

Chapter 1

Intergovernmental Organisations and Their Role in Security Sector Reform

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Introduction

This article examines the role of intergovernmental organisations¹ in security sector reform (SSR), a relatively new approach to thinking about security characterised by its comprehensive and integrated understanding of security and development.

This is an important issue for several reasons. As a subject of recent genesis, relatively little is known about SSR outside specialist circles, in particular from a comparative institutional perspective.² Intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) play, however, a crucial role in SSR. In virtually all recent and current SSR programme delivery, IGOs have either led the SSR effort or supported the lead provided by other actors. How this role is played is of vital importance for the prospects of fostering durable security and development in a wide range of countries. SSR programmes are currently underway in countries in a post-conflict phase (e.g., Liberia), those undergoing a post-communist transition (Ukraine), those that are being newly constituted (Kosovo) and those in conflict (Iraq). At the same time, IGOs have played a leading role in developing norms for SSR. As we shall see, some organisations are involved in both programme implementation and norm development, whereas others are involved in one but not the other. There is a growing realisation that the connection between the state of a country's security sector and its prospects for fostering sustainable social development and prosperity is relevant to all socio-economic contexts, including developed countries. Finally, the way that IGOs have become involved with SSR may be instructive of trends among such institutions in general.

The IGOs addressed in this volume are the following: the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Council of Europe (CoE), North Atlantic Treaty Organisa-

tion (NATO), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). They encompass a wide range of institutions, with different mandates, memberships and governance modalities. Their approaches to SSR vary significantly but they have in common an engagement in SSR or in SSR-related activities that may in time lead to fully-fledged SSR programmes. Other IGOs might have also been considered. For example, ECOWAS is the only organisation in the sample that 'receives' SSR programmes but there are other such recipient IGOs in Africa and elsewhere that are involved in SSR. However, we believe that this sample includes the most important IGOs in the SSR field and constitutes a representative grouping.

The article will proceed in the following way. The following section will review the role of IGOs in the contemporary environment and address the question of how IGOs adapt in response to changes in this environment, both in general and with respect to SSR in particular. Then, the profiles of the eight IGOs under study will be discussed. Finally, the chapter will analyse the implications for the IGOs of the relative novelty of the SSR concept and the challenges they face as they pursue their activities in this area.

IGOs in the Contemporary Environment³

Since their emergence in the nineteenth century, IGOs have greatly increased in number and influence. Now, with some 250 IGOs in existence,⁴ they are more numerous than states and are involved in every significant area of international discourse.

Originally, IGOs were principally seen as instruments through which the sovereign state sought to pursue national interests in the regional or international arena. States embraced the new IGOs as an environment of enhanced predictability for consultations with other states and as a ready meeting place. Such functions remain of utmost importance in the self-understanding of most IGOs and, indeed, of most of their member states. Increasingly, however, IGOs have also come to be seen as actors in their own right, much more than the sum of their parts, and as indispensable purveyors of policies that would go not go very far – perhaps, nowhere at all – without their engagement and sponsorship.

The strong points of IGOs are considerable. An IGO can give legitimacy to an undertaking that a state acting alone cannot. This is a quality most typically attributed to the UN but it is equally true of almost any other IGO. IGOs operate in a policy environment in which there are built-in

checks and balances that can restrain and discourage inappropriate behaviour on the part of members. They can furnish a policy framework in which all member states, regardless of their size and clout, have a seat at the table. IGOs can provide continuity through the disruption of electoral cycles and government reshuffles: IGOs tend to be around for the long term, whereas (democratic) governments (thankfully) do not. IGOs have a capacity for channelling resources from disparate sources and in the process reducing transaction costs.

Of course, there are several counterarguments. One is that the trend pointing to IGOs' growing importance is by no means linear. The number of IGOs apparently peaked in 1985 and has since declined, although the reasons for this are unclear.⁵ Second, several IGOs have found themselves in crisis as one or more of their members has engaged in aggressive criticism of the institution or withheld consensus on important decisions. The UN has had to contend with vigorous critiques of both its management and policies, from the US in particular. The OSCE has had to deal with efforts by the Russian Federation to reorder OSCE priorities and relativise its longstanding *acquis*. NATO and the EU have both had their internal functioning, as well as their relationship with one another, disrupted by members' infighting over the issue of Cyprus.⁶ There are many other examples. The realist school of international politics would additionally argue that IGOs are playthings of the powerful, to be used when they suit states' interests and to be ignored when they do not. The price in terms of legitimacy that the US has had to pay in Iraq owing to its failure to obtain a UN mandate for the invasion underlines, however, that states cannot ignore IGOs with impunity.

