficult to make since force will be ineffective. Linkages by weak states through IO will erode rather than reinforce hierarchy.
Roles of IO	Roles are minor, limited by state power and the importance of military force.	IOs will set agendas, induce coalition-formation, and act as arenas for political action by weak states. Ability to choose the organizational forum for an issue and to mobilize votes will be an important political resource.

Legitimacy rests on institutionalized procedures for open communication and collective reflection. Habermas “the essential need is the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion, and persuasion.” And many other political philosophers have upheld is that of rational persuasion—changing others’ minds on the basis of reason, not coercion, manipulation, or material sanctions.

Functions of institutionalism:

The first of these functions is to limit the use of large-scale violence. Second, mutual adjustment of policy to reduce common negative externalities (terrorism, pollution, transnational crime, etc). The third function of governance institutions is to provide *focal points* in coordination games. Smith’s liberalism calls for institutions to promote exchange;

The fourth is to deal with system disruptions. As global networks have become tighter and more complex, they have generated systemic effects that are often unanticipated.

The fifth major function of global governance is to provide a guarantee against the worst forms of abuse, particularly involving violence and deprivation, so that people can use their capabilities for productive purposes.” concern about human rights during the past two decades has been extraordinary”

Rational-choice institutionalism in political science insists that institutions, to persist, must reflect bargaining equilibria of games in which actors seek to pursue their own interests, as they define them.

Institutions, whether emphasizing coordination or collaboration, necessarily institutionalize bias, in favor of groups that have agenda control or wish to maintain the status quo. It is therefore not surprising that advocates of social equality, such as Thomas Jefferson, and democrats such as Rousseau, are often suspicious of institutions. Barriers to competition confer monopolistic privileges and therefore create normative problems.

Globalization produces discord and requires effective governance, but effective institutions are difficult to create and maintain. Liberal-democratic institutions must also meet standards of accountability and participation, and should foster persuasion rather than rely on coercion and interest-based bargaining. Effective institutions must rely on self-interest rather than altruism, yet both liberal-democratic legitimacy and the meaning of self-interest depend on people’s values and beliefs. The analysis of beliefs, and their effect on institutional outcomes, must therefore be integrated into institutional analysis. Insights from branches of political science as diverse as game theory, rational-choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and democratic theory can help political scientists understand how to design institutions on a world—and human—scale. For these institutions to be morally acceptable, they must rest both on humane beliefs and substantial mutual trust. The Mafia is not better than anarchy.

From a democratic standpoint it is not enough to have nonoppressive institutions that enforce rules. Accountability, participation, and persuasion¹ are also essential.

The world for which we need to design institutions will be culturally and politically so diverse that most functions of governance should be performed at local and national levels, on the principle familiar to students of federalism or of the European Union’s notion of “**subsidiarity**.”

Interdependence (ID) refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among actors in different countries. Where there are reciprocal—not necessarily symmetrical—costly effects of transactions, ID exists. ID does not mean mutual benefit. ID relationships involve costs, that cannot be specified a priori. Competition and distributional conflict persist. Unlike in military security politics, the resources that produce power capabilities have become more complex. Power is the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do. But there are always differences between initial resource power and ultimate power over outcomes.

¹ changing people’s choices of alternatives *independently of their calculations about the strategies of other players*. People who are persuaded, in my sense of the word, change their minds for reasons other than a recalculation of advantageous choices in light of new information about others’ behavior. They may do so because they change their preferences about the underlying attributes. They may consider new attributes during processes of choice. Or they may alter their conceptions of how attributes are linked to alternatives.

Unlike bargaining on the basis of specific reciprocity, persuasion must appeal to norms, principles, and values that are shared by participants in a conversation.

International regimes (Ireg) help to provide the political framework within which international economic processes occur. Four explanations for regime change exist:

1) economic processes

- Technological change and increases in economic ID will make existing Iregs obsolete
- Governments will be highly responsive to domestic political demands for a rising standard of living
- Great aggregate economic benefit resulting from international movement of capital, goods and labor will give governments strong incentives to modify or reconstruct Iregs to restore their effectiveness.

2) overall power structure

The distribution of military power determines the power structure, and the powerful states make the rules. Therefore, as the power of states changes (i.e. a structural change), the rules that comprise Iregs will change accordingly. This explanation does not differentiate among issue areas, and predicts a strong tendency toward congruence of outcomes among issue areas. Since power is fungible, it will be shifted to secure equal marginal returns in all areas. This explanation thus claims to understand changes in international economic relations by shifts in military power. While it explains structure, it fails to explain changes in the structure. The explanation fails to account for domestic politics and complications introduced by multiple channels of access and to differentiate issue areas.

3) *Issue Area Power Structure*

A state most powerful in the issue area will dictate the rules of the issue area. Three limitations exist in structural explanations:

- 1) If issue linkages are possible, the explanatory power of issue-area structural explanation is reduced.
- 2) They ignore domestic and transnational political actors.
- 3) The process of political bargaining and of translation of power is ignored.

An IO Model:

International organization refers to multilevel linkages, norms and institutions. Because these things are hard to change, even governments with superior capabilities will find it difficult to impose their will on established international organizations. IOs also give rise to organizationally dependent capabilities — such as voting power, ability to form coalitions and control of elite networks. In general, this explanation focuses more on the political processes. The model assumes that actors do not try to destroy the regime by attempting to exploit one another's vulnerability ID. These four different explanations are combined to explain changes in regimes—starting with the economic process explanation, adding general politics through structural explanations and refining with process-based international organization explanation.