A further consideration is that the arguments in favour of IGOs are not clear-cut. While it is true that IGOs can confer legitimacy on, say, a peace support operation led by a member state, one can also submit that such legitimacy comes with a high price, that of decisions being held hostage to the lowest common denominator politics that tend to typify IGO consultations. As for IGO checks and balances, these tend to work imperfectly: one need only think of how often it occurs that a member state conceals its intentions – for example, a plan to invade a non-member state – from fellow member states, even as that intention is being acted upon. The point about equal opportunity for all members also requires qualification. In some IGOs, some states, mainly the biggest and most powerful among them, tend to call the shots. The reverse argument can also be made, namely, that IGO membership can bestow on small states an influence well out of proportion to their population or GDP, or inflate the importance of what may sometimes be national 'niche' causes. Finally, as for financing, many IGOs face continual

and chronic funding challenges. Often, an individual member's budget for a particular activity can dwarf that of an IGO operating in the same area. In 2004, for example, US spending in Iraq is estimated to have equalled total UN spending for all seventeen of its ongoing operations.⁷

Beyond this, IGOs tend to display serious deficits in the area of governance. They suffer from a lack of transparency, as anyone will know who has ever tried to track down detailed information on, for example, the varying costs of peace support operations. In addition, IGOs tend to be only indirectly accountable to the constituencies they are supposed to serve. This can limit their inclination to exercise internal oversight over fellow members' activities and encourage mistrust of their operations by the public.

An assessment of the relative pros and cons of states and the IGOs they form yields four overriding impressions. First, IGOs suffer from imperfect governance, as do states. The latter tend to have better tools for dealing with their imperfections – in particular, in democratic states, regularly occurring elections – but in a globalising world their governance challenges are no less daunting. For the time being, however, states would appear to have the edge on IGOs in the governance department. Second, although IGOs do not exactly mirror what goes on in the life of their member states, their performance can clearly be affected if a key member is experiencing strategic shock or going through a revanchist phase, buoyed up by windfall resource profits. Third, IGOs can overcome counter-currents on the state level through enlightened leadership on the international level, however difficult this may be to secure. Fourth and most importantly, states and IGOs are joined-at-the-hip allies in today's globalising environment. IGOs need committed, enlightened member states to ensure that their agendas remain relevant and their activities effective. None of today's states are, in turn, strong enough not to need the support of IGOs in order to pursue their individual agendas effectively.

IGOs are sometimes criticised for being stuck in their ways, and there is more than a little truth in this. However, the period since the end of the Cold War is replete with examples of IGOs undertaking major changes. Some IGOs have created new agencies to deal with new problems. For example, the WB has created the World Bank Institute as its capacity-development arm, and NATO has established such institutions as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and later the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council to provide a framework for consultations with new partners and prospective members. The Council of Europe, for its part, developed in the early 1990s a new leitmotif – democratic security – that has identified democratic governance as a precondition for the population's security in the post-

communist societies of Eastern Europe. Some IGOs have taken on new functions from other organisations. For example, the EU has assumed many of the defence functions that were once the province of the Western European Union, and the Africa Union has succeeded the Organisation of African Unity, declaring in its founding document a greater attachment to governance and security issues than that entertained by its predecessor. Other organisations have reoriented their main focus: ECOWAS, for example, has evolved from being an organisation with a mandate to foster economic cooperation among West African states to one with important regional security responsibilities. The OECD, as almost all of these institutions, has taken on new members provided that they commit themselves to its principles and meet its conditions for membership. In the UN framework, the 1990s saw greater emphasis on the role of regional organisations, particularly in connection with the issues addressed in the Brahimi Report.⁸ At the same time, the IGOs under study here have sought to restructure their interrelationships and develop new paradigms of interaction with one another. The emergence of SSR is a manifestation of these processes of internal transformation and external adaptation, as we shall see in the following section.

IGO approaches to SSR

Until very recently, all the IGOs under study here were engaged in SSR-related activities but did not recognise these as such, let alone have an overall concept for SSR. Moreover, activities that under an SSR approach would have been connected programmatically to one another were pursued in isolation. This characterisation has been overtaken by events as some IGOs have begun to embrace an SSR agenda. This is the case of the OECD, the EU and, most recently, the UN. Others have not yet begun to move towards the development of an overall approach to SSR but this seems likely to happen in time.

In the following sections, we examine the SSR profiles of the IGOs under study here and their key characteristics. In very general terms, the IGOs can be classified in two broad groups depending on their core functions and the factors that have moved them in the direction of SSR. One group consists of the IGOs whose main focus is on development; the other consists of the IGOs whose main focus is on security. But as we shall see, there are also IGOs that are involved in both areas.

The development IGOs started to assume a greater interest in security issues in the mid- to late 1990s when they realised that their development

work, in particular in conflict and post-conflict countries, could not be successful in an insecure environment. As for the security IGOs, the catalyst for their involvement in SSR has also been their experience in conflict and post-conflict theatres, starting with Bosnia-Herzegovina in the mid-1990s and continuing in Kosovo and Sierra Leone towards the end of the decade. Involvement in post-conflict reconstruction made clear to many actors in both of these groupings that they needed to take a comprehensive approach to reconstruction if conflict countries were to be stabilised and a return to conflict prevented. Reform of the security sector so that it could carry out its functions professionally and effectively, as well as on behalf of the population, thus came to be seen as a central component of reconstruction in both the development and security communities.

If the post-conflict environment was a defining experience for both development and security actors in terms of SSR, it was not the only one. Several of the IGOs under study here also became concerned about the state of security sector efficiency and governance in post-communist partner countries as they contemplated the prospects for institutional enlargement and developed intricate cooperation programmes both for potential members and for other non-member states. As a result, democratic security sector governance began to assume a central role in conditionality for partnership and membership for institutions such as the EU, NATO and the Council of Europe. Finally, the rise in concern about strategic terrorism after 9/11 has also left its mark on IGO approaches to security and their understanding of how it relates to development, as well as underscoring the need for taking a broad and integrated approach to the security sector, both conceptually and in the field. At the same time, the anti-terrorist campaigns of several countries have focused on building capacity for the security sector to the detriment of efforts to ensure that oversight mechanisms are robust enough to guard against governmental abuse.

The involvement of the IGOs under study in this chapter differs as a function of several factors. Table 1.1 offers a notional typology of IGO engagement in SSR that considers how they differ by thematic approach, geographic focus, the instruments that they use and the country contexts where they tend to be active. Some of the IGOS under study in this volume – in particular, the EU and the UN – are potentially ‘complete’ organisations for SSR as their profiles incorporate all components in the table. As we shall see, however, there are limitations to the roles they currently play in SSR. The remainder of this section gives a brief profile of each organisation. It concludes with Table 1.2, which provides an overview of the different activities in which the IGOS are involved.

Table 1.1 Typology of IGO Engagement in SSR⁹

| | | | |
|---------------------------------|--|--------------|--------------|
| <i>Thematic approach</i> | Development | Security | Governance |
| <i>Geographic focus</i> | Global | Regional | Sub-regional |
| <i>Instruments</i> | Policy advice, technical assistance, programme implementation | Norm-setting | All of these |
| <i>Country contexts</i> | Developing | Transition | Developed |
| | <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;">Post-conflict</div> | | |

OECD DAC

The OECD was established in 1961 as the successor organisation to the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, with a mandate to support democracy and the market economy. It conducts research, compiles statistics and develops policy guidelines and norms with a view to coordinating policies and identifying good practice.

The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (OECD DAC) comprises the twenty-two major bilateral development donors in this area, as well as the European Commission. A subsidiary committee of the DAC is the Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC), which brings together conflict prevention and peace-building experts from bilateral and multilateral development agencies, including from the UN system, EC, IMF and WB.

As part of their work on poverty reduction and enhancing aid effectiveness, donors became increasingly involved during the 1990s in conflict and post-conflict recovery. The OECD DAC assumed an increasingly important role as a forum for discussion on the interface between development and security, and later for the elaboration of best practices for donor activity in the area of SSR. This culminated in 2004 in a document entitled DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance. This articulated what has become a widely used definition of the security sector (in the OECD discourse, the ‘security system’):

...core security actors (e.g. armed forces, police, gendarmerie, border guards, customs and immigration, and intelligence and security services); security management and oversight bodies (e.g. ministries of defence and internal affairs, financial management bodies and public complaints commissions); justice and law enforcement institutions (e.g. the judiciary, prisons, prosecution services, traditional justice systems); and non-statutory security forces (e.g. private security companies, guerrilla armies and private militia).¹⁰

The guidelines provided the basis for the development of the *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*, which provides guidance on operationalising these guidelines in policy-making and programming.

The EU

The EU’s role in SSR has evolved along several tracks. The first is reflected in the EU’s status as the world’s most important development donor. In this capacity, the EU has been guided by concerns similar to those of other IGOs active in the development area. The other track has been the EU’s emergence as a global security player, with the development of its Common Foreign and Security Policy as of the mid-1990s and its engagement in several peace support missions. Here, its trajectory has been similar to IGOs involved in the security field. At the same time, EU thinking has also been shaped by the state of security sector governance in partner and potential member countries, a factor that is subsumed in the Copenhagen criteria for future membership elaborated in 1993.¹¹

The EU emerged as a key player in SSR only in the first part of the current decade. In 2003, the EU elaborated its first-ever European Security Strategy, which stresses the need for the EU to consider a wider spectrum of missions, including undertaking SSR as part of its institution-building

activities.¹² Then in 2005-2006, the EU Council and Commission adopted their respective SSR concepts. These affirm the EU role in SSR and specify various ways in which the EU can contribute to its implementation. In both concepts, the EU uses the OECD's broad definition of the security sector and its main SSR principles. In 2006, the EU also adopted an overarching EU framework for SSR. This document is designed to bring the SSR work of the Commission and the Council together by setting out the respective responsibilities of the two pillars as well as the modalities for joint action.¹³

The UN

The UN, as in the case of the EU, has traditionally been involved in activities in both the security and development fields, but it is only recently that an effort has been made to build effective links between them. On the development side, the key actor is the UN Development Programme (UNDP), which has SSR-related programmes in developing and transition countries in such areas as crisis prevention and recovery, democratic governance and poverty reduction. On the security side, the key actor is the UN Department of Peacekeeping and Operations (UNDPKO), which has the lead role in peacekeeping and peace support operations. UNDPKO only becomes operational in a country when it finds itself in a conflict or post-conflict situation. UNDP, on the other hand, tends to have a long-term presence in the country. Its programmes can be operational both prior to and after conflict. The fact that the two organisations often find themselves working in one and the same peace-building context can give rise to issues of coordination and programme coherence.

The UN took its first steps towards SSR when it began to realise that there had to be greater policy coherence between its development and security activities, and better coordination of the main departments working in these areas. In 2006, the secretary-general created the Working Group on Security Sector Reform with representatives of both UNDPKO and UNDP. That same year, Slovakia, with a view to having the UN Security Council (UNSC) presidency in 2007, organised the first two in a series of three workshops designed to prepare the way for a discussion of SSR at the level of the UN Security Council.¹⁴ Held in February 2007, the UNSC debate has set the stage for the Secretary-General to produce a report on SSR by the end of 2007.¹⁵ This may have an impact on the organisational structure of the secretariat and could lead to the UN developing its own SSR concept. The Slovak initiative is being complemented by a Canadian government-

sponsored study that focuses on the UN's approach to SSR in post-conflict peacebuilding.¹⁶

OSCE

Originally established as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1975, the OSCE acquired IGO status in 1995. In pursuit of its mission of ensuring peace and security in Europe, the OSCE has adopted a comprehensive approach which combines the politico-military, economic and environmental, and human dimensions of security.

The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (1994), adopted as a 'politically binding' instrument, is the main OSCE statement on SSR and for roughly a decade represented the most forward-looking and comprehensive document of its kind. It calls for the democratic control not only of the military but also paramilitary, internal security forces and intelligence services, as well as of the police. It links the behaviour of security actors within a country to its external security relationships and considers their effective oversight and democratic control to be an indispensable element of stability and security.

Recently, some OSCE members have expressed an interest in updating the code to take into account the evolution of thinking in the area of SSR. Some members prefer to focus on enhancing implementation of the existing code. Others appear to have lost interest in the code altogether.¹⁷

*CoE*¹⁸

The CoE was founded in 1949 to promote the development of common democratic principles throughout Europe. Thus, in contrast with the other IGOs under review here, the CoE's approach to SSR has been conditioned not mainly by a development or security vocation, but exclusively by governance concerns. In particular, the CoE's focus on human rights and the rule of law, as well as the need for governmental accountability in these regards, has moved it in the direction of SSR. As in the case of other IGOs under study here, the changes occurring in the international environment in the 1990s also encouraged it to venture into the area of security, which had traditionally been off-limits for this organisation. In 1993, it coined the expression *democratic security* to underscore that without democracy, there could be no security. This message was inspired by the situation of post-communist countries in the queue for CoE membership.

The CoE role in SSR encompasses several areas. First, through its various programmes designed to strengthen capacity in the areas of accountability, human rights and law, it helps prepare states for EU membership. Second, it carries out investigations, such as the recent enquiry into European states' involvement in alleged secret detentions of individuals arrested as terrorists and the rendition flights used to remove them from certain jurisdictions. Third, it has a policy advisory role; for example, after Montenegro recently applied for membership, the CoE advised it on its constitution, including the clauses related to the security roles and responsibilities of the different parts of government. Fourth, the CoE also carries out training activities for police officers to sensitise them to their legal rights and responsibilities. Fifth, the CoE is an important setter of standards for the security sector.

In 1999, the CoE Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) passed a resolution on oversight of the intelligence sector.¹⁹ In 2001, PACE passed its Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the European Code of Police Ethics, which sets out the rules of behaviour for police and law enforcement bodies in accordance with the principles of democratic governance.²⁰ There have also been resolutions on the human rights of armed forces personnel and conscientious objectors, and guidelines on protecting human rights in the fight against terror. The Council's most important norm-setting exercise came in 2005 with the recommendation of its parliamentary assembly on the 'Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector in Member States'.²¹

The CoE is also a watch guard for the accountability of its member states' security practices. For example, when Serbia recently applied to be readmitted as a member, the accountability of Serbia's security sector to the government and the population was a crucial concern.²² In addition, the Council's European Court of Human Rights has been instrumental in dispensing justice in several cases of human rights abuses at the hands of security sector personnel where national courts would not become involved or where options for appealing their decisions were exhausted, as has occurred not only in cases involving people from Turkey and Chechnya, but also in cases where Western European members of the CoE were implicated.²³

NATO

Formed in 1949 as a defence alliance, NATO's mandate has expanded to include a wide range of security-related activities. This process has not been without controversy. Some of its members consider that NATO should remain focused on the collective defence of its members, rather than be distracted by broader security issues, particularly those where such countries hold that the EU must take the lead or be exclusively involved. Notwithstanding this, NATO has several SSR-relevant experiences that could point in the direction of a more expansive SSR role in the future.

First, NATO has a long involvement as an instigator and facilitator of defence reform in its member states. In fact, it has presided over several generations of defence reform, and as such it is the multilateral leader in this area.²⁴ Second, NATO has made democratic governance of the security sector and the ability to contribute to the alliance's capacities central concerns of its approaches to enlargement, *inter alia* in its 1995 Study on Enlargement.²⁵ This is also a central feature of its Membership Action Plans for the next generation of members, for the time restricted to states from the Western Balkans. Third, NATO has become involved in the reform of armed forces other than the military in countries such as Ukraine, where the situation on the ground and concerns about the impact of security actors in addition to the military – for example, paramilitary forces, intelligence services and border guards – on the prospects of Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration are high on the agenda.²⁶ Fourth, NATO has recently developed a series of programmes designed to strengthen the effectiveness and accountability of institutions concerned with defence. Programmes such as Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB) have invariably also ended up addressing dimensions of the security sector beyond defence and the military.²⁷ The same is true of NATO programmes addressing the need to build assets for fighting terrorism. Such activities, however, tend to privilege capacity building and to lack a governance component.

Beyond this, there is the impact on NATO's SSR stance of its experiences in peace support operations. A major preoccupation of current defence reform efforts is to try to ensure the necessary capacity for the various peace support operations in which NATO is involved.²⁸ But NATO has also seen that its role as a security provider and contributor to post-conflict reconstruction is contingent on factors and actors other than those normally associated with the military. This has become abundantly clear in Afghanistan, for example, where police and gendarmerie assets at the country's disposal have been insufficient to provide the necessary support to

its military operations; NATO has only recently begun to understand that reconstruction efforts – in the security sector and more broadly – are essential for the success of its mission there.

ECOWAS

Because of West Africa's status as one of the poorest regions of the world, ECOWAS is a unique case among the IGOs under study here; rather than providing programmatic and technical support for SSR, the fifteen states that comprise this IGO are themselves often the recipients of SSR.

ECOWAS was founded in 1975 primarily as a body for encouraging economic integration and development of its members' economies and societies. In the late 1970s and 1980s, security issues also began to appear on the ECOWAS agenda. Two important defence protocols were adopted in 1978 and 1981, which called for mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs and the establishment of a regional mechanism for mutual assistance in defence matters. A succession of internecine conflicts with sub-regional ramifications in the second half of the 1980s led to members giving ECOWAS a stronger security role. A non-aggression pact was agreed between them, entering into force in September 1986. In 1991, members passed a declaration of political principles, committing themselves to upholding democracy and the rule of law. By virtue of these documents, ECOWAS has distinguished itself from other regional organisations in that it has placed equal emphasis on external and internal threats to security, and has made it possible for members to intervene in other members' internal affairs when their security is imperilled.

These provisions assumed great operational importance after the end of the Cold War and the accompanying upsurge in armed conflict in the region. To address such threats, ECOWAS established the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as a multinational peacekeeping/peace enforcement force, the first such group to be established by a regional body. ECOMOG has been deployed to deal with contingencies in Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire. In 1999, the experience of regional security cooperation was consolidated when ECOWAS heads of state signed a protocol establishing the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.

In addition to participating in peace support missions and training participants for such deployments, ECOWAS has been involved in a series of other activities of relevance to the security sector. It has developed a certain expertise in the area of small arms and light weapons (SALW)

disposal. The ECOWAS Regional Parliament has been gradually building its capacity to monitor national security sectors. ECOWAS has an emerging role in the area of judicial oversight and human rights monitoring, and it has sponsored programmes designed to build security expertise on the part of regional civil society bodies. In 2006, ECOWAS Chiefs of Staff agreed on a regional Code of Conduct for Armed Forces, a norm- and standard-setting exercise that takes its inspiration from the OSCE Code of Conduct but sets different accents and in certain respects goes further.

*WB and IMF*²⁹

The WB and IMF were established in the framework of the 1944 Bretton Woods conference. The WB has tended to look at the social, economic and institutional drivers of development, whereas the IMF has concentrated on fiscal and monetary aspects. The attitude of both these IGOs toward security issues has tended to be extremely cautious. During the Cold War, neither was much involved in this area. As the Cold War faded, they developed an interest in the levels of military spending in the states to which they offered loans, and/or whose economic performance they monitored. Their scrutiny of this issue was imbalanced, however, as they tended to look only at spending levels for the defence sector and not at other components of the security sector.

The argument against taking a broader and more intrusive view has been based on an interpretation of the WB and IMF statutes that prevents them from overtly intervening in political affairs of the states where they are active. In the 1990s, however, pressures started building for change. Like other IGOs focused on development, they started making priorities of poverty reduction and good governance. They also found their activities increasingly targeted on conflict and post-conflict countries. This encouraged the WB to extend its lending and advisory activities to such issues as demining and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants.

Constraints on the two bodies becoming involved in SSR activities that do not qualify for official development assistance remain strong. However, pressures have been growing for the two institutions to review their approaches. One such pressure is manifest in the preparedness of members of the donor community to press for a more generous understanding of what can be included as official development assistance, or in the jargon, what is ODA-ble.³⁰ Beyond that, the two organisations are under pressure to put their considerable technical expertise to use in a more

holistic way – one which focuses on the interdependence of budgetary, fiscal and economic issues with security concerns.

Comparing SSR-Relevant IGOs

Table 1.2 (p. 18) addresses the general role of the IGOs with respect to SSR, the geographical scope of this role and the country contexts where the IGOs are active.

Given the diversity in their profiles, IGOs have varied widely in their approach to carrying out SSR field activities. Table 1.3 (p. 19) gives an overview of the different programme areas where the IGOs are active.

Conclusions

The different avenues by which the IGOs under study here have come to SSR and the relative novelty of the concept have several implications.

First, there is a great deal of diversity in the approaches of the IGOs to SSR. For example, while SSR, meaning security sector reform, is the most generally used term, the OECD uses the term ‘security system reform’ and UNDP ‘justice and security sector reform’. These terms reflect the specific concerns of individual organisations: the OECD uses ‘system’ instead of ‘sector’ to de-emphasise the military connotations of the latter, while the UNDP uses the term ‘justice’ to underline that the process is as much about justice as it is about security and to avoid any notion of justice being securitised. These different terminologies point to significant differences in IGO approaches to SSR that can have repercussions for the way they work together in the field. Diversity can also be found within institutions. As we have seen, the origins of SSR in the work of the EU Council and the EU Commission are quite different. The former has become involved in SSR mainly through its ESDP activities. The Commission’s experience in the area of SSR has primarily developed out of its activities in the area of development. Similarly, the leading UN agencies involved in SSR, UNDPKO and UNDP, also entertain different perspectives on SSR by virtue of their different functions.

Second, there is a great deal of unevenness and fragmentation in the design and delivery of SSR programmes. None of the IGOs under

Table 1.2 IGO SSR Profiles³¹

| Name of IGO | SSR Focus | Geographical Scope | Country Contexts |
|--------------------------|--|---|--|
| OECD DAC | Norm and policy development | Global | Developing, transition, post-conflict |
| EU | Capacity-building and technical assistance Norm development | Global | Developing, transition, post-conflict; developed through members' ESDP activities |
| UN & agencies | Capacity-building & technical assistance | Global | Developing, transition, post-conflict |
| OSCE | Capacity-building and technical assistance Norm development | Regional/ Euro-Atlantic & Euro-Asian | Developing, transition, post-conflict; developed countries as concerns norm development and implementation |
| Council of Europe | Capacity-building and technical assistance Norm development | Regional/ Europe | Transition, post-conflict; developed countries as concerns norm development and implementation |
| NATO | Capacity-building and technical assistance Norm development | Regional/ Euro-Atlantic | Developing, transition, post-conflict; developed countries as concerns defence reform |
| ECOWAS | Norm development | Regional/ West Africa | Developing, post-conflict |
| WB | Capacity-building & technical assistance | Global | Developing, transition, post-conflict |
| IMF | Technical assistance | Global | Developing, transition, post-conflict |

Table 1.3 SSR Field Activities³²
(bold ticks indicate main activity)

| | <i>EU</i> | <i>UN</i> | <i>OSCE</i> | <i>CoE</i> | <i>NATO</i> | <i>ECOWAS</i> | <i>WB</i> |
|---|-----------|-----------|-------------|------------|-------------|---------------|-----------|
| Special Post-Conflict Programmes ³³ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Gender & Security | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Civil Society & Media Capacity Building | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Regulation of Private Security Companies | | | ✓ | | | | |
| Judicial & Legal Reform | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | | ✓ |
| Police Reform | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |
| Border Service Reform | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Intelligence Reform | | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| Defence Reform | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | | |
| Good Governance ³⁴ of the Security Sector | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

examination here has the necessary expertise to be able to deal with all the components of the security sector. They tend to focus on some but not all of the security forces, or may only be concerned with the oversight functions of certain bodies, say the parliament, while ignoring those of the judiciary and civil society institutions.

Third, the IGOs do generally not see themselves as being part of the security sector. But it is clear that they are, especially when one considers that IGOs perform many of the functions of government as in a post-conflict environment such as Kosovo. Organisations such as the EU and NATO are also key players in the security sectors of their member states.

Fourth, IGOs may lack the necessary policy tools to implement SSR effectively. As we have seen, only two institutions – the OECD and the EU – have as yet SSR concepts, an indispensable tool for orienting an institution's SSR activities. In addition, only one institution – the OECD – has developed SSR policy guidelines taking into consideration how SSR has been approached in different country and regional environments; this work is, however, restricted to post-conflict settings. Furthermore, little effort has been made so far to catalogue norms applicable to SSR, a shortcoming that the following chapter may help correct.

Fifth, the novelty of SSR also tends to mean that material, administrative and personnel resources for SSR are underdeveloped. Part of the problem is finding the necessary capacity; for example, there is a shortage of personnel trained for designing and delivering SSR programmes, which can require hard-to-find skill sets, multi-disciplinary work experience and new kinds of managerial, sector and country expertise. This can be an important constraint on the further development of the IGO SSR agenda.

A sixth and related problem is that available resources are not always organised in such a way as to give effective support to SSR activities in the field. For example, financial instruments may be unconnected or 'unconnectable', thereby discouraging a holistic approach to programming. Moreover, the cross-cutting nature of SSR programmes often conflicts with the reflex to compartmentalise that is apparent in most institutions. This problem is highlighted when a SSR programme requires cross-departmental efforts.

Seventh, the lack of common points of reference within and across institutions complicates communication and cooperation in IGO activity. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that, until recently, intergovernmental organisations focussing on SSR had little contact with one another, despite the fact that in the 1990s they found themselves increasingly involved in the same countries and regions. Similarly, they have been slow to develop a culture of cooperation with other entities engaged in SSR, such

as national governments and non-governmental actors. This is a crucial point because both these types of actors are often involved in implementing SSR programmes alongside IGOs.

Perhaps the most important challenge concerns governance. IGO mechanisms to ensure that their activities are carried out in a transparent and accountable manner are underdeveloped and in general suffer from the fact that oversight is weak or only indirectly exercised by member states. This is a particular problem for IGOs delivering SSR programmes in countries that are not members, where concerns as to the motivations driving programmes can easily arise. In post-conflict countries, where IGOs and other actors may temporarily have to supplant the functions of a local government because local elites are discredited, decimated or otherwise in disarray and incapable of playing their role, this problem can be particularly acute. IGOs thus face challenging issues of legitimacy and credibility in their SSR activities. We will return to these issues in the concluding chapter.

Notes

- 1 Authors disagree in their understanding of the key criteria determining whether an entity is an intergovernmental organisation. A representative definition would be the following: intergovernmental organisations are permanent bodies that states create to address matters entrusted to them and which result from international agreement among states. See Clive Archer, *International Organizations* (London: Routledge, 2001), 31-36. International organisations also include international non-governmental organisations, defined by the UN Economic and Social Council as any international organisation not created by means of an intergovernmental agreement.
- 2 Since its founding in 2001, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) has produced a significant body of research and policy documents on security sector reform and governance. See, in particular, the four previous Yearly Books in this series as well as a variety of other articles. This material is available on the DCAF website at <http://www.dcaf.ch>.
- 3 For background on this section, the following books on IGOs have been consulted: Archer, *International Organizations*; John-ren Chen, ed., *The Role of International Institutions in Globalisation: Challenges of Reform* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003); Jean-Marc Coicaud and Veijo Heiskanen, eds., *The Legitimacy of International Organizations* (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001); K. J. Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).
- 4 Union of International Associations, *Yearbook of International Organisations 2006-2007* (Munich: K. G. Sauer, 2006).
- 5 Archer proposes that the steady drop in the number of IGOs may be due to '...the poverty of many states and the increased unwillingness of the richer states to finance the IGOs',

- International Organizations*, 25. The current number of IGOs is placed at 244 (Union of International Associations).
- 6 Staff-to-staff meetings between the EU and NATO take place under their Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2002, but this cooperation remains low-profile due to the ongoing dispute between the Republic of Cyprus (in the EU but not in NATO) and Turkey (in NATO but not in the EU) over the status of Northern Cyprus (in neither).
 - 7 James Dobbins et. al., *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: from the Congo to Iraq* (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2005).
 - 8 United Nations, Brahimi Report, 'Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations', Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (21 August 2000).
 - 9 An earlier version of this table appeared in David Law, *Intergovernmental Approaches to Security Sector Reform (SSR)*, Background paper for the workshop on 'Developing a SSR Concept for the United Nations', Bratislava, 7 July 2006 (Geneva: DCAF, 2006).
 - 10 OECD, 'The OECD DAC Handbook on SSR: Supporting Security and Justice' (Paris: OECD, 2007), available at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/if-ssr>.
 - 11 European Commission, 'Enlargement – Accession criteria', European Commission, accessed 4 September 2007 at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accesion_process/criteria/index_en.htm.
 - 12 European Union, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy', (Brussels, 12 December 2003). The strategy addresses key threats and ways to address them, as well as discusses policy implications for Europe.
 - 13 For more on the EU role in SSR, see David Law and Oksana Myshlovska, 'The Evolution of the Concepts of Security Sector Reform and Security Sector Governance: the EU perspective', in *The European Union and Security Sector Reform*, eds. Philipp H. Fluri and David Spence (Biggleswade, UK: John Harper Publishing, forthcoming).
 - 14 For more information on these three workshops, see their event profiles at DCAF, 'UN Security Council and Security Sector Reform: A DCAF Project', http://www.dcaf.ch/unssr/_events.cfm?navsub1=30&navsub2=2&nav1=3.
 - 15 See UNSC, 'Security Sector Reform In Post-Conflict States Critical To Consolidating Peace: Report Needed Aimed At Improving Un Effectiveness, Security Council Says', UN Doc. SC/8958 (20 February 2007); UNSC, 'Statement by the President of the Security Council', UN Doc. S/PRST/2007/3* (21 February 2007).
 - 16 The complete results of this study will appear in the forthcoming DCAF publication, *The Role of UN Integrated Missions in Security Sector/System Reform (SSR): Review and Recommendations*.
 - 17 For an article on the relationship between the code and SSR, see David Law, 'Security Sector Reform and the Future of the Code of Conduct', *Helsinki Monitor* 17, no. 2 (2006): 160-174.
 - 18 More detail is provided on the CoE than on other IGOs as no chapter in this volume has been exclusively devoted to it.
 - 19 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 'Control of internal security services in Council of Europe member states', Recommendation 1402 (1999).
 - 20 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 'Committee of Ministers draft recommendation on the European code of police ethics', Opinion No. 223 (14 March 2001).
 - 21 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 'Democratic oversight of the security sector in member states', Recommendation 1713 (2005).

- 22 See Council of Europe, 'Speech by Terry Davis, Secretary General of the Council of Europe to the Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro', Belgrade (6 April 2006); Council of Europe, 'Serbia and Montenegro: Compliance with obligations and commitments and implementation of the post-accession co-operation programme', SG/Inf(2005)16 final (11 October 2005).
- 23 For a list of all judgments rendered by the European Court of Human Rights since 1967, see 'Chronological List of Judgments and Decisions' (30 August 2007), available at <http://www.echr.coe.int>.
- 24 For an overview of NATO strengths and weaknesses in this area, see David Law, 'Security Sector Reform in the North Atlantic Area: unfinished business', in *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, eds. Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (Geneva: DCAF, 2004).
- 25 See NATO, 'Study on NATO Enlargement' (September 1995).
- 26 After the adoption of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine in 1997, NATO-Ukraine cooperation evolved from a narrow focus on defence and military reform to a broader one including such areas as economic aspects of defence, civil emergency planning, and science and environment. After 2004, NATO further expanded its reform agenda in Ukraine by emphasising the need to ensure a fair and free electoral process, to guarantee media freedoms and the rule of law, to strengthen civil society and the judiciary, to improve arms export controls and to allocate adequate financial resources for the implementation of planned defence and security sector reforms. See NATO, 'NATO-Ukraine Action Plan' (22 November 2002); NATO, 'NATO-Ukraine Target Plans for 2006 in the Framework of NATO-Ukraine Action Plan: Executive Summary' (no date), available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b060407e.pdf>.
- 27 DCAF, 'Defence Institution Building: Papers Presented at the Conference on the 2005 Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB)' (Lvak, 2005), available at <http://www.dcaf.ch>.
- 28 See NATO, 'Final Communiqué: Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session' (14 June 2007).
- 29 See Chapter 8 in this volume.
- 30 The OECD DAC, for example, has expanded the range of activities it considers as official development assistance. A 2005 directive lists six security-related activities that now qualify, and SSR figures among them. See OECD DAC, 'Conflict Prevention and Peace Building: What Counts as ODA?' (3 March 2005), available at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/32/34535173.pdf>.
- 31 This table is taken from David Law, *Intergovernmental Approaches to Security Sector Reform*.
- 32 The OECD has no field activities (although this may change as the organisation seeks to implement the best practices elaborated in *The OECD DAC Handbook on SSR: Supporting Security and Justice*). The IMF has no SSR-related field activities. They are therefore not included in this table.
- 33 These include demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR); mine action and reduction; and control of small arms and light weapons (SALW).
- 34 For our purposes, good governance of the security sectors includes three components: democratic oversight, accountability and transparency.